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ABSTRACT 
Donald J. Schepker 
Research on the dismissal of Chief Executive Officers has primarily examined how firm 
performance and executive power affect dismissal.  However, the process used to evaluate a 
CEO’s capabilities is complex, as a myriad of factors affect firm performance outside of the 
CEO’s control and the board often has minimal interaction with the CEO.  Instead, the board 
may be forced to examine external cues or signals th t help provide information regarding the 
CEO’s capabilities.  Analyzing 3,648 firm-year observations for likelihood of dismissal, this 
dissertation examines the role that CEO human and reputational capital play with regard to 
signaling the board regarding the CEO’s capabilities as well as the effects of the market for 
alternative CEO candidates on the likelihood of CEO dismissal.  Findings from probit regression 
analysis indicate that CEOs are less likely to be dismissed when they have greater tenure, a 
greater base salary, a less negative reputation in the media, and when there are fewer non-CEO 
inside directors serving on the board.  These results ggest that the board identifies some 
external cues when evaluating CEOs and evaluates visible nternal candidates in the decision to 
dismiss a CEO.  Building upon this line of research, the second chapter of this dissertation 
examines the career consequences of dismissal on the future job prospects of executives.  I argue 
that dismissal serves as a stigma on executive carers which reduces job future prospects.  
However, executives may use human, reputational, and social capital to buffer themselves from 
the effects of stigmatization.  Examining the re-employment prospects of 88 dismissed 
executives, results using Cox Proportional Hazards models indicate that executive job prospects 
at publicly traded organizations are lessened following dismissal for reasons of violation of 
fiduciary duty or personal conduct.  Alternatively, executive re-employment is more likely when 
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executives have experience with prestigious organizations, have a reputation for being a top 
CEO, have less negative publicity, and are located in a major city.  These results suggest that 
while dismissal may be stigmatizing, such effects can be overcome with acquired human, 
reputational, and social capital. 
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STUDY 1: THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL, REPUTATION, AND  THE MARKET 
FOR ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES IN THE DISMISSAL OF CHIE F EXECUTIVES 
Introduction 
Turnover of chief executive officers in organizations has long been studied, given the 
importance of top managers in firm strategic decision making (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & 
Baumrin, 1988).  While CEO turnover may occur for a variety of reasons (e.g. retirement, 
resignation for personal reasons), researchers have been intrigued by executive dismissal; that is, 
instances where the organization chooses to replace the CEO with another individual.  The 
decision to replace a CEO is one of the most important made by a firm’s board of directors 
(Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001).  Despite this importance, relatively few researchers have 
attempted to model the antecedents of executive dismissal (Hatfield, Worrell, Davidson III, & 
Bland, 1999) and the vast majority of work on dismisal has centered around the role that 
performance and power play in the process (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Hatfield et al., 1999; Huson et 
al., 2001; Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
 A number of prior studies have examined the question of why are CEOs dismissed.  
Research shows dismissal of chief executives may occur due to sociopsychological dynamics 
within the top management team, ritual scapegoating of executives for poor performance, or in 
an attempt to adapt an organization to changes in it environment (Shen & Cho, 2005).  
Additionally, performance alone only explains approximately 20 percent of variance in executive 
turnover (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).  However, more recent research has 
examined the opposite effect: why aren’t some CEOs fired.  Consistent with these findings, 
research has noted that ambiguity exists with respect to how much a CEO contributes to firm 
performance, which makes evaluation of the CEO difficult (Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972; 
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Pfeffer, 1977).  This ambiguity creates difficulty in evaluating managerial ability as 
organizational performance is affected by a myriad of factors, including factors at the 
organizational and industry level (Holmstrom, 1982).  In other words, poor performance may not 
be the result of a poor CEO, while good performance may be attributed to factors other than the 
CEO.  Compounding the problem, the board also has limited interaction with the CEO (Carter & 
Lorsch, 2004).  Board members rarely, if ever, directly observe and monitor the CEO’s 
performance on the job.  Instead, the board must evaluate the CEO’s capabilities based on the 
few meetings held per year and other, albeit extremely limited, interactions.  This lack of 
interaction only contributes further to the difficulty of evaluating the CEO.  This study seeks to 
add to the growing literature examining why boards choose not to dismiss some CEOs, even 
when scrutiny over firm performance may put pressure on the board to dismiss the CEO.   
Given the difficulty of CEO evaluation, the board may examine factors that serve as 
signals of an executive’s quality in addition to the firm’s performance.  When capabilities are 
uncertain and difficult to assess, it is more likely that evaluators will seek out third party signals 
to help in the evaluation process (Graffin & Ward, 2010; Podolny, 2005; Rindova, Williamson, 
Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Such external signals may assist evaluators in corroborating their 
beliefs regarding capabilities.  This study argues that a CEO’s human and reputational capital 
can provide a quality signal to the board of directors regarding the CEO’s capabilities, 
independent of firm performance, that reduces the likelihood of CEO dismissal.  CEOs with high 
levels of reputational capital have been endorsed by reputable third parties as having a certain 
level of quality in the position of CEO.  Under conditions of poor performance, these effects are 
expected to be further attenuated, as human and reputational capital may buffer an executive 
from dismissal, as such signals can help the board more positively evaluate a CEO even in the 
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face of poor performance.  When a CEO has significat human and reputational capital, boards 
should be less likely to dismiss the CEO, even in the face of poor performance, as there is a 
signal that the executive may be more likely than an alternative candidate with a lesser reputation 
nor lesser accumulated human capital to lead the firm to success in the future.   
A second and critical aspect of the decision whether to dismiss the CEO is whether 
alternative candidates exist and are available that could achieve superior performance beyond the 
current CEO for the firm.  Boards must assess not oly the current CEO’s capabilities, but the 
likelihood of improving performance if a new CEO were to be hired.  CEO dismissals are often 
extremely disruptive and costly (Wiersema, 2002).  Due to the costs associated with dismissal, 
firms should be wary of dismissing a CEO if an executive of higher quality cannot be acquired to 
replace the CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Alternatively, the board has a duty to dismiss even an 
adequate CEO if a higher quality candidate can be hired.  Thus, the board should assess the 
quality of both internal and external candidates that are available in the labor market for CEOs as 
part of the decision of whether to dismiss a current CEO.  Dismissing a CEO without a higher 
quality replacement available may only worsen firm performance due to the executive’s lack of 
capabilities or due to disruption associated with the CEO dismissal process (Wiersema, 2002).  
Thus, this study argues that the availability and the board’s perceived quality of potential 
replacements for the CEO position will also influenc  the board’s decision of whether to dismiss 
the CEO.  This relationship is expected to be stronger under conditions of poor firm 
performance, as the board seeks solutions in order to achieve future aspiration levels. 
This study makes several important contributions to the literature on CEO dismissal.  
First, this study builds upon the research examining why some CEOs are not dismissed and 
identifies that the qualities and capabilities of the executive may alter the likelihood that a CEO 
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will be dismissed, such that executives with higher levels of human and reputational capital will 
be less likely to be dismissed.  While past research has focused on the power executives have due 
to ownership or co-optation of a firm’s board, this study argues that influence can be wielded in a 
different, more subtle manner.  Second, this study argues that a board’s situational assessment of 
managerial performance may be altered based on the stock of human and reputational capital that 
the executive has built up, which may signal greater or lesser capabilities.  This is especially 
important when performance is poor, as these signals m y lead the firm to retain a CEO even 
under poor performance.  Third, this study examines th  role that the market for alternative CEO 
candidates can have on a firm’s decision to dismiss a CEO.  A board does not examine the CEO 
in a vacuum, but instead must determine whether a rpl cement candidate can achieve better 
performance than the current CEO.  Taken together, se evaluations can help the board 
determine whether dismissing a current CEO is a move that strategically positions the 
organization for better future success.  The arguments in this study indicate that replacing a CEO 
may occur regardless of performance if the firm believ s an alternative candidate can achieve 
superior returns.  Finally, prior research argues and often assumes that dismissal does not occur 
when performance is poor due to weak governance.  However, this study builds a theoretical 
model that argues that the board utilizes and evaluates information that provides signals 
regarding executive quality outside of performance that rationally leads the board to retain a 
CEO, even when performance may indicate dismissal i warranted.   
PAST RESEARCH ON CEO DISMISSAL 
 The decision to replace a firm’s CEO is one of the most critical decisions a board has to 
undertake (Huson et al., 2001), as top executive dismissals may lead to wide-spread changes in 
personnel and strategic direction.  Furthermore, not all successions are equally interesting from a 
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theoretical perspective; dismissal itself represents the most theoretically interesting form of 
executive succession, as the reasons for the executiv ’s removal are not always clear and extend 
beyond just merely responding to poor performance (Fr drickson et al., 1988).  Friedman and 
Singh (1989) noted that the removal of top managers, especially CEOs, is a unique form of 
turnover whose antecedents are different from those of other types of separation, including death 
(Worrell, Davidson III, Chandy, & Garrison, 1986) and mandatory retirement.  Dismissal 
represents a decision not undertaken by the executiv  him or herself, but involve group dynamics 
and decision making processes undertaken by the firm’s board of directors.  Forced CEO 
turnover has attracted growing attention in recent y ars as the process has been identified as a 
social and political process involving power struggles among executives, boards, shareholders, 
and other stakeholders with a vested interest in the firm. 
In recent years, the incidence of CEO dismissal has increased greatly (Huson et al., 
2001).  In a sample of firms from 1965-1974, Herman (1981) found only 20 firings in the largest 
200 nonfinancial firms in the United States.  However, in a study spanning more than 30 years, 
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that the frequency of forced turnover increased from 10.2 
percent of turnovers in the time period dating 1971-1976 to a high of 23.4 percent of turnovers 
over the period 1989-1994, with significant increases between 1976 and 1989 as well. These 
numbers indicate that chief executive dismissal has become even more increasingly common in 
recent years.  Despite the increased focus on executiv  dismissal, relatively little is known about 
its antecedents (Hatfield et al., 1999). 
Antecedents of CEO Dismissal 
 Early research on executive succession focuses primarily on executive turnover (e.g., 
Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Grusky, 1963); that is, any change in the top executive at an 
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organization.  Turnover may occur for a variety of reasons, including retirement, CEO death or 
other medical complications, dismissal of the CEO, or the CEO voluntarily leaving for a new 
position.  These studies examine the antecedents, primarily performance, that predict whether an 
executive would be replaced, voluntarily or involuntarily, after a period of time.  Dismissal, on 
the other hand, refers to the forced or involuntary replacement of an executive as an action taken 
by the board of directors (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Thus, turnover includes all cases of 
dismissal, but dismissal is only a subset of all executive turnovers. 
Early research on executive turnover and dismissal focuses primarily on the economic 
performance of a firm as the key antecedent.   Executive dismissal in the case of poor 
performance is expected in order to attempt to stimulate change in an organization (Barker, 
Patterson Jr, & Mueller, 2001) or to placate concered stakeholders (Boeker, 1992; Gamson & 
Scotch, 1964).  Overwhelming empirical evidence is consistent with the expectation that 
turnover will occur in poorly performing firms (Allen & Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Grusky, 
1963; James & Soref, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980; Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Warner, Watts, 
& Wruck, 1988).   
 While performance is an important antecedent of executive turnover and dismissal, 
performance alone explains only approximately 20 percent of variance in executive turnover 
according to one compilation of research on top executives (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  Numerous 
examples exist where CEOs have retained their jobs despite poor performance, while other 
examples highlight dismissed executives even when firms are performing well (Fredrickson et 
al., 1988).  Given this anecdotal evidence, researchers have begun examining other antecedents 
that may explain executive dismissal. 
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 In recent years, research has evolved to examine other dynamics that may affect a CEO’s 
dismissal, particularly focusing on the role board monitoring, governance, and power play in 
making this decision.  In order for the CEO to be dismissed, the executive must lack sufficient 
power to prevent his or her own dismissal.  Power in the context of executive dismissal has been 
primarily examined from three different perspectives: 1) Board power, 2) executive power, 3) 
third-party power.   
 The board of directors is ultimately charged with the decision of whether to remove a 
CEO from office (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  A number of esearchers examine whether boards 
with more power (e.g. outsider representation) are more likely to remove CEOs when firms 
perform poorly.  Board allegiances can be critical when determining whether a CEO will be 
removed from office (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Under conditions of poor performance, boards 
dominated by outsiders are more likely to dismiss a CEO than insider-dominated boards (Boeker, 
1992; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Hatfield et al., 1999). As the board gains power and has fewer 
allegiances to the CEO, the board is more able to exert its power to remove the CEO. 
 The CEO’s power can also play a significant role in whether the board can exert 
influence by removing the chief executive.  Finkelst in (1992) notes that top managers can 
develop power through four means: 1) structural power (e.g. duality), 2) ownership power, 3) 
expert power, and 4) prestige power.  To date, resea ch rs have primarily focused on structural 
and ownership power, with some focus on expert power through examination of the effects of 
executive tenure on CEO dismissal.  As CEOs gain structural power by holding multiple titles in 
an organization, they gain greater power and are able to dominate the board’s agenda (Harrison, 
Torres, & Kukalis, 1988; Ocasio, 1994).  CEO duality is thought to hamper board independence 
and promote managerial entrenchment (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  
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Consistent with expectations, previous research has found CEOs are less likely to be removed 
when the executive also serves as board chair (Goyal & P rk, 2002). 
CEOs also gain additional power by accumulating ownership stakes in the organization.  
As CEO ownership increases, the CEO is able to exercise greater voting rights, increasing the 
CEO’s ability to remain entrenched in the organization and reducing the board’s ability to 
remove the CEO.  Finally, CEOs also gain power through greater tenure in the organization.  
Tenure allows the CEO to develop greater knowledge that is firm-specific (Harris & Helfat, 
1997), while also nominating directors whose allegiance lies more with the CEO than with the 
firm (Boeker, 1992).  Research has found that CEOs with greater tenures and who have 
nominated more directors face lower probabilities of dismissal (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; 
Gregory-Smith, Thompson, & Wright, 2009; Harrison et al., 1988).  Each of these potential 
sources of power increases the executive’s ability to remain entrenched in the organization and 
reduces the independence of the board when attempting to evaluate the CEO’s ability. 
While these studies on board monitoring, CEO ownership, and executive power add 
considerably to our understanding of under what circumstances CEOs will be dismissed, these 
studies have almost exclusively been performed using agency theory and its assumptions.  Little 
research has examined other antecedents or used alternative theoretical viewpoints in order to 
understand decision making processes boards undertake when determining whether to dismiss 
the CEO. 
Despite this focus on agency theory, several new studies examine dismissal from an 
alternative context; specifically, the role that third parties play in framing a CEO’s performance.  
This line of research indicates that third parties also play a critical role in influencing whether 
dismissal will occur.  First, significant owners may influence the process, such that large 
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blockholders or institutional investors may be able to reduce the power of the CEO or limit the 
problems related to non-independent or weak boards.  Greater ownership power by such 
investors may enable them to discipline poorly performing CEOs (Koh, 2003).  Firms with more 
concentrated ownership, as well as with greater holdings by blockholders have been shown to 
have an increased likelihood to dismiss CEOs, especially when performance is poor (Boeker, 
1992; Gregory-Smith et al., 2009).  Second, independent third parties can play a large role in 
influencing how the board assesses a chief executive’s performance.  Specifically, media 
accounts expressing dismay over a CEO’s performance repeatedly, especially in high profile 
outlets, may pressure the board into making a change.  Additionally, investment analysts who 
alter company ratings may also change how the board evaluates an executive’s performance.  
Recent research provides evidence that analysts, independent arbiters of firm current and future 
performance, may compel a board to make a change by rating firms’ stock less favorably 
(Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). 
Research on the importance of power in executive dismissal is still in its early stages, but 
results clearly provide evidence that as executives gain power vis-à-vis the board of directors, the 
probability of dismissal decreases significantly.  However, if the board can maintain both power 
and independence from management, the board has the bility to remove the CEO from office.  
In cases where the board becomes co-opted, significa t owners and independent third parties 
may be able to step in and reduce the board’s ineffectiveness and facilitate the dismissal of the 
CEO. 
Reasons for CEO Dismissal 
 Evidence on the dismissal of key executives in organizations tells us that CEOs get fired 
for a variety of reasons.  The most common of these is that organizations dismiss executives 
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when performance of the firm is poor.  The behavioral theory of the firm (e.g., Cyert & March, 
1963; March & Simon, 1958) argues that as firm performance declines and firms fail to meet 
their aspiration levels, firms solve the problem through a search for alternatives.  One solution to 
the problem of poor performance is to dismiss the chi f executive and replace him or her with 
another candidate.  Thus, one of the primary drivers of dismissal is poor performance by the 
CEO’s firm. 
 While performance is a strong driver of dismissal, evidence suggests CEOs are dismissed 
for a variety of other reasons as well.  CEOs may be dismissed for personality reasons, strategic 
disagreements with the board of directors, or due to in-fighting with other top managers.  For 
example, Bob Nardelli was fired after five years at Home Depot in part because his personal 
style and demeanor came off as arrogant and he often alienated other executives of the firm.  
Similarly, Carly Fiorina was ousted as CEO of Hewlett-Packard after a number of disagreements 
about the firm’s strategic direction occurred with the board.  While the firm was not severely 
underperforming, Fiorina’s personal style and unwillingness to listen to the board of directors led 
to her ultimate dismissal. 
 While firm performance and interpersonal dynamics may both serve as reasons for 
dismissal of CEOs, the firm’s board of directors alo has a fiduciary duty to shareholders to 
consider when evaluating the CEO.  As such, it is the board’s job to replace a CEO even if the 
firm has achieved satisfactory returns for shareholders during the CEO’s tenure if another 
executive is available that can increase returns to shareholders.  Thus, if the board believes an 
available alternative candidate will achieve greater success for the organization, the board has a 
duty and responsibility to shareholders to dismiss the current CEO and hire the new candidate.  
For example, in 2003 the Detroit Pistons of the National Basketball Association dismissed head 
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coach Rick Carlisle, who had just won two straight divisional titles.  Carlisle’s performance 
certainly could not be considered sub-par, as only 6 teams claim a divisional title each year.  
However, the Pistons immediately turned around and hired Hall of Fame head coach Larry 
Brown as Carlisle’s replacement.  Brown represented a candidate with tremendous experience, 
bringing a resume that included championships in both the NBA as well as college basketball.  
The dismissal of Carlisle followed by the hiring of Brown represented a situation where the 
Pistons attempted to improve their franchise by hiring the best available candidate to coach their 
team, despite already having what appeared to be a capable executive as coach. 
Uncertainty in Assessment of Executive Performance 
 While CEOs may be dismissed for a variety of reasons, poor performance is often the 
catalyst for the dismissal of a CEO.  When firms perform poorly, the board of directors must 
make both a managerial and an environmental assessment as to why performance was below 
expectations (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  Managerial asses ment requires examining the effort and 
ability of the executive in place, while an environmental assessment requires examination of 
environmental effects, including competition and inustry effects.  According to Walsh and 
Seward (1990), decoupling ability and effort from managerial performance is difficult.  As such, 
prior to removing the CEO from office, the firm should alter the mix and arrangement of 
incentives and compensation offered to the CEO.  If per ormance persists as poor, the board 
must then replace the manager as he / she does not have he required ability to run the company.  
These arguments provide some logic as to why performance only explains a modest amount of 
variance in executive dismissal. 
 More importantly, however, these arguments call into question the notion that the 
evaluation of executive performance is simplistic.  Evaluation of the CEO is much more 
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complex, as there is ambiguity over how much the CEO actually contributes to firm performance 
(Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977).  Furthermore, attributions of 
managerial ability are both difficult and noisy as organizational performance is affected by both 
managerial decisions and systematic factors that exis both at the firm and industry level 
(Holmstrom, 1982).  Given the ambiguity noted above, both technological uncertainty and 
performance standard uncertainty may increase the difficulty of evaluating a manager’s 
capabilities (Graffin & Ward, 2010).  Technological uncertainty exists when there is a loose 
coupling between an actor’s performance and his or her underlying capabilities, which presents a 
problem when evaluating a CEO’s ability based on firm performance.  As noted above, this 
problem makes understanding and evaluating the CEO’s capabilities even more difficult.  
Alternatively, performance standard uncertainty exists when uncertainty surrounds the 
benchmarks or standards against which the CEO is to be judged (Graffin & Ward, 2010).   
 With regards to technological uncertainty, identifying a CEO’s true capabilities becomes 
difficult to assess based on performance due to the factors outside the CEO’s control with regard 
to performance.  Additionally, the board often has minimal interactions with the firm’s CEO 
(Carter & Lorsch, 2004).  Board interactions with the CEO often occur only a few times a year 
when the CEO and board meet directly face to face.  This limited interaction means the board 
does not understand the CEO’s complex thought patterns, the day to day operational decisions 
made by the CEO, or often even the CEO’s interpersonal style with others in the organization.  
In other words, the board does not directly monitor and observe the CEO’s behavior.  While the 
evaluation of the CEO is one of the most important sks in an organization, it is often one done 
with some of the least directly observable information available.  This limited interaction forces 
the board to seek alternative cues that provide a signal of the executive’s quality.  
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There are three distinct problems which create performance standard ambiguity when 
assessing managerial performance.  First, boards must determine what exactly constitutes poor 
performance worthy of dismissing a CEO.  In other wo ds, how bad does performance need to be 
in order to warrant a change in CEOs?  Firms performing below the industry’s average in 
profitability may need change, but research has not yet examined how far below industry average 
performance needs to fall before the board starts to search for a solution to the performance 
problem.  Alternatively, boards may have a duty to replace a CEO if the firm’s industry is 
performing extremely well and the firm is not (Jenter & Kanaan, forthcoming; Kaplan & Minton, 
2010).  These problems only further complicate the evaluation of the CEO by the board of 
directors.  
.  Second, research has not yet addressed how long performance needs to be poor before 
change is necessary.  Dismissing a CEO after one year of poor performance may be reactive and 
cause harm to the firm itself.  Different boards may h ve different standards for performance 
evaluation, such that two years of poor performance for one board may justify CEO dismissal, 
while in other firms significantly longer downturns are necessary before change is warranted. 
Within each situation, ambiguity may exist where factors outside the CEO’s or firm’s control 
affect firm profitability.  This ambiguity over when firms are performing poorly indicates that 
boards have latitude they can afford to CEOs when performance is poor. 
Finally, standards need to be identified against whom and what should performance be 
evaluated.  Firms must examine performance within te context of historical performance and 
future aspirations for performance.  For example, two firms may perform at slightly below 
industry average levels in a given year.  Taken together, these firms may not see a need for 
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change.  However, if one firm has historically underperformed and changed leadership recently, 
this firm may be extremely pleased with current performance (performance, while still below 
industry average, may be at an all time high).  Alternatively, the second firm may historically 
outperform the industry.  In this case, the firm may see slightly below average industry 
performance as extremely poor and believe change may be necessary.  In this situation, the firm 
may be losing its competitive advantage and failure to adapt quickly may only further erode such 
an advantage.  In both of these situation, merely using the industry as a referent, rather than 
considering historical context, may not provide enough information for the board to assess 
managerial performance.  
  Overall, these arguments suggest that determining whether a manager’s ability (or lack 
thereof) contributed to poor firm performance is extr mely difficult.  Furthermore, these 
arguments call into question the simplistic notion that poor performance should lead to dismissal, 
as different boards may define “poor performance” in alternative fashions.  When determining 
whether to make the decision to dismiss a CEO, the board must also determine whether the 
existing CEO has the ability to perform well going i to the future.  Higher quality CEOs may be 
decoupled from past performance or may signal the ability to turn around the firm in the future.  
Boards must also be wary of dismissing an executive if another executive of higher quality 
cannot be obtained.   
Given these arguments, it is important to begin to at empt to understand why boards 
choose to dismiss some executives and not others.  Figure 1 presents the main hypotheses of this 
study.  Regardless of firm performance, I argue that executives with higher levels of human and 
reputational capital are expected to signal higher levels of capabilities to the board.  These two 
factors send quality signals to the board of directors o alter the assessment of an executive’s 
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capabilities, which should lead to a lowered likelihood of dismissal.  Board members limited 
interaction with CEOs occurs as members only work part-time for the companies on whose 
boards they sit and often lack detailed knowledge necessary to understand the firm’s intricate 
operations.  This limited interaction reduces the dir ctly observable information that is evaluated 
in assessing managerial ability.  Thus, I argue that given this limited interaction, boards will look 
to quality signals to assist in the evaluation of aCEO’s capabilities.  These signals may include 
the CEO’s reputation as an executive, the CEO’s background, or the CEO’s previous affiliation 
with prestigious organizations to help assess the CEO’s capabilities.   
Additionally, as firms perform poorly, these quality signals will become more important, 
as the board will increase scrutiny on the CEO’s performance and capabilities.  As scrutiny on 
the executive’s performance increases, the board will look to signals that may indicate whether 
the executive can turn the organization around going forward or if new management is needed.  
Given the uncertainty faced when assessing executive capabilities in the wake of poor 
performance, boards may turn to external cues, such as t ird-party quality signals (e.g. 
certifications) in order to reduce ambiguity and provide additional corroboration for conclusions 
reached (Graffin & Ward, 2010; Podolny, 2005; Rao, 1994; Rindova et al., 2005).  The board 
can argue that the CEO has the required capabilities and experience to turn the firm around in the 
future, while arguing that factors beyond the CEO’s control contributed to poor firm 
performance.  Human capital and reputation can serve as a signal of the executive’s quality, 
which reduces the noise surrounding the CEO’s ability and contribution to past performance. 
Furthermore, the availability of high quality candidates as CEO alternatives should 
impact the likelihood of CEO dismissal.  If the board has access to high quality internal or 
external candidates that can improve firm performance i  the future, the board has a duty to 
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dismiss the current CEO and replace him/her with the higher quality candidate.  In cases where 
there are more viable internal and external candidates that can improve the expected quality of 
the firm’s CEO, the board should have an increased lik lihood of dismissing the CEO.  However, 
if few candidates are available, the board should be more reticent to dismiss a chief executive.  
These arguments are especially important when performance is poor.  Under conditions of poor 
performance, a larger pool of high quality candidates, either internal or external to the firm, 
should increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal, as the current CEO has been unable to deliver 
adequate performance.  If few quality candidates ar available, the board may choose not to 
dismiss the current CEO, as the next best alternative may only disrupt firm operations without 
bringing future benefits. 
Finally, it is important to note that this study controls for characteristics relating to board 
monitoring and CEO power in the analysis.  Firms with better board monitoring are expected to 
be more likely to dismiss a CEO, all else equal.  This relationship is especially attenuated when 
performance is poor, as better monitoring ensures that agency problems are reduced.  However, 
CEO power through duality and ownership stakes may also affect the decision to dismiss a CEO, 
such that CEO’s with greater power will have a lower likelihood of being dismissed.  In 
situations where CEOs have a great amount of power, it will be more unlikely that the board can 
dismiss the CEO.  Furthermore, this relationship will also be attenuated when performance is 
poor.  CEOs will have a lower need to exercise power when performance is above average, but 
when performance is poor, power can buffer the CEO from effective monitoring by the board. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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 The remainder of this study will address how human c pital and executive reputation can 
serve as signals of a CEO’s capabilities to the board f directors, how the market for alternative 
available CEO candidates can affect the board’s decision to dismiss a CEO, and how 
performance interacts with the executive’s capital and the market for alternative CEO candidates 
to increase the likelihood of dismissal.  Finally, an empirical analysis is performed regarding the 
likelihood of dismissal of CEOs over a 5 year period examining whether executive capital and 
the market for CEO candidates affects the likelihood f dismissal. 
SIGNALS OF EXECUTIVE QUALITY AND CEO DISMISSAL 
 As noted above, the board is responsible for the decision of whether to dismiss the firm’s 
CEO.  However, the board often has minimal interactions with the firm’s CEO (Carter & Lorsch, 
2004).  This limited interaction means the board does directly observe the CEO’s performance.  
Instead, the board must examine externally visible output signals regarding the CEO’s ability.  
Thus, boards often look to performance as an indicator of managerial ability.  However, 
performance alone does not provide a strong enough signal regarding ability due to the variety of 
factors that influence performance.  Therefore, the board is likely to look to external cues that 
may corroborate their beliefs regarding the executive’s ability including media reports and 
analyst ratings (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011).  Building upon this logic, I argue that an executive’s 
stock of human capital and reputation as a CEO can influence how the board perceives the 
executive’s capabilities when evaluating the CEO, as these provide proxies for the executive’s 
knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
Human Capital and CEO Dismissal 
 Human capital theory notes that a CEO has a collection of skills, knowledge, and 
experience (Becker, 1962; Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003); skills which may assist the 
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board in determining whether to dismiss a CEO.  At the time employers decide whether to hire 
executives, employers are unsure of the individual’s capabilities (Hamori, 2006). Signaling 
theory (Spence, 1974), however, contends that employers can observe visible cues relating to the 
executive, including educational background, prior experience, and past achievements, all of 
which signal expected future performance (Rosenbaum, 1984).  These observable characteristics 
and individual attributes assist in evaluating the capabilities of a potential executive (Spence, 
1973). 
As human capital is accumulated, executives can better signal their own quality to the 
external labor market, as attributes of human capital are the strongest and most consistent 
predictors of managerial career advancement (Kirchmeyer, 1998).  Furthermore, a number of 
human capital investments, including education and experience, not only represent past 
achievements and decisions, but also can serve as a signal of future performance (Fulmer, 2009).  
Given that employers only have limited interaction with most potential executives, accumulated 
human capital, including past performance, affiliation with prestigious organizations, and 
educational prestige, can all signal the executive’s quality and reduce the potential problem of 
adverse selection (Zajac, 1990).  Managers may differ in the level of skills and ability they 
possess from previous experience (Bailey & Helfat, 2003), which may affect the decisions 
managers make when serving as CEO. 
Human capital may not only help reduce the problem of adverse selection, but can also 
assist the board in its assessment of the CEO’s ability when deciding whether to retain an 
existing CEO.  Decision makers are vulnerable to their own biases when arriving at judgments 
(Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  As CEOs develop greater levels of human 
capital, the board’s decision making process is more likely to be biased towards retaining the 
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CEO.  The CEO’s accumulated human capital will assist in the evaluation process, by providing 
cues to the board that the CEO has the ability to perform well.  Thus, I argue that as CEOs 
develop greater levels of human capital, the board is more likely to positively evaluate a CEO’s 
ability, as the board has a signal that the CEO has the ability to successfully run the firm based 
on past achievements.  Replacing the CEO in these situations may yield a lower quality CEO 
who performs worse than the existing CEO.  Alternatively, CEOs with lower levels of human 
capital, which provides fewer signals of the CEO’s capabilities, will be more likely to be 
dismissed.  This logic suggests that boards will utilize existing information based on past 
accomplishments by CEOs in office to determine whether o retain the CEO.  As more signals 
are sent that indicate the CEO has the ability to be successful in the future, the more likely it is 
that the board will choose to retain the CEO, regardless of past performance.  Thus, I argue that 
the CEO’s firm tenure, prior experience, education level, educational institution affiliation, and 
compensation will all impact the firm’s evaluation f the CEO’s capabilities and ultimately 
whether to dismiss the CEO. 
Firm Tenure. Past research has examined executive tenure from a power perspective, 
noting that greater tenure enables managerial power building and entrenchment (Harrison et al., 
1988), primarily through the nomination of new directors to the board.  However, firm tenure 
also enables managerial learning and develops firm-specific knowledge and skills (Harris & 
Helfat, 1997).  As executives spend time in the organization, they gain a stronger understanding 
of the firm’s operations and begin to make better decisions (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; 
Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006).  Firm-specifi skills include understanding the day to 
day operations of the firm and the firm’s internal technologies.  Greater tenure also allows for 
building of relationships with key stakeholders (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Hill & Phan, 
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1991), which can be critical when implementing new strategies.  These firm-specific skills 
enable managers to develop superior knowledge vis-à-  other potential CEO candidates, as 
they have a better understanding of all aspects of the firm (Castanias & Helfat, 1991).   
Firm specific skills are worthless to other firms, but can have great value to the focal firm 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991).  Dismissal of the existing CEO results in losing all firm-specific 
skills gained by the executive during his or her tenur .  In cases of dismissal, firms must ensure 
that the loss of this knowledge will not seriously affect the firm in the future or must make plans 
in order to ensure minimal knowledge loss as well.  Thus, as CEO’s develop greater tenure 
within the firm, either as an executive or as CEO, the firm should be less likely to dismiss the 
CEO, as the potential loss of knowledge will outweigh the potential gains from replacement.  
The board will risk losing less in firm-specific skills if a CEO with lesser tenure is dismissed. 
Hypothesis 1: Regardless of performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will decrease 
as tenure within the firm increases. 
Prior Experience in Prestigious Firms. The prior stock of knowledge and experience 
built by a firm’s CEO serves as a strong influence on cognitive decision making and strategic 
choices (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).  Joining industry leaders early in 
the career process can help individuals achieve greater success (Citrin & Smith, 2003).  For 
instance, an examination of career origins of Fortune 100 CFOs showed that 89 percent began 
their careers with industry leaders, including McKinsey, General Electric, IBM, and Bain 
(O'Sullivan, 2004).  Affiliation with prestigious firms increases an executive’s prominence as the 
association enables future employers to assume that industry leaders evaluated the executive 
positively (Stuart, 2000).  Reputable and prestigious rganizations bestow ‘career imprints’ that 
the market values highly in executives (Higgins, 2005).  As such, employees of industry leaders 
24 
 
make more successful moves to other employers (Hamori, 2006) and are hired disproportionately 
to run start-up firms (Higgins & Gulati, 2006).  Specifically, reputable organizations facilitate 
development of employee capabilities by hiring the most talented individuals, providing better  
mentors, and training and immersing the individuals in the company’s superior industry and 
product knowledge (Crane, 1965; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Long, 1978).  Given this logic, 
executives with experience at industry leading firms should have greater levels of capability and 
insight to bring to the role of CEO.  This experienc  signals quality in the executive in terms of 
both a reputable third-party’s endorsement of the candidate and the candidate’s own 
development through involvement and understanding of a leading firm’s operations. 
Specifically, firms can reduce potential problems with adverse selection by hiring CEOs 
with experience at prestigious firms.  For instance, firms hiring CEOs who have been executives 
at General Electric have been found to get an abnormal stock return solely from announcing the 
CEO’s hiring (Lehmberg, Rowe, White, & Phillips, 2009).  Previous experience managing a 
prestigious organization sends a signal that the individual has developed the ability to 
successfully run a reputable organization.  CEOs with experience in prestigious firms may signal 
their ability to perform better in the future.  Dismissal of CEOs with these prestigious affiliations 
and development of past capabilities through managerial experience in these organizations may 
lose important capabilities and relationships with critical stakeholders. 
Hypothesis 2: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will be 
lower for CEOs with prior experience as an executive with a prestigious firm. 
Prior CEO Experience.  In addition to experience with reputable firms, prior experience 
as a CEO can also provide a greater levels of skill and background knowledge when CEOs are 
hired.  Managers acquire and perfect skills through their prior work experience (Castanias & 
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Helfat, 1991).  When a manager is in charge of a business, he or she learns about managing in 
that firm and the competitive cycle of the industry (Bailey & Helfat, 2003).  Managerial 
experience, particularly as a CEO, can provide additional insight for a CEO candidate to pull 
from when making decisions in the future.  In particular, past experiences and insights serve as a 
cognitive foundation for future strategic actions ad outcomes, regardless of the success of the 
prior outcomes.  The CEO position is unlike any other in the organization and requires different 
knowledge, skills and abilities that can only be learned through involvement in the position 
(Porter, Lorsch, & Nohria, 2004). 
CEOs with previous experience as another organization’s CEO, therefore, should face a 
lower likelihood of dismissal for several reasons.  First, these CEOs develop prior capabilities 
relating to effective management and understanding the rigors of the CEO position. These 
capabilities, all else equal, should allow for the CEO with prior CEO experience to make better 
decisions and more effectively run operations.  Second, CEOs with prior experience as chief 
executive also send a signal that another organization had a belief in the CEO’s ability.  When 
evaluating whether to dismiss a CEO, the board’s assessment may be altered by the belief that a 
CEO with prior CEO experience will be more likely to achieve higher levels of performance and 
therefore should not be dismissed in comparison to CEOs with no prior experience as chief 
executive. Finally, being a CEO allows access into an elite club of managers and provides 
greater connections (Useem, 1984).  These connectios may be leveraged to bring new resources 
to help build a competitive advantage for the focal firm.  
Hypothesis 3: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will be 
lower for CEOs with prior experience as a CEO with another firm. 
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CEO Education Level.  A manager’s educational background influences the functional 
and other experiences that the manager acquires (Castani s & Helfat, 2001).  Educational level 
has been shown to have a strong effect on compensatio  in past studies (Agarwal, 1981; Fisher 
& Govindarajan, 1992).  As managers acquire greater lev ls of education, additional capabilities 
are acquired and managers are exposed to additional information and perspectives that may 
affect decision-making.  Additionally, education may allow for executives to build strong social 
networks.  Previous research has linked educational leve  with greater innovation, knowledge, 
skills, and openness to change (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
CEOs with greater levels of education signal higher quality and greater ability.  When 
boards assess managerial quality, education level srve  as a signal of cognitive orientation for 
future decision making and performance.  CEOs with greater levels of education should be 
expected to have a greater psychological orientation with regards to ability and future 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will 
decrease as CEO educational level increases. 
CEO Elite Education.  While educational level endows greater background knowledge 
and experience, education at prestigious institutions also yields additional human capital.  
Education from elite universities creates greater cr dibility and prestige than association with 
less visible schools (Baltzell, 1989; Clement, 1977; Domhoff, 1967).  Useem and Karabel (1986) 
noted that promotion to top corporate positions wasmo t influenced by executives who earned a 
degree from an elite university.  Executives graduating from elite institutions signal to others 
their importance (D'Aveni, 1990).  Graduation from an elite institution not only yields a 
perceived higher quality education, but also provides access to an extensive network of 
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successful contacts. Finally, graduation from an elite institution signals that the institution was 
willing to accept the CEO as a candidate and that the CEO had the ability to complete the 
rigorous process to receive a degree. 
Graduation from a prestigious institution serves as a high quality signal about an 
executive’s capability in that both the institution was willing to endorse the CEO with 
acceptance, as well as bestow the CEO with a degree once the CEO met the institution’s 
requirements for graduation.  Thus, CEOs having graduated from an elite institution provide a 
higher quality signal to the board of directors when p rformance is assessed.  A CEO’s elite 
education can assist in reducing uncertainty regarding a CEO’s ability.  These arguments do not 
suggest that CEO’s without elite educations cannot successfully serve as CEO; however, these 
CEOs do not emit signals which help the board of directors favorably evaluate the CEO’s ability. 
Hypothesis 5: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will be 
lower when the CEO has graduated from an elite institution. 
CEO Compensation. Like dismissal, the CEO compensation process is typically viewed 
as the result of an economic or political process, whereby CEOs with greater economic 
contributions to the firm or greater power within the firm are afforded higher compensation.  
However, an alternative view notes that the value of specific human capital is related to the 
availability of that type of human capital within the labor market (Becker & Murphy, 1992).  
Executives earning above average pay premiums or compensation represent rents earned for 
unique and valuable managerial skills (Castanias & Helfat, 1991).  Pay premiums paid to 
executives with superior managerial skills represent a belief about the executive’s ability to 
generate superior performance (Harris & Helfat, 1997).  Superior managerial skills meet the 
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criteria for competitive advantage and allow the firm to generate above average returns 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991).   
Given this logic, I argue that firms that firms will be less likely to dismiss executives with 
higher levels of compensation.  These executives have been offered pay premiums in order to 
acquire the superior managerial skills of the executive, regardless of the firm’s performance 
during the CEO’s tenure.  Given the board’s investmnt in the CEO’s ability through its 
willingness to pay a premium to the CEO, dismissal hould be less likely for two reasons.  First, 
the board has made an investment to acquire the CEO’s valuable managerial skills that they 
believe will generate superior returns in the future.  Thus, the board should be less likely to cut 
ties with that investment in the short-term.  Second, if the board decides to dismiss the CEO, 
their decision-making ability may be called into question if the executive was paid a premium 
and was unable to deliver on the investment made.  Thus, the board may be hesitant to dismiss an 
executive until absolutely necessary in order to “save face” regarding past decisions.  CEOs 
earning less in compensation may earn less due to fewer alternatives outside of the focal firm and 
the compensation level may be indicative of the CEO’s lower perceived level of ability vis-à-vis 
other potential CEOs. 
Hypothesis 6: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will 
decrease as CEO compensation increases. 
 Overall, human capital can serve as a signal of an executive’s quality when evaluating the 
executive’s performance.  As ambiguity around an individual’s performance contribution and the 
appropriate metrics for evaluating performance exists, these quality signals should play a 
significant role in helping reduce uncertainty regarding a CEO’s expected future performance 
and should act as a buffer from dismissal for CEOs with significant levels of human capital.  
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These signals provide at least some information to reduce the level of uncertainty that boards 
face when attempting to assess managerial performance d may at least provide some 
information that can alter the board’s evaluation of performance. 
CEO Reputation and Executive Dismissal 
 While an executive’s human capital, developed over time, may serve as a quality signal 
regarding his or her ability, an executive’s reputation should also serve as a signal of ability and 
impact how others evaluate the executive.  An executive’s reputation serves as the collective 
judgment of others regarding the capabilities or quality of the executive earned over time 
(Graffin & Ward, 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; Washington & Zajac, 2005).  While some human 
capital variables (e.g. prior experience, graduation fr m an elite institution) may inform 
individual’s perceptions of the executive over time (e.g. reputation as an individual or as an 
employee), this study focuses on the executive’s reputation as a CEO; that is, the collective 
belief others hold regarding the CEO’s ability to manage an entire organization.   
One school of thought notes that reputation is based on a continued appraisal of the 
executive’s capabilities over time informed by the executive’s performance (Carter & Ruefli, 
2006).  However, an alternative view argues that reputation is based on a world of imperfect 
information in which proxies or signals are used to make assumptions about the intentions and 
future behaviors of actors (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Kreps & Spence, 1985; Rao, 1994).  
These two views, however, are not mutually exclusive.  An executive’s reputation can be 
informed by his or her past performance.  However, given the ambiguity associated with an 
executive’s contribution to performance, third party quality signals and related proxies may also 
provide relevant and important information regarding a  executive’s quality or capabilities (or 
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lack of quality or capabilities in some cases).  Most importantly, a CEO’s reputation may be 
viewed as a sort of brand that the CEO cultivates (Ranft, Zinko, Ferris, & Buckley, 2006). 
 A CEO’s reputation can be valuable to both the firm and the executive for several 
reasons.  First, prestigious executive can aid in providing legitimacy to the firm and provide 
access to other prestigious individuals (Daily & Johnson, 1997).  In particular, executives with 
higher levels of reputational capital may open doors t  new opportunities and influential 
stakeholders who invest energy in the organization due to their belief in the CEO.  The extent to 
which the organization is recognized in its field can strongly influence the organization’s 
economic value (Rindova et al., 2005).  Second, enhanced reputational capital can signal a higher 
level of managerial talent (Lehmberg et al., 2009).  Managers with better reputations are thought 
of as having greater ability and endorsements from others signify their belief in the executive’s 
capabilities.  Finally, once an individual develops a reputation or track record, the marginal 
effect of new information is weakened (Holmstrom, 1982).  In these cases, the effects of recent 
performance will be lesser for long-tenured executives. 
 Given the importance of a CEO’s reputation for both the firm and the executive, it stands 
that a CEO’s reputation may alter how the board assesses the CEO’s capabilities.  This altering 
of the assessment may allow the CEO to use his or her favorable reputation with the board to 
buffer him or herself from dismissal.  When executives develop reputational capital, others 
believe the CEO is credible, signaling the CEO has t e ability to successfully lead the 
organization.  In these cases, the board will need extra evidence or special circumstances to 
dismiss the CEO, as external parties provide a positive evaluation of the CEO’s performance.  
Boards with a strong efficacy belief in the CEO aremore likely to allow the CEO to persevere as 
he or she attempts to control the external environment (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). Boards 
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can gain greater belief through looking at both past erformance of the executive and external 
cues that signal the quality of the executive.  Market participants in general form a belief in the 
CEO’s ability and update it over time as new information is received.  CEOs with a higher 
estimate of their ability are more likely to be retained than CEOs who are initially assessed as 
lower in ability (Milbourn, 2003).  These arguments ote that past performance can be critical to 
whether the board retains an executive, but also note that how others perceive the executive can 
alter the board’s evaluation of performance. 
 Specifically, third party certification contests can also help to alter the executive’s 
reputation and impact the board’s assessment of a CEO’s performance.  Certification contests 
influence the board by providing independent signals of the executive’s quality (Johnson, 
Ellstrand, Dalton, & Dalton, 2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 
2006).  Certification contests exists as competitions where actors are ranked in a given domain 
based upon performance criteria accepted by key stakeholders as credible and legitimate (Wade 
et al., 2006).  These contests are likely to be considered as one of the few neutral sources of 
information regarding a CEO’s contribution and ability (Wade et al., 2006).   
 The marginal contribution of executives is difficult to assess (Holmstrom, 1982; 
Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972), thus stakeholders may contest quality beliefs about the CEO.  In 
these cases, certifications can act as useful cues regarding managerial competence (Wade et al., 
2006).  Victories in certification contests have ben found to re-assure risk averse stakeholders 
and induce support for the organization, increasing both reputation and odds of survival (Rao, 
1994).  Under conditions of uncertainty when evaluating ability and competence, certification 
contests and endorsements from reputable third parties provide clear signals of capabilities and 
play an important role in quality evaluations (Rao, 1994; Rindova et al., 2005).  Not only can 
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certifications reduce uncertainty regarding the individual’s performance, certifications may also 
reduce performance standard uncertainty regarding whether the executive’s capabilities meet or 
exceed standards that are desirable (Graffin & Ward, 2010).  In the end, certification contests 
regarding executives allow for clear and comparable comparisons of a CEO’s relative worth or 
standing vis-à-vis other chief executives (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).   Employing a publicly 
certified CEO can also yield organizational benefits by signaling that the CEO is of high quality 
and will add value to the company (Wade et al., 2006). 
 Given these arguments, I argue boards will be less likely to dismiss CEOs with higher 
levels of reputational capital.  Such CEOs have extrnal endorsements regarding their quality and 
competence, reducing the ambiguity surrounding the CEO’s performance and the appropriate 
metrics on which to evaluate the CEO.  Furthermore, removing the CEO without good reason 
may result in media backlash and a loss of critical st keholder support.  CEO’s who are publicly 
certified or with track records of good performance send signals to stakeholders regarding their 
ability to perform well in the future.  Dismissing such CEOs may result in a loss of future 
economic value to the organization, as the current CEO shows evidence he or she can contribute 
positively to the organization. 
Hypothesis 7: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will 
decrease as CEO reputation increases. 
THE MANAGERIAL LABOR MARKET AND CEO DISMISSAL 
 The board of directors does not operate in a vacuum when determining whether to change 
CEOs (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Instead, the board must consider the availability of potential 
alternatives who may replace the CEO.  If there is a strong supply of qualified candidates at the 
board’s disposal, the CEO is more likely to be dismis ed (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  The board 
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has an obvious replacement if a decision exists to dismiss the current CEO.  Firms must be wary 
of dismissing the current CEO if a qualified candidate does not exist, as future performance may 
not improve, or in some cases may get worse.  In fact, Wiersema (2002) found that most 
companies perform no better after dismissing a CEO.   
When examining potential replacements for a dismissed CEO, firms may seek 
alternatives both internally and externally to find qualified candidates.  Successful CEO 
succession requires the grooming of internal candidates or an extensive external search 
(Friedman & Olk, 1995; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). Internal candidates may come through the 
ranks of senior management or the board of directors, while external candidates may be found 
within the industry or through contacts of the board of directors.  As more qualified candidates 
exist in the market, the likelihood of CEO dismissal should also increase.  Poorly performing 
firms with few internal or external options may be reticent to replace the CEO, as it may cause 
significant disruption in the organization without yielding much benefit (Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  Alternatively, firms performing even at an verage level may consider dismissing the 
CEO if the potential exists to hire an extremely qualified CEO candidate. 
Internal Candidates for CEO Replacement 
 Presence of a COO.  The presence of a Chief Operating Officer (COO) provides a 
potential candidate for the position of CEO, as the COO is often groomed to replace the CEO 
when he or she retires (Vancil, 1987).  Senior executives have a personal stake in the firm’s 
success, as the firm’s success impacts managerial prospects in the market for managerial talent 
(Fama, 1980a).  The presence of a COO weakens the CEO’s power, as power becomes split 
among the CEO and COO (Worrell, Nemec, & Davidson, 1997).  Furthermore, the COO as an 
heir apparent may become impatient under the CEO’s shadow and challenge the CEO in front of 
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the board (Levinson, 1993).  The presence of a COO or president significantly increases the 
likelihood of selection of a new CEO internal to the firm (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) and also 
significantly increases the likelihood of CEO dismisal when performance is poor or there is 
limited strategic change (Zhang, 2006).  
 The COO provides a credible candidate to replace the CEO in case of dismissal and is 
often groomed directly by the CEO to become the chif general manager of the organization, has 
significant exposure to the board of directors already, and has had time to be evaluated by the 
board.  Thus, a sitting COO provides a ready-made replacement for the board of directors to 
select if the CEO is dismissed. 
Hypothesis 8: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal increases 
if a COO or President exists within the firm.   
Non-CEO Inside Directors.  When evaluating potential candidates to replace a CEO in 
case of dismissal, directors typically have more complete information about the ability and 
personality of senior executives and other directors of the firm with whom the board has had 
prior experience (Zajac, 1990).  Non-CEO inside dirctors allow for others to challenge the CEO 
and limit the CEO’s influence over the board (Shen & Cannella, 2002).  Senior executives who 
serve on the board have the greatest contact and experi nce with other board members who make 
the decision of whether to dismiss the CEO, making them the most likely contenders to replace a 
dismissed CEO (Ocasio, 1994).  A seat on the board gives senior executives exposure to the 
board of directors and allows for the building of scial networks and coalitions (Vancil, 1987).  
Greater numbers of insider non-CEO directors has been shown to lead to a higher likelihood of 
CEO dismissal followed by insider succession (Shen & Cannella, 2002).  Furthermore, the 
ownership of non-CEO insiders has also been found to directly influence the likelihood of forced 
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CEO turnover (Huson et al., 2001).  These arguments suggest that as the board has greater 
exposure to senior management through seats on the board of directors the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal will increase.  This exposure reduces the risk of adverse selection associated with 
removing the CEO and hiring an insider and increases th  board’s comfort with making the 
decision to dismiss a CEO. 
Hypothesis 9: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal increases 
as the number of non-CEO inside directors increases. 
Number of Firm Divisions / Business Lines.  Previous research has also found that firm 
size plays a significant role in the decision to replace a CEO (Grusky, 1963; James & Soref, 
1981).  Furthermore, as firm size increases, the likelihood of external succession decreases 
significantly (Dalton & Kesner, 1983).  Larger firms have a greater ability to find an internal 
management candidate with a full complement of skills and abilities to run the organization 
(Bailey & Helfat, 2003).  This pool of general management talent leads to managerial 
replacement, as qualified candidates can be found internally (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).   
In diversified firms, candidates frequently can be id ntified through a “horse race” when 
running different lines of business (Bailey & Helfat, 2003).  As firms acquire additional 
businesses or develop new lines of business, general management must be hired or groomed 
from within to run each line of business.  These diversified business lines can essentially run 
independently, with each general manager responsible for a business line serving as a “CEO,” 
responsible for that unit’s performance.  This situation allows for the grooming of general 
management talent and creates a tournament style “horse race” to identify potential CEO 
candidates (Friedman & Olk, 1995).  For instance, prior to being hired as General Electric CEO, 
Jeffrey Immelt ran the Medical Systems division of the corporate giant.  Mr. Immelt’s experience 
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and success as head of this organization helped him naturally stand out as a successful 
replacement for the retiring Jack Welch.  Organizations with more divisions or lines of business 
have a greater need for general management talent and are better able to groom potential CEO 
candidates.  The board can directly observe the performance of each of the internal CEO 
candidate’s business units to potentially identify an alternative candidate to the CEO.  If some 
business units significantly outperform others, the board may be able to identify better talent 
internally to replace a dismissed CEO.  
Hypothesis 10: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal 
increases as the number of firm divisions or lines of business increases. 
Presence of Interim CEO Candidates.  While candidates may be readily identified 
among senior management talent, the board may also identify other candidates among its own 
ranks to potentially replace a departed CEO.  Recent research supports the notion that replacing 
CEOs is a disruptive process, with many firms resorting to an interim CEO until the board 
identifies a permanent successor (Brady, 2006; Hymowitz, 2006).  The decision to employ an 
interim CEO is often made under duress, including the board losing confidence in the current 
CEO to the point where the CEO is dismissed (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010).  In interviews with 
three different interim CEOs, Ballinger and Marcel (2010) note that all three indicated they 
occupied the office of CEO due to the lack of viable candidates.  The dismissal of a CEO often 
leads to bypassing the normal CEO succession process due to the pressures of finding a new 
CEO (Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008).  This pressure to s lect a new CEO may lead to the 
process being completed too hastily, resulting in a loss of stakeholder confidence (Wiersema, 
2002).   
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Interim CEOs are an attractive option as they allow f r the board to assess the current 
situation and conduct a thorough search for a succesor (Hymowitz, 2006).  Utilizing an interim 
CEO also allows for immediate dismissal of a lackluster CEO, rather than performing a search 
while retaining a lame duck CEO (Brady, 2006).  Overall, interim CEOs allow boards to 
alleviate the time constraints associated with a search for a new CEO and to adequately assess a 
larger number of external candidates (Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988; Simon, 1997).   
Boards of directors may identify two different types of interim CEOs among their own 
ranks to select from if the sitting CEO is dismissed.  First, previous CEOs of the focal firm 
serving on the board of directors can serve as a signal that an experienced candidate is ready to 
replace the CEO, even if for only an interim period, if ismissal occurs (Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  Prior CEOs of the firm have in-depth knowledg  of the organization’s operations, often 
have maintained social networks which will be advantageous to ensuring operations run 
smoothly, and have previous general management experi nc  to run the organization until a new 
CEO is identified.  These individuals should more successfully be able to transition into the role 
of interim CEO and reduce some disruption associated with CEO dismissal.  For instance, 
Michael Dell reclaimed the CEO position of the computer company he founded following the 
dismissal of then CEO Kevin Rollins. 
Second, the board may contain directors with prior experience as a CEO at other firms.  
These individuals have general management experienc with other organizations which can be 
applied to the focal firm and may represent an attractive option to the board of directors in order 
to reduce disruption following CEO dismissal.  The availability of an experienced candidate to 
serve as caretaker CEO until a replacement candidate can be appropriately identified may reduce 
the uncertainty associated with dismissal.  For example, in 2001, United Airlines hired board 
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member John Creighton, former CEO of Weyerhaeuser, a  CEO and Chairman of the board to 
replace departing CEO James Goodwin.  Similarly, in 2005, 3M hired Robert Morrison as 
interim CEO after having served previously as CEO of Quaker Oats.  Both of these individuals 
represented board members with a credible reputation in a prior organization as a CEO.  
Organizations with credible candidates to replace a dismissed CEO, even only on an interim 
basis, provide the board of directors with greater leverage when determining whether to dismiss 
the current CEO.  A lack of credible candidates within the board may increase the disruption 
associated with CEO dismissal and may leave the organization as a “rudderless ship” should the 
CEO be dismissed. 
Hypothesis 11: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will 
increase with the presence of a prior CEO of the focal firm on the firm’s board of 
directors. 
Hypothesis 12: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will 
increase with the presence of a prior CEO of another firm on the firm’s board of 
directors. 
External Candidates for CEO Replacement 
 Industry Concentration.  The number of externally available candidates to replace the 
CEO should also affect the board’s decision of whether o dismiss the current CEO.  Due to their 
understanding of competitive dynamics and industry operations, most CEOs are hired from 
within the industry.  Hires from within the industry can offer different opinions on markets, 
provide links to suppliers and customers, or offer b tter approaches (Hager, Driscoll, Weber, & 
McWilliams, 1991) and may have a shorter learning curve, minimizing the disruption associated 
with changes in CEOs (Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, & Lin, 2002).    Industries with more firms 
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have more potential general manager candidates from which to choose a new CEO.  Fredrickson, 
Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) noted that the number of firms in an industry should matter when 
dismissing a CEO, as more firms in an industry indicates a greater pool of general management 
talent to choose from.  Furthermore, a greater number of firms in an industry create a natural 
experiment from which to pick the most successful general managers in an industry.  Thus, firms 
replacing a CEO should have a larger talent pool of candidates to choose from when industries 
have a greater number of firms or lower level of industry concentration, making CEO dismissal 
more likely. 
Hypothesis 13: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will 
increase as industry concentration decreases. 
 Prestigious Firms in an Industry. The willingness to dismiss a CEO is not only 
impacted by the number of potential candidates for the position, but also the quality of those 
candidates.  As noted earlier, larger firms have more management talent to choose from (Pfeffer 
& Moore, 1980).  Firms with greater access to manageri l talent in more prestigious 
organizations will be more likely to dismiss a CEO for several reasons.  First, individuals 
affiliated with reputable organizations make more successful moves to other organizations 
(Hamori, 2006).  Second, reputable organizations provide career ‘imprints’ on employees that 
are valued by the market, making candidates in reputable organizations more attractive (Higgins, 
2005).  Firms that operate in industries with more pr stigious organizations will have greater 
access to these candidates with valuable pedigrees.  Third, affiliation with these high status 
actors increases the organization’s legitimacy.   
Given that most CEOs are hired from within the same industry, firms within the same 
industry as prestigious firms may have greater access to managerial talent.  Prestigious 
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organizations not only provide successful imprints on their employees, but also train greater 
numbers of general management talent.  These organizations tend to be larger in size and have 
multiple lines of business, facilitating general management training.  Previous research has 
identified that the market values hiring individuals from these prestigious organizations due to 
this level of training and experience (Lehmberg et al., 2009).  Not all senior managers and 
business unit CEOs of prestigious organizations can go on to become CEO of that organization.  
Thus, many are willing to leave to become CEO at other organizations within the industry.  
When assessing whether to dismiss a CEO, the board should examine the pool of general 
management candidates that exists not only within the firm, but within other prestigious firms in 
the industry.  As this pool increases in size, the board is likely to be more willing to dismiss a 
CEO. 
Hypothesis 14: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal 
increases as the number of prestigious organizations n a firm’s industry increases. 
Board Memberships of Firm Directors. While boards often look to industry 
competitors to find replacements for CEOs, external el tionships can also yield quality 
candidates.  Directorships provide firms with important sources of information on other firm 
practices and procedures (Haunschild, 1993).  External directorships of sitting directors at a firm 
are a good way for directors to identify outside CEO candidates (Khurana, 2001).  Directors may 
use these relationships specifically to recruit new managers when necessary (Barry, Muscarella, 
Peavy III, & Vetsuypens, 1990).  As directors have gr ater ties to other firms, they develop 
stronger relationships with managerial talent. These ties also allow the directors evaluate 
managerial talent.  When directors need to find newcandidates to replace CEOs at other firms on 
whose boards they serve, they may turn to candidates wi h whom they are familiar in order to 
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reduce the problems of adverse selection.  As directo s have access to a larger pool of managerial 
talent, they are able to reduce the uncertainty that comes with dismissing a CEO and reduce the 
likelihood of adverse selection.  Thus, dismissing a CEO is more likely when directors have 
personal experience working with a greater pool of managerial talent, especially when this 
experience is first hand based on direct interaction. 
Hypothesis 15: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal 
increases as the number of external directorships among board members increases. 
Firm Geographical Location. While director networks are often a source of interaction 
and experience with pools of managerial talent, firms located in large cities with greater numbers 
of corporate headquarters also have an advantage when conducting executive searches.  Denser 
networks of elites in local areas tend to spread information quicker (Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Marquis, 2003).  A relatively small group of business executives tends to dominate local boards 
and other local colleagues are offered board seats as they become available in local companies 
(Ward & Feldman, 2008).  Geographic proximity is often a source of invitation to join corporate 
boards.  One study noted that 27 percent of ties among Fortune 1000 firms were between firms 
headquartered in the same state, indicating that geographical proximity plays a large role in firm 
interlocks (Friedland & Palmer, 1994).  Overall, ties are likely to be reconstituted among 
directors of firms with headquarters in the same locati n (Palmer, Friedland, & Singh, 1986).   
These arguments suggest that firms often find directo s and executives through interlocks 
in regional locations.  Furthermore, executives can be identified by their involvement on local 
boards through local colleagues.  As firms operate in larger cities with denser networks, boards 
should have access to a larger potential pool of candid tes should they choose to dismiss the 
CEO.  In addition to having access to a larger pool of candidates, boards in larger cities may also 
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more easily entice executives from other networks to join as CEO.  Taken together, these 
arguments suggest that firms will be more likely to dismiss the CEO when operating in larger 
cities or regional locations. 
Hypothesis 16: Regardless of firm performance, the likelihood of CEO dismissal will be 
greater when firms operate in larger cities. 
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE DISMISSAL 
 As noted earlier, much of the research on executive turnover and dismissal has revolved 
around the theory that as firm performance declines, firms will replace top managers (Allen & 
Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Grusky, 1963; James & Soref, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980; 
Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Warner et al., 1988).  The behavioral theory of the firm (e.g., Cyert & 
March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958) argues that poor performance forces the board into action 
to search for alternatives.  Thus, poor performance leads the board to take action in order to solve 
the problem; namely, find recourse that leads to beter firm performance.  While ambiguity may 
exist regarding the CEO’s contribution to performance, firms performing at extremely low levels 
and failing to meet aspiration levels will seek alternatives, including finding new management to 
implement new strategies.  Thus, as firms perform poorly, the board is more likely to dismiss the 
new CEO in an attempt to correct the problem of poor performance. 
Hypothesis 17: The likelihood of CEO dismissal willincrease as firm performance 
decreases. 
The Interaction of Performance and Executive Capital 
 Firms performing well often have little incentive to dismiss managers.  Following poor 
performance, however, the board must seek a solution in rder to achieve future aspiration 
levels.  During this process, the board must determine whether the CEO contributed to poor 
43 
 
performance.  Thus, the board will place increased scrutiny on the CEO in order to assess 
whether a change in management is needed.  The key issue for the board to determine is whether 
the CEO was responsible for poor performance and whether the CEO can help lead the firm to 
better performance in the future.  If the board does not believe the CEO is capable of improving 
performance, the board has a duty to dismiss the executive. 
However, given the board’s limited interaction with the CEO and the ambiguity 
surrounding the CEO’s contribution to firm performance, the board may not have direct evidence 
or knowledge of the CEO’s capabilities.  Instead, the board may examine external cues to 
determine whether the CEO is responsible for poor performance or whether the CEO can achieve 
better performance for the firm in the future.  Thus, as performance declines, an executive’s 
human and reputational capital may play a more important role in serving as a buffer from 
dismissal.  Executives with higher levels of human c pital and a better reputation as a CEO may 
signal to the board greater levels of knowledge, skills, and abilities that can be applied to the 
organization in order to produce better future firm performance.  For example, a poorly 
performing firm may retain a CEO with a reputation f r managing in large firms with superior 
performance, significant knowledge of the focal firm, and an elite education as these 
characteristics may signal to the board that performance was out of his / her control.    
Alternatively, a CEO with little management experienc  and a low external reputation may be 
more likely to be dismissed, as the board may feel other potential candidates could be more 
successful in the CEO position.  Thus, I argue that human capital and an executive’s reputation 
as a CEO will moderate the relationship between performance and executive dismissal, such that 
executives with higher levels of human capital will be less likely to be dismissed under 
conditions of poor performance. 
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Hypothesis 18: Firm tenure will moderate the relationship between poor performance 
and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that executives with higher levels of firm 
tenure will be less likely to be dismissed as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 19: Prior experience in a prestigious firm will moderate the relationship 
between poor performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that executives with 
prior executive experience in a prestigious firm will be less likely to be dismissed as 
performance declines. 
Hypothesis 20: Prior experience as a CEO will moderat  the relationship between poor 
performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that executives with prior 
experience as a CEO will be less likely to be dismis ed as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 21: The level of education completed by a CEO will moderate the 
relationship between poor performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that 
executives with higher levels of education completed will be less likely to be dismissed as 
performance declines. 
Hypothesis 22: Elite education by a CEO will moderat  the relationship between poor 
performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that executives graduating from 
an elite educational institution will be less likely to be dismissed as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 23: CEO compensation will moderate the relationship between poor 
performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that executives with higher levels 
compensation will be less likely to be dismissed as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 24: The executive’s reputation as a CEO will moderate the relationship 
between poor performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that executives with 
a greater reputation as a CEO will be less likely to be dismissed as performance declines. 
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The Interaction of Performance and the Managerial Labor Market  
 While performance is expected to serve as a signal to the board of the CEO’s quality, the 
perceived quality and quantity of candidates available to the board to replace a dismissed CEO 
should also affect the board’s decision of whether o dismiss the CEO.  While the board may 
seek to dismiss a CEO under conditions of poor performance, one important aspect of the 
decision must be whether a qualified individual exists to replace the current CEO.  On the one 
hand, the board has the fiduciary duty to shareholders to dismiss CEOs if better candidates exist, 
even if performance is adequate.  On the other hand, the board also has a fiduciary duty to retain 
the CEO of a poorly performing firm if no viable candidates exist that could replace the current 
CEO and improve firm performance.  Thus, I argue that even if the CEO is determined to be 
responsible for poor firm performance, the board will only replace the CEO if there are quality 
candidates that are available to replace the current CEO.  
Hypothesis 25: The presence of a COO will moderate the relationship between firm 
performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that firms with a COO will be 
more likely to dismiss a CEO as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 26: The number of non-CEO inside directors will moderate the relationship 
between firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that firms with more 
non-CEO directors will be more likely to dismiss a CEO as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 27: The number of divisions in a firm will moderate the relationship between 
firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, uch that firms with more 
divisions will be more likely to dismiss a CEO as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 28: The presence of a firm’s former CEO on the board will moderate the 
relationship between firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that 
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firms with the prior CEO on the board will be more likely to dismiss a CEO as 
performance declines. 
Hypothesis 29: The presence of a retired CEO of another firm on a firm’s board of 
directors will moderate the relationship between firm performance and the likelihood of 
CEO dismissal, such that firms with a retired CEO as a director will be more likely to 
dismiss a CEO as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 30: The concentration of an industry will moderate the relationship between 
firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, uch that firms in a more 
concentrated industry will be more likely to dismiss a CEO as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 31: The number of prestigious firms in an industry will moderate the 
relationship between firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that 
firms with more prestigious firms in their industry will be more likely to dismiss a CEO 
as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 32: The number of board memberships held by a firm’s directors will 
moderate the relationship between firm performance and the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal, such that firms with more directorships held by its director will be more likely 
to dismiss a CEO as performance declines. 
Hypothesis 33: The location of a firm in a major city will moderate the relationship 
between firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, such that firms 
headquartered in a major city will be more likely to dismiss a CEO as performance 
declines. 
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METHODS 
Sample  
The initial sample to examine dismissals of CEOs wadr wn from all United States, 
publicly traded, manufacturing firms (SIC codes from 2000 to 3999) with more than 1000 
employees in existence in 2005 and yielded 783 firms.  Full data to estimate the likelihood of 
dismissal was gathered to cover the period 2005-2010 for all firms, where complete data is 
available.  An initial examination yielded 3670 firm-year observations over this period, 
accounting for firms that were acquired, went bankrupt, or went private during the period 2006-
2010.  After removing observations for which full data could not be retrieved, the final sample of 
firm years was 3,648 covering 778 companies and 1,080 firm-CEO pairings.  
 All firm and performance information was gathered from CompuStat, while all 
information relating to firm board composition was gathered from the Corporate Library 
database, where available, as well as individual firm proxy statements.  Data on Chief Executive 
Officers was gathered from the Marquis’ Who’s Who On the Web, Standard & Poor’s Corporate 
Register of Directors & Executives, Dun & Bradstree’s Reference Book of Corporate 
Management, and Forbes, as well as from other company and executive profiles where available.  
Data on CEO compensation and previous employment was gathered from Execucomp.  Data on 
geographical locations has been gathered from the Unit d States Census Bureau.  Data on CEO 
reputation was gathered from Institutional Investor Magazine, as well as news searches 
conducted via Factiva. 
CEO Dismissals 
 The dependent variable for this study is whether a CEO was dismissed in a given year.  
Identifying dismissals of CEOs represents a significant challenge in management research, as 
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firms may not often disclose why CEOs resign or depart (Denis & Denis, 1995; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988; Shen & Cannella, 2002).  However, recent r search has identified several techniques in 
order to better identify dismissals which more successfully help in their identification (e.g., Shen 
& Cannella, 2002).  Given the success of these appro ches at identifying dismissals (e.g., Shen & 
Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006, 2008), this study follows the approach used by Shen and Cannella 
(2002) relying on news reports and descriptions of the event surrounding the departure of a CEO 
from a sample firm. 
 News reports surrounding all CEO turnover events were examined in order to classify 
each turnover event and determine whether dismissal occurred. First, successions were excluded 
that were the result of a CEO’s death, health reasons, acceptance of a similar position at another 
firm, or a merger or acquisition.  Three criteria were then used to identify instances defined as 
dismissals.  First, a CEO may be directly reported as fired or forced out; however, this is rare.  
Second, a CEO is reported as resigning under pressure, unexpectedly, or immediately, due to 
poor performance, personal reasons that are not indicate , or a desire to pursue “other interests.”  
Third, cases where CEOs chose early retirement, but discussion of performance problems is 
reported in the announcement were classified as dismissals.  As noted by Shen and Cannella 
(2002), CEOs may have little choice but to resign when pressure surrounding their performance 
is high. One slight modification to Shen and Cannella’s methodology in this study is that a 
dismissal was also recorded if other problems were identified that were not performance related, 
including notification of an SEC investigation or an indication of accounting restatement.  
Turnover of a CEO was classified as a dismissal if ny of the above three criteria are met.  CEO 
dismissal is therefore recorded as a dichotomous variable for each firm/year/CEO pairing in the 
sample, with a value of 1 for each year where a CEO is coded as dismissed within that year and a 
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value of 0 for years where no CEO turnover occurs or where a CEO turnover does not meet the 
above criteria for dismissal. 
Because this process requires judgment to determine whether a dismissal occurs, two 
independent research assistants coded each turnover event in the sample.  There were 347 
turnover events which occurred in the sample time period.  Of these, the coders reached 
independent agreement on classification in 314 of the 347 cases (Cohen’s Kappa=0.727, 
p<0.001), indicating significant agreement was achieved.  Due to unavailability of the first 
research assistant when the second coder completed th  coding process, the author of this study 
discussed any disagreements with the second coder until m tual agreement was achieved on the 
34 cases were initial agreement was not achieved.  The final process yielded the identification of 
102 dismissals, with 96 of the 778 sample firms dismis ing at least one CEO. 
Independent Variables 
 Executive capital. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has worked for the firm 
in any capacity.  Prior experience is operationalized in two different ways.  Prestige Experience 
is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the CEO has served as an executive listed on a proxy 
statement of any Fortune 500 company, and 0 otherwis .  Fortune 500 companies are highly 
visible and attract top talent.  Executives at these organizations are regularly sought after to run 
other organizations.  This variable serves as a proxy for human capital with regards to an actor’s 
credibility and an indicator of capabilities.  CEO Experience is also a dichotomous variable 
coded as 1 if the CEO has previously served in the capacity of CEO for another firm, and 0 
otherwise.  
 Education level was calculated using a 7-point scale based on the hig st level of 
education completed by the CEO, adapted from Hermann and Datta (2005) (1=high school, 
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2=some college, 3=undergraduate degree, 4=some graduate program, 5=graduate degree, 
6=medical or law degree, 7=doctorate)1.  Elite education is a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 
if the CEO attended one of the US News and World Report college rankings top 25 institutions 
in 2011 for either undergraduate or graduate education nd 0 otherwise2.  CEO compensation is 
the amount of a CEO’s base salary earned in a given year.  Base salary was chosen as it is not 
affected by firm performance and as more indicative of the firm’s belief in the value the CEO 
brings to the firm independent of the firm’s performance.   
CEO reputation is measured using two constructs.  The first measure of CEO reputation 
is the result of a certification contest; whether the CEO was included on I stitutional Investor 
magazine’s Best CEOs list, which began identifying top CEOs in 20033.   Institutional Investor 
asks buy and sell-side analysts to identify the best executives from the companies they follow 
and ranks the top 5 CEOs by industry.  Survey data reflects the opinions of more than 1,300 
analysts from more than 550 firms.  Institutional Investor has a circulation of more than 130,000 
and its list of Best CEOs has been reported on by outlets such as CNN and CNBC.  IIM Top 5 
CEO, therefore, is a dichotomous variable based on whether the CEO has been indicated as a top 
5 CEO in his or her industry in any year prior to the observation year by Institutional Investor.  
CEOs that have been named a Top 5 CEO prior to the bs rvation year were given a value of 1, 
while those who have not made the list were given a value of 0. 
                                                          
1 An alternative conceptualization was also tested uilizing a 5-point scale (1=high school, 2=some college, 
3=undergraduate degree, 4=graduate degree, 5=doctorate, law or medical degree).  Results using the alterna ive 
conceptualization followed a similar pattern. 
2 Alternative conceptualizations were also tested utilizing dummy variables for whether the CEO attended an Ivy 
League institution or not, or whether the CEO attended a small group of institutions identified as elite by Finkelstein 
(1994).  A second test was also done using the continuous variable developed by Finkelstein, ranging from 0-3 
based on the level of education and the number of elite institutions that were attended.  Results for all specifications 
were not significantly different from those reported herein, and are available from the author upon request. 
3 Johnson, Young, and Welker (1993) used Financial World’s list of best CEOs in order to examine managerial 
reputation; however, Financial World discontinued operations in 1998 and the list is no lo ger published.   
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The second measure is the n gative publicity associated with the CEO over the 3 years 
prior to the observation year in major US newspapers.  An independent coder examined all 
newspaper reports across six major US news papers and coded each article mentioning a CEO’s 
name as either positive/neutral or negative.  Publicity regarding the CEO was only coded as 
negative if the article specifically mentions the CEO and would cast the CEO in a negative light 
(e.g. adversely affect how others view the CEO, not how others view the organization).  The six 
newspapers examined were The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, 
USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the Houston Chronicle.  These 
newspapers cover different regions of the United States, but also represent 7 of the top 10 
newspapers in circulation in the United States.  This measure represents a count of the negative 
articles regarding the CEO over the three years prior to the observation year.  This measure is 
similar to Milbourn’s (2003) construct of CEO reputation with regard to press coverage.   
 Market for Alternative CEO Candidates. COO is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
the firm reports a COO or President in the given year, and 0 otherwise.  Non-CEO Board 
Insiders represents a count variable equal to the number of inside managers on the board of 
directors who are not the CEO.  Firm divisions is a count variable equal to the number of 
segments or business lines the company reports in a given year to the SEC based on data 
gathered from Compustat.  Retired CEO on Board is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 in a 
given year if any previous CEO of the firm remains o  the board of directors and 0 otherwise.  
Other Retired CEO on Board is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there is a retired CEO of 
another firm on the board of directors in a given yar and 0 otherwise.  Industry concentration is 
the concentration ratio of a given 2-digit SIC code calculated using the Herfindahl index, a well-
known indicator of competitive intensity in industries that is designed to capture the number of 
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competitors and the distribution of market shares among competitors (Kotha & Nair, 1995; Li, 
Poppo, & Zhou, 2008).   
 Fortune 500 firms in industry is a variable representing the number of Fortune 500 firms 
in a given two-digit SIC code in a given year and is a measure of the number of prestigious, large 
firms in an industry.  Directors’ board memberships i a variable representing the sum of all 
external directorships held by the firm’s board of directors in the observation year and measures 
the number of ties that a focal firm’s directors maint in through board involvement to other firms 
in a given year.  Finally, Firm’s geographic location represents a dichotomous variable equal to 
1 if the firm’s corporate headquarters are located in one of the 28 largest metropolitan statistical 
areas in the United States and 0 otherwise in a given year.  The top 28 metropolitan areas were 
used in order to examine all metropolitan areas with more than 2 million people in the 
surrounding area4. 
Firm Performance. Firm performance was analyzed using two measures: Return on 
assets and Tobin’s q.  Both ROA and Tobin’s q were analyzed using the current year’s firm 
performance industry adjusted by a firm’s two-digit SIC code based on data provided by 
COMPUSTAT5 in order to test how the performance at the time the decision was made affected 
the likelihood of dismissal. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Alternative conceptualizations were utilized to examine the top 10 largest MSAs (greater than 4.5 million people), 
top 15 (greater than 3.5 million people), and top 20 (2 million people).  The pattern of results were similar with less 
explained variance. 
5 Alternative conceptualizations were tested examining prior year industry averaged performance, three year
industry averaged performance, and three and five year trends.  Additionally, data were examined at both the 2 digit 
and 4 digit SIC level.  The results are available upon request.  The models with the greatest explained variance are 
reported in this study. 
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Control Variables 
 Given prior research on the antecedents of executive dismissal, a number of control 
variables relating to executive power, board power, and ownership characteristics are added to 
the model to control for alternative effects on the lik lihood of dismissal. 
Duality is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the CEO is also the board chair and 0 
otherwise.  Outside directors represents the proportion of outside directors on the board of 
directors.  Outside directors are theoretically thought to provide more independence from 
management and therefore will be more likely to dismis  a poorly performing CEO (Pitcher, 
Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000).  Blockholder ownership represents the proportion of shares held by 
large blockholders including institutions, which are expected to be able to better monitor 
managerial actions and lead to better firm governance.  Debt to equity ratio represents a ratio of 
the firm’s level of debt to its level of equity.  This measure controls for the leverage a firm has in 
a given year and may be an indication of financial problems in the organization.  Firm size is the 
natural log of the total assets of the firm in the observation year.  Larger firms may face different 
decisions than small firms, and some research has identified larger firms are more likely to 
dismiss CEOs (Boeker, 1992).  CEO Gender is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the CEO is a 
male and 0 for female in order to determine whether  likelihood of dismissal is different for 
men versus women in publicly traded firms.  CEO Ownership is a proportion of firm stock 
owned by the CEO in the observation year and is a me sure of the CEO’s power.  CEOs with 
significant ownership may be able to insulate themselves from dismissal due to such power 
(Finkelstein, 1992).  Finally, Current ratio is a ratio of the firm’s current assets to current 
liabilities and measures a firm’s liquidity or finacial solvency.  Firms with less liquidity may 
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face financial hardship that is separate from measur s of performance and may be more likely to 
dismiss CEOs, as firm survival may be threatened.   
Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted using event history analysis techniques, examining the 
likelihood of dismissal of a CEO in a given year.  Each individual observation is a 
firm/year/CEO pairing, with the sample including 3648 of such pairings.  While the same 
firm/year/CEO pairing can appear multiple times in the sample, non-independence of 
observations is not an issue, as each year the board makes the decision, explicitly or implicitly, 
whether to dismiss the CEO.  Thus, each case represents an independent observation based on 
the variety of variables included in the models specified.  
The analysis was conducted using probit regression.  T  control for time effects, dummy 
variables for each year in the sample were entered into the model, which can capture unseen time 
effects outside the model.  For example, if executive dismissal was fashionable in a given year, 
the dummy variables would capture this phenomenon.  All data which vary over time were 
recorded as of the observation year in order to capture effects at the time in which the decision 
was made, with the exception of IIM Top 5 CEO, which was recorded based on the CEO’s 
inclusion on the list in any prior year. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among variables except for the 
year dummies.  The decision to dismiss a CEO is significantly correlated with duality, 
blockholder ownership, CEO ownership, a firm’s Tobin’s q, CEO tenure, CEO compensation, 
and negative publicity.  In this study, 347 turnovers occurred, of which 102 CEOs were classified 
as dismissed (29.39%).   
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----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Hypotheses are tested using probit regression as reported in Table 2.  Model 1 includes 
only control variables. Model 2 tests the effects of firm performance on the decision to dismiss a 
CEO, while Model 3 includes all main effects for hypothesis testing.  To correct for 
heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are report d and used for hypothesis testing (Huber, 
1967; White, 1982).  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
----------------------------------------------- 
In examining the impact of control variables on the lik lihood of dismissal, results 
indicate that CEOs with duality, or who also serve as board chair, are significantly less likely to 
be dismissed, indicating that power via duality insulates a CEO.  Furthermore, a firm’s current 
ratio, an indicator of liquidity, is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of 
dismissal, suggesting that when firms face issues dealing with solvency (e.g. bankruptcy 
potentially looms), dismissal is more likely.  Firm size and CEO ownership are both negative and 
marginally significant, suggesting that larger firms are less likely to dismiss CEOs and that 
dismissal is less likely when CEOs gain greater ownership power. 
In models 2 and 3, I examine the impact of firm performance, human capital, and 
alternative CEO candidates on the likelihood of dismissal.  Hypotheses 1 through 6 examine the 
relationship between executive human capital and the likelihood of dismissal.  Hypothesis 1 
predicts that as a CEO’s tenure in the firm, in anyposition, increases, dismissal is less likely due 
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to the firm-specific human capital the CEO has accumulated.  Results provide support for 
Hypothesis 1, as greater CEO tenure in the firm is associated with a lower likelihood f 
dismissal (p ≤ 0.05).  Hypothesis 2 argues that prestigious experience, in the form of experience 
as an executive at a Fortune 500 firm, will insulate  CEO from dismissal.  The coefficient for 
prestige experience is not significant, failing to provide support for Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 3 
predicts that prior CEO experience will reduce the likelihood of dismissal; however, results fail 
to support Hypothesis 3, as Prior CEO experience is not significant.  With regard to Hypothesis 
4, a CEO’s education level is predicted to decrease the likelihood of dismissal; however, results 
fail to provide support for Hypothesis 4.  Hypothesis 5 predicts that a CEO’s elite education will 
signal higher quality to the board of directors.  The coefficient on elite education is significant 
and indicates a relationship between the prestige of a CEO’s education and likelihood of 
dismissal (p ≤ 0.05); however, results are in the opposite direction of that predicted.  Findings 
from the analysis indicate that a CEO’s elite education increases the likelihood of dismissal, 
suggesting that elite education may alter how the board views a candidate in a negative, rather 
than positive, manner.  Finally, Hypothesis 6 examines the relationship between CEO 
compensation and the likelihood of dismissal, predicting that CEOs with higher compensation 
are less likely to be dismissed.  Hypothesis 6 is supported, as the coefficient on CEO 
compensation is negative and significant (p ≤ 0.01), indicating that greater base salaries paid to 
CEOs decrease the likelihood of dismissal.  While some argue that compensation may represent 
a CEO’s power, compensation in this case may be indicative of greater value attributed to the 
CEO.  As firms increase the base salaries of their CEOs, the salary is a signal of the economic 
value the firm believes the CEO brings to the organization. 
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Hypothesis 7 examines the relationship between a CEO’s reputational capital and his or 
her likelihood of dismissal.  The first measure of reputation examines an externally awarded 
certification, whether the CEO has been named a top 5 CEO by analysts in Institutional Investor 
magazine.  Results on IIM Top 5 CEO, however, fail to find any significant relationship6. The 
second measure examined the amount of negative publicity the CEO received over the three 
years prior to the observation year.  Results show t at as CEOs received more n gative publicity, 
the likelihood of dismissal increased significantly (p ≤ 0.05).  These results suggest that negative 
publicity sends a signal to the board about the CEO’s quality, which then increases the likelihood 
of dismissal.  Taken together, these results suggest that there is some support for Hypothesis 7, 
that reputational capital impacts the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
Hypotheses 8 through 16 examine proxies for the market for alternative CEO candidates 
on the likelihood of CEO dismissal.  Hypotheses 8-12 represent proxies for internal candidates to 
replace the CEO and argue that dismissal is more likely when there is a COO, when there are 
greater numbers of non-CEO insiders on the board, when the firm has more divisions to cultivate  
and identify managerial talent, and when a retired CEO of either the focal firm or another firm 
sits on the board.  Among these variables, only the coefficient on Non-CEO board insiders is 
positive and significant (p ≤ 0.05), suggesting that when more insiders are on the board, 
dismissal is more likely.  These results are consistent with Shen and Cannella (2002) who note 
that insiders serving on the board represent viable candidates to replace a CEO, as the board’s 
familiarity with such candidates can reduce problems associated with adverse selection.  Thus, 
results provide support for Hypothesis 9, while failing to support Hypotheses 8, 10, 11, and 12. 
                                                          
6 Alternative conceptualizations examined whether th CEO was ranked as the top CEO in the Institutional Investor 
awards at any point, the count of appearances priorto the observation year for a CEO in the top 5 or as top CEO, 
and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the CEO was named a Top 30 CEO by Barron’s magazine.  Results 
followed similar patterns using each of the conceptualizations and are available from the author. 
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Hypotheses 13-16 represent proxies for external candid tes to replace the CEO and argue 
that dismissal is more likely when the industry is le s concentrated, when there are more Fortune 
500 firms in an industry, when directors have more board memberships to identify candidates, 
and when the firm is located in a major city.  Results, however, fail to identify any significant 
relationships, and thus Hypotheses 13, 14, 15, and 16 are not supported. 
The final main effect examined is the effect of firm performance on likelihood of 
dismissal.  In both model 2 and 3, the coefficients on both Firm ROA (p ≤ 0.01) and Tobin’s q (p 
≤ 0.001) are negative and highly significant, suggesting that as firm performance (both 
accounting and market based measures) increases, dimissal is less likely.  These results provide 
support for Hypothesis 17.   
Hypotheses 18 through 24 examine the interaction between firm performance and 
executive capital, predicting that CEO human and reputational capital will buffer a CEO from 
dismissal as performance decreases.  Tables 3a, 3b, nd 3c present the results of the analyses 
regarding the effects of the interaction between firm ROA and both executive capital and the 
market for alternative CEO candidates on the likelihood of dismissal.  Following Aiken and 
West (1991), each term included in an interaction was mean centered prior to calculating the 
interaction term7.  Model 4 presents the results of the analysis with all interaction terms included, 
while Models 5 through 21 test and report each interaction individually8.  Results of the analyses 
indicate that the interaction between firm ROA and CEO compensation (p ≤ 0.01) and the 
                                                          
7 An alternative process was also used, whereby a dummy variable was created to represent any observations where 
firm performance fell below industry average performance (ROA < 0) in a given year.  This dummy variable was 
then interacted with each human and reputational capital variable and each market for alternative candidate variable 
in order to determine whether these relationships were greater in firms with below industry averaged prformance.  
The results are available from the author upon request. 
8 For the sake of parsimony the remaining variables ar  not reported.  However, in any cases where results were 
changed by the inclusion of the interaction term on main effects that are not in the interaction term, these changes 
have been highlighted in the table’s footnotes.  Full results are available from the author upon request. 
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interaction between ROA and negative publicity (p ≤ 0.001) are significant, providing support 
for Hypotheses 23 and 24.  Results, however, fail to provide support for Hypotheses 18 through 
22.    
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c  
about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Hypotheses 25 through 33 predict an interaction betwe n firm performance and the 
market for alternative CEO candidates, such that as the firm’s board can identify more external 
and internal candidates, dismissal should be more likely as performance decreases.  Results find 
support for Hypothesis 33, as the interaction betwen ROA and the firm’s location in a major 
city is significant (p ≤ 0.01).  Hypotheses 25 through 32 are not supported. 
To better understand the significant interactions, Figures 3, 4, and 5 plot the relationships 
between ROA and CEO compensation, negative publicity, and location in a major US city.  Each 
interaction graph examines the likelihood of dismissal as ROA moves from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean.  As seen in Figure 2, when 
CEO compensation is one standard deviation above the mean (“High CEO Compensation”), the 
likelihood of dismissal increases slightly as firm ROA increases.  However, when CEO 
compensation is one standard deviation below the mean, the likelihood of dismissal increases at 
a greater rate as ROA increases. These results suggest that lower compensation significantly 
impacts the likelihood of dismissal when performance is poor.  Figure 3 graphs the relationship 
between negative publicity and ROA.  The plot of the effects illustrates that the likelihood of 
dismissal is highest for CEOs with low negative publicity and low ROA, but decreases as ROA 
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increases.  For CEOs with higher levels of negative publicity, the likelihood of dismissal 
increases as ROA increases, suggesting that negativ publicity limits the effects of ROA on 
reducing the likelihood of dismissal.  Finally, as seen in Figure 4, a firm’s location in a major 
city affects the likelihood of dismissal, such that CEOs are more likely to be dismissed when the 
firm is not located in one of the 28 largest US metropolitan areas.  This likelihood decreases 
significantly as the firm’s ROA decreases, suggesting that the firm’s location in a major 
metropolitan area actually buffers a CEO from dismissal when ROA is poor.  These results 
suggest that major metropolitan areas may not serve as pools for attracting talent, but rather may 
serve as networks that insulate CEOs from dismissal. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2, 3, and 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
In order to test additional interactions, analyses w re run interacting each main effect of 
executive capital and the market for alternative CEO candidates with firm market performance as 
measured by Tobin’s q.  Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c present th  results of these analyses.  Significant 
results were identified for the interaction between Tobin’s q and prestige experience.  Figure 5 
graphs the significant relationship identified.  As seen in the figure, prestigious experience does 
not significantly alter the likelihood of dismissal regardless of Tobin’s q; however, for executives 
without prestigious experience, the likelihood of dismissal decreases as Tobin’s q increases, 
suggesting that prestigious experience provides some insulation from dismissal when market 
performance is poor. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4a, 4b, and 4c and  
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Figure 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
In sum, results provide support that both measures of human and reputational capital 
reduce the likelihood of dismissal.  Results indicate that greater firm tenure and CEO 
compensation provide evidence of CEO capabilities which reduce the likelihood of dismissal.   
Additionally, negative publicity about a CEO impacts his or her reputation, which increases the 
likelihood of dismissal. With regards to the market for alternative CEO candidates, only the 
number of non-CEO insiders on the board significantly impacts the likelihood of dismissal, such 
that when more non-CEO insiders are on the board, dismissal is more likely.  The influence of 
performance also has a significant impact, as both accounting and market measures of 
performance impact the likelihood of dismissal.  Additionally, firm ROA impacts the 
relationship between CEO compensation, negative publicity, and the firm’s location in a major 
city on the likelihood of dismissal, while market performance impacts the relationship between 
dismissal and prestigious experience similarly.  Importantly, dismissal is most likely when CEO 
compensation is below average and performance is poor, indicating that lack of human capital in 
the form of compensation impacts the board’s evaluation of CEO performance.  
DISCUSSION 
In recent decades, the number of CEO dismissals has continued to increase.  Research on 
CEO dismissal has primarily examined the decision to dismiss a CEO using agency theory and 
the behavioral theory of the firm; that is, when performance is poor, dismissal is more likely.  
Additionally, prior studies note that CEOs are able to insulate themselves from dismissal when 
monitoring is weak or when they have greater power than the board.  However, firms in recent 
years are also under ever greater scrutiny by the media, investors, analysts, and the general 
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public.  This scrutiny often leads to individuals outside the organization questioning the firm’s 
board as to why some CEOs are not fired.  This study attempts to examine the question and 
provide reasons outside of agency theory for some boards choose to not fire some CEOs when 
expectations might dictate dismissal should occur.  This study makes several important 
contributions to the existing literature on CEO dismi sal. 
First, this study builds a theoretical model predicated on signaling of executive talent to 
the board of directors based on the foundation that bo rd decision making is imperfect for 
several reasons.  Building on prior research, I argue that performance alone is a noisy signal 
regarding CEO talent; that is, while CEOs are respon ible for the firm’s performance, a variety 
of other factors contribute significantly to performance.  Thus, performance alone should not be 
the measuring stick for CEO talent or ability.  Second, I argue that the limited interaction the 
board has with the CEO makes the evaluation of a CEO’s capabilities extremely difficult.  
Despite the important task with which boards face in valuating CEOs, boards spend little time 
in direct interaction with the CEO and rarely observe the CEO performing his or her 
responsibility. This limited interaction leads the board to evaluate external, observable cues 
regarding the CEO’s capabilities, as board members cannot fully observe the true capabilities of 
the CEO.  This study adds to the existing literature on dismissal by adding to prior research that 
argues and discusses how the board of directors look  t  external cues in order to help develop 
their opinions regarding CEO capabilities by illustrating how both human and reputational 
capital may signal an executive’s capabilities for the board’s evaluation process.  In particular, 
the notion of a CEO’s reputation has not been explored in great detail.  This study is one of the 
first to examine how multiple measures of reputation may affect the evaluation of the CEO and 
his or her capabilities.  Future studies should continue to examine how CEOs develop 
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reputations, how such reputations change over time,and how reputation affects both firm and 
board decision making.  In this study, a CEO’s reputation assists the board by providing 
information that can corroborate board member’s evaluation of CEO ability. 
Prior research argues and often assumes that dismissal does not occur when performance 
is poor primarily due to weak governance.  However, this perspective discredits the integrity and 
willingness to perform fiduciary duties of many board members, as the assumption exists that 
board members perform their duties to serve the interes s of the firm’s executives rather than 
performing their fiduciary duty.  However, this study builds a theoretical model to provide 
evidence that the board utilizes and evaluates information that provides signals regarding 
executive quality outside of performance that may rationally lead the board to retain a CEO, even 
when outside stakeholders may believe that dismissal i  warranted.   
The results of this study indicate that human capital and reputational capital do affect the 
likelihood of dismissal, in addition to a firm’s performance.  Firm tenure, an indication of the 
knowledge that the CEO has gained regarding the firm’s operations, decreases the likelihood of 
dismissal.  As CEOs gain greater tenure, firm specific human capital accumulates and the firm 
risks losing such capital if dismissal occurs.  Additionally, results indicate greater CEO 
compensation in the form of base salary decreases the likelihood of dismissal.  A CEO’s base 
salary is indicative of the firm’s willingness to pay to acquire the capabilities the CEO has 
developed.  Given that base salary is not dependent upon performance, this portion of a CEO’s 
compensation is indicative of the board’s belief in the talent component of the CEO.  Finally, 
results indicate that greater negative publicity rega ding the CEO increases the likelihood of 
dismissal.  Negative publicity in major US newspapers sends a negative signal regarding the 
CEO’s reputation and his or her capabilities to the board of directors, which in turn alters the 
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likelihood of dismissal.  Taken together, these findings provide support for the notion that human 
and reputational capital affect the likelihood of dismissal. This finding is important as it indicates 
that a CEO’s negative reputation as displayed in pri t media can influence the board’s evaluation 
process. 
Despite these findings, several of the arguments of his study were not supported.  First, 
elite education was found to be significantly relatd o dismissal; however, CEOs with elite 
education are more likely to be dismissed.  This may indicate that boards have different 
evaluation patterns and expectations regarding CEOs with elite educations.  Future research 
should continue to examine how CEO’s educational backgrounds impact firm decision making 
and how others evaluate the CEO.  Additionally, no support was found for the role of the “Best 
CEO” certification contest from Institutional Investor magazine.  Prior research has identified 
that certification contests can impact how others evaluate the winner of the contest, such that 
winning awards improves an organization’s or indiviual’s reputations (e.g., Rao, 1994).  
However, results of this study do not find results for such a certification using the Institutional 
Investor list of Best CEOs.  Such results may indicate that certifications do not impact board 
decision making with regard to CEO quality and that performance represents a stronger signal of 
executive quality.  Alternatively, however, the life of the Institutional Investor award was still 
relatively short during the sample timeframe, having been instituted in 2003.  Given that winning 
a Best CEO award is positively correlated with firm performance, firms may not have had to 
make true dismissal decisions on CEOs awarded the Best CEO award, as performance may still 
be high.  Future research should continue to examine whether certification contests alter how 
individuals and boards evaluate CEOs. 
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Second, this study is the first to develop and test a model for whether the market for 
alternative CEO candidates affects the board’s decision to dismiss a CEO.  The decision to 
dismiss a CEO does not occur in a vacuum.  If the firm’s board does not believe a higher quality 
CEO can be acquired when dismissal occurs, the board is committing the firm to unnecessary 
cost (e.g. severance, golden parachutes) and disruption in the organization.  Thus, boards should 
be wary of dismissing executives when capable successors have not already been identified.  
Furthermore, boards also have a duty to dismiss CEOs if better alternatives are available.  These 
arguments suggest that boards must evaluate not only he capabilities of the current CEO, but 
also identify potential alternatives before choosing to dismiss a CEO.  This study identifies a 
variety of candidates both internally and externally that can assist in reducing the likelihood of 
adverse selection and help the board gain comfort with the decision to dismiss the CEO.  Internal 
candidates are visible to the board, have developed relationships within the firm, and understand 
the firm’s operations.  Theoretically, external candidates discussed in this study belong to highly 
visible organizations or are executives with whom the board already has a relationship with, in 
order to be able to assess the capabilities of altern ive executives.  This study builds on prior 
research by examining and testing whether the market for alternative candidates affects the 
likelihood of dismissal.  
Results of this study find some support, though limited, for the notion that alternative 
candidates affect the dismissal decision making process.  The number of non-CEO board insiders 
significantly increases the likelihood of dismissal, such that as the board becomes more familiar 
with more internal candidates, the likelihood of dism ssal increases.  This finding is consistent 
with Shen and Cannella (2002) who note that internal executives may challenge the CEO in a 
socio-political process and co-opt the CEO’s power by going to other board members directly.  
66 
 
Despite this finding, significant results were not ob ained to support the other predictions 
regarding the market for alternative CEO candidates.  Other proxies for internal candidates, 
including the presence of a COO, the number of busines  segments, and the existence of retired 
CEOs on the board of directors do not significantly influence the dismissal decision.  
Additionally, proxies utilized for external candidates did not display significant findings either, 
including the industry’s concentration ratio, the number of board memberships held by directors 
and the location of the firm’s headquarters.  There are several possible explanations for the lack 
of significant results.  First, the proxies utilized within this study may not be representative of the 
process used by the board of directors.  In fact, boards may not truly evaluate potential 
alternatives until the decision to dismiss a CEO is made and an interim CEO has been installed.  
In these cases, boards may believe that any new CEO presents a better alternative and that 
change is necessary.  Change may only occur when the board believes any executive allows for a 
better long-term future.  Additionally, boards may dismiss a CEO and utilize executive search 
firms as the primary means to identify candidates.  The prevalence of executive search firms has 
increased in recent years in order to assist in idetifying quality candidates for firms seeking 
executives.  Thus, boards may not be the parties responsible for identifying candidates and 
alternative processes, including the use of executive search firms, may need to be more fully 
examined in the future.  Second, alternative proxies may better identify how firms evaluate 
external candidates.  For instance, the number of directorships held by the board may not matter 
as much as the quality of those directorships or the overlap among the directorships (e.g. 
directorships in the same industry).  Directors who serve on multiple boards may not believe 
knowledge will transfer from executives of one firm to another.  Additionally, firms may not be 
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able to acquire talent from other firms in the industry for a variety of reasons, including the lack 
of prestige of the firm who wishes to dismiss its CEO.   
In totality, the results of this study provide support for the idea that executive human and 
reputational capital affect how the board evaluates th  CEO’s performance and capabilities, 
while limited support exists for the notion that the board evaluates alternative candidates in the 
decision to dismiss a CEO.  Additionally, some support exists that these processes change as 
firm performance increases or decreases.  Specifically, the level of CEO compensation, negative 
publicity regarding the CEO, and the firm’s location in a major city all work in conjunction with 
firm ROA in order to affect the likelihood of dismissal, such that the likelihood of dismissal is 
different at lower levels of compensation, publicity and firm location as performance changes. 
Future Research 
Future research should continue to understand the decision making process that boards 
use when determining whether to dismiss or retain a CEO.  In particular, greater attention should 
be paid to opening the “black box” behind how boards interact and make decisions regarding 
topics such as CEO dismissal.  For instance, research should examine the group decision making 
dynamics that affect the decision to dismiss a CEO.  The process may be driven by consensus or 
dominated by individual directors.  Additionally, research should examine how these group 
decision making dynamics revolve around group members’ interpersonal relations and individual 
power in order to alter the decision made by the board. 
Second, future research should speak with corporate gov rnance experts and board 
members to better understand the processes used in or er to evaluate CEO capabilities and 
performance.  Furthermore, this research should better link how the evaluation process interacts 
with the dismissal process.  Research is needed to understand how the evaluation of a CEO 
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affects the board’s decision to retain or dismiss a CEO.  For instance, CEO evaluation may lead 
to a negative evaluation of the CEO’s performance; however, the board may believe that such 
performance is unlikely to continue for a variety of reasons, including changes in the general 
environment or the CEO ‘learning curve.’  Research should continue to understand other factors 
that provide additional information that serves as inputs to the board in evaluating the CEO’s 
capabilities. 
Third, research should continue to understand and evaluate how the board identifies 
alternative candidates in the decision to dismiss a CEO and when such an evaluation is 
appropriate.  For instance, some boards may believe the current CEO’s performance to be so 
poor that a change is needed regardless of any potential replacements.  Alternatively, the market 
for alternative candidates may have its greatest impact when performance is only slightly poor, 
as such performance may provide the greatest level of uncertainty regarding the CEO’s 
capabilities.  Additionally, future research should continue to examine other avenues in which 
board members and firms identify alternative CEO candidates and how these candidates may 
impact the decision to dismiss a CEO. 
Finally, future research should continue to explore the concept of CEO reputation.  CEO 
reputation may be a construct with multiple indicators that is developed over time and changes as 
new information is received.  Future research should examine both how a reputation is developed 
and updated over time, as well as the consequences of CEO reputation on CEO, firm, and board 
decision making. 
Limitations 
While this study builds on previous theoretical and empirical work regarding dismissal, it 
is not without its limitations. First, this study utilizes only US based, publicly traded 
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manufacturing firms.  The results identified in this study may not generalize to non-US firms or 
firms outside of manufacturing industries.  However, these results are still important as they 
identify how a series of homogeneous firms examine the decision to dismiss a CEO over a 6 year 
time period and, in many cases, across multiple CEOs. 
Second, this study utilizes only proxies for information evaluated by the board. 
Additionally, this study does not examine the group decision making dynamics that occur in the 
decision to dismiss a CEO.  Without exploring these dynamics, significant results may not be 
identified as group decision making dynamics alter how the information discussed in this study is 
evaluated.  Despite this limitation, the results of this study do provide evidence that the board 
examines the human and reputational capital of a CEO when determining whether to dismiss a 
CEO. 
Conclusion 
While CEO dismissal has become relatively more commn in recent years, few studies 
have moved beyond examining the role that power, politics, and performance play in the 
decision to dismiss a CEO.  This study builds on a growing body of literature that examines this 
decision and utilizes signaling theory, as well as theories on human capital, executive reputation, 
and the market for managerial talent in order to explain how signals of executive capabilities can 
alter the board’s decision making process in determining whether to dismiss a CEO.  Results of 
this study provide evidence that an executive’s human and reputational capital can buffer an 
executive from the board’s decision to dismiss the CEO regardless of performance.  Future 
research should continue to understand this phenomea in greater detail in order to better 
understand how such decisions are made and the informati n that is evaluated in this important 
decision making process. 
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STUDY 2: WHAT HAPPENS TO DISMISSED EXECUTIVES: THE ROLE OF 
HUMAN, REPUTATIONAL, AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CEO RE-E MPLOYMENT  
Introduction 
Dismissals are an increasing phenomenon in the corporate world, with the frequency of 
dismissals occurring at the Chief Executive Officer level reaching new highs each decade 
(Huson et al., 2001).  Poor performance, conflicts wi h top management, strategic disagreements 
with the board, and personality conflicts may all lead to dismissal of top executives.  Despite the 
increasing prevalence of executive dismissal, little research examines what happens to executives 
and their careers following dismissal.  This study examines the likelihood that dismissed CEOs 
regain employment as a top manager of a publicly traded firm within five years following 
dismissal. 
 Dismissal from any employment position can be a difficult time in an individual’s life.  
However, the dismissal of a CEO may indicate that te executive failed in his or her duty to 
effectively lead a firm.  Failure on the part of a CEO may indicate his or her inability to lead 
ethically, to establish appropriate standards of conduct in organization, or merely failure to 
achieve the level of performance desired by the board.  However, each of these explanations may 
affect the likelihood that other organizations are willing to employ the dismissed CEO as a top 
manager going forward, leading to the question as to whether dismissal may represent a stigma 
on the dismissed executive. 
According to the psychology literature on stigmatiztion, a stigma is ‘an attribute that is 
deeply discrediting’, reducing the individual from a ‘whole and usual person to a tainted, 
discounted person’ (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). This denigrat on of the individual negatively impacts 
his or her reputation (Goffman, 1963) and forms a basis for reduced social interaction (Carter & 
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Feld, 2004).  Past research on the likelihood of executive re-employment following dismissal 
from failing firms has identified that relatively few executives regain employment as a top 
manager within five years (e.g., Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 1995; Gilson, 1989, 1990), suggesting 
that dismissal, especially under conditions of leading a failing organization, reduces the 
likelihood that other organizations are willing to interact with executives.  The process of firing a 
CEO may ‘single out’ one individual as warranting the stain and denigration of the 
organization’s failure and assign blame (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008).  This 
process may be difficult to overcome, as other potential employing organizations examining the 
executive’s background and capabilities will not have the same information the CEO’s prior firm 
had when deciding to dismiss the CEO.  Potential employing organizations have limited visible 
information regarding the CEO, of which a major piece is that the CEO was fired.  Thus, 
dismissal likely serves as a form of stigmatization relating to the individual’s re-employability as 
a top executive.  Furthermore, the level of stigma att ched to the executive’s dismissal is likely 
to be based in large part on the circumstances surrounding the executive’s dismissal.  For 
instance, CEOs dismissed for violating fiduciary duty may be more likely to be associated with 
greater levels of stigma than CEOs dismissed for below average performance.   
Despite the potential for stigmatization and reduce social interaction in the form of 
gainful re-employment as a top manager for dismissed executives, several factors may enhance 
the ability of a CEO to overcome the stigma associated with his / her dismissal regardless of the 
circumstances of dismissal.  First, an executive’s human capital, the stock of observable 
characteristics relating to the executive’s cumulative past experience and knowledge, may send a 
signal that the executive represents a quality candid te for employment as a top manager that can 
be successful in a new organization (e.g., Spence, 1973).  Executives with significant 
72 
 
accumulated human capital may send a high quality signal to the marketplace that reasons for 
dismissal were an aberration and that such executives can be a significant asset in a new position.  
Second, executives with high levels of social capital may be able to utilize resources and ties to 
enhance their position (Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996).  Greater accumulated social capital 
may also buffer executives from stigmatization, as social capital may alter how observers react to 
these executives (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  Finally, n executive’s reputation in the marketplace 
may also send a signal that the executive is a worthy candidate for re-employment as a top 
manager.  Reputation serves as the collective judgment of others regarding the executive’s 
capabilities, and executives with greater levels of reputational capital signal that others 
collectively evaluate the executive’s capabilities positively (Graffin & Ward, 2010; Rindova et 
al., 2005; Washington & Zajac, 2005).  Human capital, social capital, and executive reputation 
can each uniquely provide information to the marketplace about an executive’s quality or be used 
as a resource by executives in order to reduce the harmful effects of dismissal and eventually 
find new employment as a top manager.  Furthermore, an xecutive’s stock of human, 
reputational, and social capital may moderate the relationship between circumstances of 
dismissal and likelihood of re-employment, such that executives with higher levels of capital will 
be able to regain employment, even if dismissed for reasons of personal conduct violations or 
poor performance.   
This study examines what factors may allow executives to overcome the harmful effects 
and stigmatization of dismissal to regain employment as a top manager following dismissal 
making several contributions to the existing literau e.  First, this study examines the role that 
circumstances of dismissal play in the likelihood of executive re-employment.  Differing 
circumstances of dismissal may result in differing likelihoods that firms are willing to re-employ 
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a dismissed executive as a top manager.  In other words, the reasons for an executive’s dismissal 
may determine the degree of stigmatization of the executive.  Second, this study argues that 
human, reputational, and social capital can enhance the likelihood that an executive regains 
employment as a top manager within five years of dismissal, suggesting that an executive can 
reduce the degree of stigmatization associated with dismissal.  Finally, this study notes that 
different levels of capital can also affect the degre  of stigma associated with individual 
circumstances surrounding a CEO’s dismissal, such that in the face of different circumstances of 
dismissal, human, reputational, and social capital can provide different effects on the likelihood 
of future employment.  The next sections will examine why dismissal serves as a stigmatizing 
process, how circumstances of dismissal affect likelihood of future employment, and how 
executives buffer themselves from the effects of stigma, prior to examining data related to 
executive re-employment as a top manager following d smissal. 
EXECUTIVE DISMISSAL AND STIGMATIZATION 
 Stigma at the individual level is ‘an attribute tha  is deeply discrediting’ and which 
reduces the bearer ‘from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one’ (Goffman, 1963, 
p.3).  A stigma results when an individual is perceived as belonging to a category that is viewed 
as a basis for disassociation (Leary & Schreindorfer, 1998).  Most importantly, stigma negatively 
impacts the image and reputation of the associated ndividual (Goffman, 1963).  Overall, those 
attached to a stigma are viewed as tainted (Pozner, 2008).  Stigmas thus represent an attribute 
that make others less apt to deal with the associated ndividual (Carter & Feld, 2004).   
 Executive dismissal can serve as a stigmatizing event through a process of singling out 
and shunning. Wiesenfeld and colleagues (2008) noted that stigmatization of executives can 
occur through the process of ‘singling out’, or assigning blame to one individual who is then 
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seen as culpable for failure and warrants denigration.  According to the authors, this ‘singling 
out’ implicates the individual and his or her qualities directly.  In the case of corporate failures, 
the CEO is most likely to be the individual singled out (Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiesenfeld et 
al., 2008).  Once the singling out process occurs, individuals may be involved in a ‘shunning’ 
process.  This process may include pressure on economic arbiters to reject the shunned 
individuals and pushes the executives to ‘the dark recesses of the business world’ (Wiesenfeld et 
al., 2008, p.242) resulting in devaluation of the ex cutive’s capabilities.  Once the individual has 
been shunned, hiring the tarnished person becomes at odds with requirements for legitimacy, 
even if the stigma is believed to be unfair (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  Executive dismissal leads to 
the ‘singling out’ of the CEO as the individual to blame for the organization’s problems, 
regardless of whether the blame is just.  A 2003 article in the Economist quotes an executive 
recruiting expert noting that fired executives are nearly unemployable (Cairncross, 2003).  
Dismissed executives will rarely ever run another public company and may be lucky to retain 
existing board seats.  The recruiting executive even lik ns attempting to gain employment as a 
top manager following dismissal to returning from the dead.  Dismissal is expected to harm 
managerial reputation and make it difficult to gain nother position through a process of ‘settling 
up’ (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Fama, 1980b). 
 Empirical examination of executive career paths following dismissal provides evidence 
that dismissal reduces the willingness of other parties to interact with the dismissed executives in 
a business capacity. Cannella, Fraser, and Lee (1995) find that fired executives in the Texas 
banking industry were unlikely to be rehired and those that do receive gainful re-employment 
often find it in much lesser capacities.  Gilson (1989) examines firms going through bankruptcy 
and finds that none of the managers from the bankrupt firms he studied were found in 
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management posts in other firms within 3 years of leaving the distressed firm.  Similarly, an 
analysis of four bankrupt firms in the computer industry finds that managers suffer severe losses 
in reputation and self-esteem following bankruptcy filings (Sutton & Callahan, 1987).   Fee and 
Hadlock (2004) find that almost 40 percent of executives under the age of 50 that depart 
organizations eventually were found in another executive capacity (e.g. listed on firm proxy 
statements); however, those that did find re-employment usually find it in inferior positions.  
 In the most comprehensive examination of executive rehiring following dismissals, 
Ward, Sonnenfeld, and Kimberly (1995) find that 39 of 60 former CEOs in their sample do not 
resume a career as an executive.  The authors note that dismissed executives have a negative 
stigma associated with them as damaged goods and appear as unsuitable to executive recruiting 
firms, who assist boards when examining candidates for executive positions.  Taken together, 
these results provide significant evidence that the dismissal of a CEO provides a mark that 
discredits an executive’s career and reduces the likelihood that other firms will rehire the 
executive in a significant position.   
Despite these results, it is possible that an executive can regain employment as a top 
manager.  For instance, Ward and colleagues (1995) find 21 of 60 former CEOs did regain 
executive re-employment.  Furthermore, Cannella, Frser, and Lee (1995) note that managers of 
Texas banks that were seen as unable to control the situation were likely to gain re-employment, 
while a limited subset of managers of failing banks also gained executive re-employment.  These 
results provide some hope for dismissed managers that the stigma of dismissal can be overcome 
and the executive can gain re-employment as a top manager.  While few managers may regain 
employment as an executive following dismissal, research has shown that some do, leading us to 
ask why can some regain employment when others cannot. 
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THE EFFECTS OF DISMISSAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON EXECUTIVE  RE-
EMPLOYMENT AS A TOP MANAGER 
The circumstances surrounding an executive’s dismissal may alter the degree of 
stigmatization associated with dismissal.  Executives dismissed following poor performance may 
escape severe stigmatization, as attributions regarding managerial contributions to firm 
performance are often noisy and may not be the manager’s fault (Holmstrom, 1982).  
Alternatively, executives dismissed for personal conduct violations may provide greater levels of 
stigma, such that firms may be unlikely to associate wi h individuals who were dismissed for 
violations relating to personal conduct (Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, & Betman, 1988).  The most serious 
potential violation may be a violation of fiduciary duty.  An executive violating his/her fiduciary 
duty, or a violation of the trust and confidence of the firm’s shareholders, while CEO may never 
be able to regain position as an executive, as the violation indicates the executive did not uphold 
his/her legal obligations to shareholders.   
As noted in Figure 6, the circumstances surrounding an executive’s dismissal should 
directly affect the CEO’s ability to regain employment as an executive.  Executives dismissed for 
reasons of poor performance, violations relating to personal conduct, or violations relating to 
fiduciary duty are less likely to gain re-employment as a top manager.  It is expected, however, 
that violations of fiduciary duty are likely to be associated with the largest level of stigma on an 
executive.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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Despite the potential for stigma following dismissal, executives can rebuild their stature 
and buffer themselves from the effects of dismissal in three primary fashions.  First, executives 
can point to signals of their quality and capabilities as an executive through the accumulation of 
human capital.  Human capital can serve as a signal of the executive’s capabilities through 
endorsements from past actors and indication of the ot rs’ willingness to employ or interact 
with the executive.  Second, the executive’s reputation may signal his or her qualities based on 
past performance and also on the evaluation of others.  When others evaluate the executive 
highly, the executive may be able to retain a strong reputation regardless of dismissal 
circumstances. Finally, executives can utilize accumulated social capital to call on favors from 
other parties, including friends  (Westphal, 1999), and may also alter how others perceive the 
actor through their involvement in high status social rcles (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  
Integration into the corporate elite and accumulation of social capital will alter judgments of the 
executive as members would judge the executive on mre than the instance of one corporate 
failure (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). 
Human, reputational, and social capital may be particularly important when the 
circumstances of dismissal are taken into account, s ggesting that capital moderates the 
relationship between circumstances of dismissal and likelihood of employment as a top 
executive.  This relationship is likely to vary depending on the circumstances of dismissal, such 
that an executive’s capital may provide a stronger buffer from stigmatization under conditions of 
poor performance than under conditions of dismissal due to a violation of fiduciary duty.   
Performance Related Dismissal 
 The performance of the executive’s firm for which he or she was responsible is likely to 
be a meaningful indicator of the executive’s quality, such that firms that perform well should 
78 
 
indicate higher quality executives (Fee & Hadlock, 2004).  Managers in superior performing 
firms know how to win and succeed and also increase the likelihood of a CEO or other executive 
finding gainful employment as a top manager in other firms.  These managers have established a 
track record for performance which will be rewarded by the market (Fama, 1980a).   
Poor performance may indicate, though not necessarily, poorer quality executives.  Firms 
may be wary of re-hiring managers whose prior firms performed poorly.  For instance, evidence 
has shown that managers overseeing firms in financial distress or bankruptcy are much less 
likely to find employment in an executive capacity elsewhere (e.g., Gilson, 1989, 1990; Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987).  Ward, Sonnenfeld, and Kimberly (1995) find that executives dismissed for 
reasons of poor performance were significantly lessikely to regain active executive positions 
elsewhere.   
An executive’s reputation is based in part upon past erformance and actions (Milbourn, 
2003).  While these actions may be difficult to observe and determine  (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982), 
executives who run firms that perform poorly firms ay be signaling their lack of quality and 
capabilities to successfully manage an organization. These executives will need greater levels of 
human, social, and reputational capital to signal the market of their capabilities and their ability 
to be successful in the future.  In order for performance of the executive’s dismissing firm to 
matter, however, the firm must also indicate that te CEO was dismissed for performance-related 
reasons.  Thus, I argue that performance related dismissals are likely to decrease the executive’s 
prospects for future re-employment more than dismisal due to reasons that are unspecified at the 
time of the dismissal. 
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Hypothesis 34: Executives dismissed for performance related reasons will be less likely 
to regain re-employment as an executive than executiv s not dismissed for performance 
related reasons. 
Violations of Fiduciary Duty   
Ethical and legal standards are often viewed with great significance.  Therefore, violation 
of ethical and legal standards is often viewed with particular indignation and results in a large 
backlash against the violator (Tetlock, 2002).  In the case of CEOs, violation of ethical and legal 
standards may lead to punishment or singling out of specific events leading to stigmatization 
(Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  One great source of potential outrage is the committing of unethical 
behavior, such as leading to earnings restatements, committing fraud, or shirking on the job 
(Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  In these cases, the executive has not proven his or her lack of 
competence, but rather has proven he or she lacks integrity.  At the individual level, trust is much 
more difficult to restore for those perceived to lack integrity than for those who lack competence 
(Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).  Thus, executives who commit legal or ethical violations 
are expected to be much more likely to not only lose their position as CEO, but also to be 
shunned by the market from gaining future employment as a top executive.  For instance, 
coaches in college athletics who violate NCAA rules and commit ethical violations are 
significantly less likely to gain re-employment, and when opportunities arise they are at smaller 
or less prestigious universities and programs.  Thekey argument here, however, is not just that 
illegal or unethical behavior occurs at an organization, but also that the executive’s dismissal is 
linked to it.  Linking the executive to the behavior creates the stigmatization and warns other 
organizations not to trust the executive. These typs of violations relate directly to a violation of 
the CEO’s fiduciary duty to properly manage shareholder value.  Failing to uphold an 
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executive’s fiduciary duty exhibits the individuals’ lack of trustworthiness, as such actions 
represent opportunistic behavior on the part of the CEO at the expense of shareholders. 
 The limited empirical literature on this topic provides some evidence that CEOs fired for 
ethical or legal violations are significantly less likely to find future employment as a top 
manager.  For instance, Desai, Hogans, and Wilkins (2006) find that managers of firms with 
earnings restatements are not likely to find future jobs and those that do suffer a deterioration in 
job quality.  Managers involved in scandal are also significantly less likely to find re-
employment as a top manager, with scandals representing a far worse case than other types of 
forced departures examined (Fee & Hadlock, 2004).  Finally, Ward, Sonnenfeld, and Kimberly 
(1995) also note that executives who were fired for illegal behavior were significantly less likely 
to find gainful re-employment than other executives.  These findings suggest that executives 
responsible for ethical or legal violations at a prior firm are stigmatized, which leads to shunning 
by other organizations who choose not to associate with such executives.  Therefore, I expect 
that violations of fiduciary duty will make it especially difficult to gain future employment as a 
top executive. 
Hypothesis 35: Executives dismissed for violations of fiduciary duty will be less likely to 
be re-employed as an executive than executives not dismissed for violations of fiduciary 
duty. 
Personal Conduct Violations   
Ethical and legal violations represent that the executive has not acted in accordance with 
the desires of his or her firm’s primary stakeholders in many cases.  However, executives may 
also be dismissed for violations relating to personal conduct that may place the organization in a 
negative light.  Violations of personal conduct often relate to moral and legal standards and are 
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also an important consideration with regards to executives, as CEOs are often the public face of 
an organization.  Violations of moral standards are oft n also viewed in a very negative light and 
may yield punitive action against the violator (Tetlock, 2002).  Violations of personal conduct do 
not relate directly to an organization’s operations, but may include illegal behavior on the part of 
the executive (e.g. arrested for behavior outside of the office) or personal conduct that violates 
societal norms (e.g. adultery, falsifying a resume).  Previous research has noted that dismissed 
executives involved in both personal mismanagement or executive scandal are less likely to find 
re-employment in an executive capacity (Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Ward et al., 1995).  The reduced 
likelihood of hiring an executive stigmatized by personal scandal is likely as scandals bring 
negative publicity about the individual, which creates tarnish or stain with which the 
organization may not want to be associated.  Furthermore, stakeholders may pressure the 
organization not to be involved with an executive whose behaviors are not in line with their 
expectations of behavior.  In these situations, firms may shy away from hiring stigmatized 
managers with personal character concerns in order to avoid having personal problems tarnish 
the firm’s reputation. 
Hypothesis 36: Executives dismissed for reasons of personal conduct violations will be 
less likely to regain re-employment as an executive than executives not dismissed for 
personal conduct violations. 
Degrees of Stigmatization based on Dismissal Circumstances 
 While each set of circumstances leading to dismissal  expected to yield some degree of 
stigmatization with regards to the executive, each set of circumstances is also likely to be viewed 
differently when evaluated by other stakeholders.  With regards to performance, attributions for 
performance are often noisy and include a variety of external factors that alter performance, 
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making it easier for managers to attribute performance to factors outside their control 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972).  In situations where executives may not be in 
control, studies have shown that executives are more likely to regain employment (Cannella et 
al., 1995).  In other words, executives may be ableto deflect blame for poor performance onto 
other factors, such as industry conditions, and illustrate their other qualities in order to improve 
how others view the CEO’s ability. 
 Executives attempting to bounce back from personal violations and violations of 
fiduciary duty may face a different story.  Executives who violate personal standards of conduct, 
such as getting into legal trouble, may be able to re-gain employment; however, this process will 
be more difficult, as blame for past troubles cannot be shifted.  These executives, however, 
should be more likely to regain employment than executives committing violations of fiduciary 
duty, as violations of fiduciary duty call into question an executive’s ability to exert a high 
standard of care on behalf of the shareholders and c not be entrusted with managing 
shareholder value. Violations of personal conduct, while associated with the individual, merely 
indicate the individual made a personal mistake.  However, this mistake may be overcome and 
the individual can atone for the violation and provide significant value to an organization.  That 
is, through statements of apology and remorse, or thr ugh behaviors shown to indicate penance 
for the culpability of their actions, executives dimissed due to personal conduct violations may 
prove they are worth being provided a second chance.  Violations of fiduciary duty, however, 
call into question whether an executive can ever lead a company with integrity again.  In such 
situations, publicly traded firms are unlikely to associate with such executives. 
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Hypothesis 37: Executives dismissed for reasons of po r performance or personal 
conduct violations will be more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than 
executives dismissed for violations of fiduciary duty. 
EXECUTIVE CAPITAL AS A BUFFER FROM STIGMA’S EFFECTS  
While dismissal can clearly have negative effects on an executive’s future career 
prospects (e.g., Gilson, 1989, 1990; Houston & James, 1993; Ward et al., 1995), executives may 
also use accumulated human, reputational, and social capital in order to regain employment 
following dismissal.  In the dark times following dismissal, leaders need to rally friends and 
acquaintances in order to rebuild their stature and reputation (Sonnenfeld & Ward, 2007).   
Human Capital and Executive Stigma 
 Human capital, such as the executive’s education and experience, represents past actions 
and accomplishments, but can also signal future performance in the labor market (Fulmer, 2009; 
Rosenbaum, 1984).  These observable characteristics can help employers identify the likelihood 
of success an individual may have in their organizations, as well as provide information 
regarding the expertise an individual may bring if hired (Spence, 1973).  Human capital can help 
buffer individuals from the effects of stigmatization by signaling the executive’s quality, which 
may illustrate the expected future gains from the employment relationship. More importantly, 
executives with significant accumulation of human cpital, including having worked for 
prestigious organizations or having attended elite universities, may gain entry into the network of 
corporate elites through this status (Westphal & Stern, 2006).  This network of corporate elites 
may shield the executive from the effects of stigma. 
 A variety of human capital attributes may help provide this buffer and continue to serve 
as signals of the executive’s quality even after dismissal that may allow organizations to employ 
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the executive as a top manager, including the executiv ’s knowledge in an industry, prior 
experience with high status actors, educational level and prestige of the executive’s educational 
institutions attended. 
Experience with Prestigious Organizations.  Previous affiliation with prestigious 
organizations may impact a dismissed executive’s future job prospects.  Working for prestigious 
organizations can help enhance future job prospects and allows individuals to make transitions to 
other organizations more successfully (Hamori, 2006).  Organizations that are prestigious and 
reputable instill ‘career imprints’ on employees that are valued by other organizations in the 
market (Higgins, 2005).  Affiliation with prestigious firms increases an executive’s prominence 
as the association enables future employers to assume that such industry leaders have positively 
evaluated the executive (Stuart, 2000).   
Specifically, reputable organizations facilitate development of employee capabilities by 
hiring the most talented individuals, providing better  mentors, and training and immersing the 
individuals in the company’s superior industry and product knowledge (Crane, 1965; Higgins & 
Gulati, 2003; Long, 1978).  This experience signals quality in the executive in terms of both a 
reputable third-party’s endorsement of the candidate and the candidate’s own development 
through involvement in and understanding of a leading firm’s operations. 
Experience as an executive with high status or prestigious organizations may help buffer 
the executive from stigmatization.  This experience signals to the market that high status actors 
evaluated the executive positively.  This evaluation indicates that the executive has knowledge, 
capabilities, and/or expertise that were valuable to a prestigious organization and that may be 
valuable to other organizations in the future.  Furthermore, dismissed executives with previous 
experience in prestigious firms are more likely to have ties with members of the corporate elite 
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who are willing to assure others of the executive’s capabilities when attempting to gain re-
employment as an executive. 
Hypothesis 38: Dismissed executives with executive exp rience in a prestigious firm are 
more likely to be re-employed as an executive than dismissed executives who do not have 
executive experience in a prestigious firm. 
Executive Education Level. A manager’s education influences the experiences, both 
functional and otherwise, that the manager acquires ov r time (Castanias & Helfat, 2001).  
Education has been shown to be a significant predictor of compensation in previous studies (e.g., 
Agarwal, 1981; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992), indicating that the market values the education of 
employees.  Executives with greater levels of education signal higher quality and greater ability, 
as greater levels of education can help instill newp rspectives, greater knowledge, and new 
expertise in executives.  When organizations assess managerial quality, educational level serves 
as a signal of cognitive orientation for future decision making and performance.  Thus, I argue 
that individuals with greater levels of education will have a greater chance of achieving re-
employment as a top manager in the future. 
Hypothesis 39: Dismissed executives with greater levels of education are more likely to 
be re-employed as an executive than dismissed executives who have lesser levels of 
education. 
Prestige of the Executive’s Education. Education at prestigious institutions also yields 
additional human capital which may send a strong signal to the market when evaluating 
dismissed executives.  Education from elite universiti s creates greater credibility and prestige 
than association with less visible schools (Baltzell, 1989; Clement, 1977; Domhoff, 1967).  
Promotion to top corporate positions has been noted t  be more influenced by executives who 
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earned a degree from an elite university (Useem & Karabel, 1986). Graduation from an elite 
institution may not only yield a perceived higher quality education, but also provides access to an 
extensive network of successful contacts. Finally, graduation from an elite institution signals that 
the institution was willing to accept the CEO as a candidate and that the CEO had the ability to 
complete the rigorous process to receive a degree. 
Graduation from a prestigious institution can therefore help to buffer an executive from 
the effects of the stigma of dismissal in three ways.  First, graduation from a prestigious 
institution serves as a high quality signal about an executive’s capability in that the institution 
was willing to accept the CEO.  This endorsement serves as a signal to the marketplace that the 
institution had belief in the executive’s abilities.  Second, graduating from a prestigious 
institution signals that the executive has the knowledge and capabilities to complete a rigorous 
educational program.  This signal provides evidence that the executive is willing to work hard, 
but also has obtained the requisite knowledge and skills to meet the institution’s degree 
requirements.  Finally, graduation from a prestigious institution also grants access into the 
network of elite who have also graduated from the institution.  Dismissed executives may utilize 
this network to buffer themselves from the effects of tigma by calling upon others for 
employment as an executive or by vouching for the executive’s capabilities and expertise to 
others following dismissal. 
Hypothesis 40: Dismissed executives who have graduate  from an elite educational 
institution are more likely to be re-employed as an executive than dismissed executives 
who have not graduated from an elite educational institution. 
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Reputational Capital and Executive Stigma 
 An executive’s reputation is the result of information exchanges and social influences 
among various actors (Rao, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999).  The continued appraisal of an 
actor’s performance is one subset of the executive’s reputation that affects how others view the 
quality or capabilities of the executive (Carter & Ruefli, 2006).  However, attributions of 
managerial ability are often difficult to make as the market has difficulty in determining how 
much of an organization’s performance can be attributed to the executive due to systematic risk 
factors at the organizational and industry level (Holmstrom, 1982).  However, executive 
reputation can also be enhanced through proxies or signals that allow others to make assumptions 
about the quality of the executive (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Kreps & Spence, 1985; Rao, 
1994).  In this regard, reputation becomes a socially constructed entity that may be based on the 
outcome of legitimation processes (Rao, 1994). 
 In particular, certification contests can provide a means of reducing uncertainty regarding 
the quality of an executive (Graffin & Ward, 2010; Rao, 1994; Rindova et al., 2005).  When the 
marginal contribution of executives is difficult to assess, powerful stakeholders will look to 
certification contests to provide useful cues about the executive’s ability (Wade et al., 2006).  
Certification contests refer to competitions in which actors in a given domain are ranked based 
upon performance criteria that have been accepted previously as credible or legitimate by 
stakeholders (Wade et al., 2006).  These contests gnerate information from reputable observers 
that evaluate and endorse certain actors in a given domain (Rao, 1994; Wade et al., 2006) and 
influence evaluations of an individual’s quality (Rindova et al., 2005).  At their heart, 
certification contests allow for clear and comparable attributions of an actor’s quality or 
capabilities vis-à-vis others’ relative worth or standing (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).  Certifications 
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that are awarded by experts and independent arbiters confer a positive reputation on the certified 
individual or organization and lead to increased prestige power (Wade et al., 2006).   
 With regard to CEOs, certifications are likely to be one of the few neutral and 
independent sources of information regarding a CEO’s contribution and capabilities (Wade et al., 
2006).  These contests can also reduce the ambiguity surrounding the executive’s contribution to 
potential performance of his or her previous organiz tions (Graffin & Ward, 2010).  The effects 
of certification contests not only provide quality signals to an executive’s current employer, but 
also send a signal to the entire market that the executive is of high quality or provides substantial 
contributions to his or her organization. Thus, I argue that an executive’s reputation should have 
an impact on prospects for future employment in an executive capacity for several reasons.  First, 
given that certification contests send a signal rega ding the positive contributions of the 
executive, the executive should maintain credibility and reputational capital even after dismissal, 
as independent experts have highly valued the executiv ’s capabilities.  Second, firms looking to 
hire dismissed executives can point to the certification contest’s endorsement of the executive as 
proof that the executive can bring valuable capabilities and expertise to the firm, even after the 
executive has been previously dismissed.  This allows the potential hiring firm to downplay any 
loss in legitimacy that may be associated with dealing with a stigmatized or shunned executive.  
Third, information that negatively influences an executive’s reputation may reduce the likelihood 
of re-employment, as firms may not be willing to associate with executives who are negatively 
viewed by external parties.  
Hypothesis 41: Dismissed executives with greater positive reputational capital are more 
likely to be re-employed as an executive than dismis ed executives with lower levels of 
reputational capital. 
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Social Capital and Executive Stigma  
 An executive’s social capital may provide additional benefits beyond his or her human 
capital that can buffer the executive from the harmful effects of stigmatization.  Social capital 
refers to resources available through both social networks and institutional ties that individuals 
can use to enhance their positions (Belliveau et al., 1996).  Sociologists view social capital in 
terms of the benefits that actors can obtain through the social ties they develop over time (Burt, 
1992; Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998).  Social capital may provide information, influence, and 
solidarity resources to prevent the shunning process from occurring for dismissed executives 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).   
 Specifically social capital can help reduce the harmful effects of dismissal on an 
executive’s future job prospects in several ways.  First, social capital through personal contacts 
and network ties can allow for the executive to call on favors from others within his or her 
network (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Useem & Karabel, 1986) which can be crucial to advancement.  
Sonnenfeld and Ward (2007) note that our society has a norm of reciprocity where people can 
pay forward help they have received from others and seek opportunities to do favors for those in 
their network in case they need help in the future.  S cond, CEOs with higher levels of prestige 
through social capital may be seen as more competent, cr dible, or trustworthy (D'Aveni, 1990; 
Giordano, 1983).  Third, executives with higher status may be excused for past poor performance 
as others may believe their attention was absorbed by other issues (Carson, 1980).  Fourth, as 
executives become more ingrained in the corporate elite, other members of the elite are likely to 
judge them for more than one instance of failure (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  Social capital can 
thus alter the way that other observers react to the dismissed executive.  As executives gain 
greater social capital they have more individuals and network resources to call upon in times of 
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need.  Finally, organizations may value executives with significant levels of social capital as they 
may provide access to new resources or valuable knowledge bases to which the organization did 
not have already have access (Brown & Duguid, 1998).  Furthermore, firms may gain legitimacy 
through hiring executives with previous CEO experience to serve as a member of the executive 
team. 
 Each of these arguments highlights the importance that significant external relationships 
may play in buffering an executive from the effects of dismissal on future employment 
prospects.  Specifically, I argue that the size of the network through directorship contacts and 
relationships with other firms, as well as the location of the executive’s dismissing firm can all 
influence whether or not the executive can obtain another executive position in the future. 
 Number of Directorships. An executive’s links to others in a social network can often 
be built and strengthened through direct contact via board memberships.  Serving on the board of 
directors for another firm allows the firm’s other di ectors, as well as the firm’s management 
team, to assess the qualities and the capabilities of the executive (Khurana, 2002).  Prior 
acquaintanceship through director ties allows for other directors to vouch for the executive’s 
capabilities and his or her qualities as a director (Khurana, 2002).  As executives gain access to 
more directorships, the size of their network grows, increasing their potential social capital.  
These networks can also provide access to information regarding new opportunities and better 
career outcomes (Granovetter, 1995).   
 Greater numbers of directorships can help executives overcome dismissal by allowing 
them to call in favors with individuals in their network when their career is at risk (Wiesenfeld et 
al., 2008).  Given that the best jobs are likely to be filled through personal contacts (Granovetter, 
1995), the greater the size of an executive’s network, the more likely he or she is able to use the 
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network to help find future employment in an executive capacity.  Specifically, directorships 
provide a better way for executives to develop contacts and social capital that will be useful in 
the future when seeking executive re-employment.  Other directors tend to either serve as 
directors or executives for other firms, who are influential when seeking external candidates for 
executive positions and vouching for the qualities and capabilities of executive candidates. 
Hypothesis 42:  Dismissed executives with greater numbers of external directorships are 
more likely to be re-employed as an executive than dismissed executives with fewer 
numbers of external directorships. 
 Number of Executive Positions. In addition to directorships, the prior experience of the 
candidate at other firms also increases the size of an executive’s network.  Executives who have 
served in the capacity of an executive (CEO or otherwis ) for more firms will have a greater 
number of personal contacts from those firms they can potentially call in when in times of need.  
These executives will have a greater number of ties to other executives who are influential in the 
hiring decisions at their firms (Granovetter, 1995).  Furthermore, the familiarity of the 
individuals through ties related to executive employment may allow individuals in the 
executive’s social network to more personally vouch for the executive’s capabilities and reduce 
the potential for adverse selection at a firm choosing to hire a dismissed executive. As the size of 
the executive’s network increases, the executive is more likely to be able to utilize this capital in 
order to find alternative positions in the future.   
Hypothesis 43: Dismissed executives with greater numbers of executive positions in their 
career are more likely to be re-employed as an executive than dismissed executives with 
fewer numbers of executive positions. 
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 Geographical Location.  An executive’s physical location may also enhance the value of 
existing social networks and ties that have been developed or provide access to additional 
networks.  While social networks may facilitate trans ctions worldwide, ideas particularly flow 
through denser networks in local areas (Davis & Greve, 1997; Marquis, 2003).  Local boards 
tend to be dominated by a relatively small group of executives in a given area and local 
colleagues tend to be offered these seats when they become available (Ward & Feldman, 2008).  
Friedland and Palmer (1994) find that geographic proximity is an important predictor of 
invitations to join boards of directors, as 27 percent of ties among Fortune 1000 firms were from 
companies headquartered in the same state.  This logic suggests that ties are likely to be 
reconstituted among directors of firms headquartered in the same area (Palmer et al., 1986).   
 Geographical location of the executive can thus play a role in evaluating whether an 
executive can regain executive status following dismis al.  Given the above arguments, 
executives whose corporations were headquartered in larger metropolitan locations should have 
access to a larger social network of other elite executives and influential colleagues.  Dismissed 
executives in larger metropolitan areas more likely have had greater exposure to influential 
executives and economic arbiters to reduce the effects of stigmatization on the dismissed 
executive.  Thus, geographic location should serve in helping certain executives enhance their 
social capital and reduce the effects of past job loss on future employment prospects. 
Hypothesis 44:  Dismissed executives whose position as CEO was in a major city are 
more likely to be re-employed as an executive than dismissed executives whose position 
as CEO were in smaller markets. 
THE INTERACTION OF DISMISSAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND EXEC UTIVE 
CAPITAL 
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 While human, reputational, and social capital may send quality signals to the market 
about a dismissed executive’s capabilities and likelihood of future success, the circumstances 
surrounding an executive’s dismissal may limit the eff ctiveness of these signals.  In some cases, 
the degree of stigmatization associated with the executive’s dismissal may not be overcome by 
the amount of capital accumulated by the executive.  For instance, employers may be unwilling 
to hire an executive fired for embezzling money from a prior firm even if that executive had a 
strong reputation as a CEO, graduated from elite institutions, and had work experience a large 
number of prestigious institutions.  In these circumstances, the signal sent by the circumstances 
surrounding the executive’s dismissal may be significantly stronger than the executive’s own 
accumulated human, reputational, and social capital. 
Performance Related Dismissal and Executive Capital 
 Executives who are fired for performance related reasons will encounter significant 
hurdles to gaining re-employment, as poor performance i dicates a lower quality executive (Fee 
& Hadlock, 2004).  When dismissal is associated with poor firm performance, the executive is 
associated with poor personal performance and tied to the lack of success of his or her firing 
firm.  Specifically, when firms face financial distress or bankruptcy, executives are much less 
likely to find future employment as a top manager (Gilson, 1989, 1990; Sutton & Callahan, 
1987).  Performance of an executive’s prior firm sends a signal separate from the executive’s 
capital about the executive’s ability to effectively manage a firm.  However, alternative signals 
regarding an executive’s capabilities may help provide differing cues regarding the executive’s 
potential contribution to a new organization.  An executive’s human, reputational, and social 
capital may help a new organization attribute prior p or performance to factors outside the 
executive’s control, such that executives with higher levels of human, reputational, and social 
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capital will be more likely to gain re-employment as  top manager in the future, even in the face 
of poor performance.  In these situations, executives may be able to use the evaluations of others 
or call in favors through social capital in order to persuade organizations to hire the dismissed 
executive in the capacity of a top manager. 
Hypothesis 45: A dismissed executive’s prior experience in a prestigious organization 
will moderate the relationship between performance related CEO dismissal and 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with 
experience in a prestigious firm will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives without experience in a prestigious firm. 
Hypothesis 46: A dismissed executive’s level of education will moderate the relationship 
between performance related CEO dismissal and likelihood of re-employment as an 
executive such that dismissed executives with greater levels of education will be more 
likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives with lower levels 
of education. 
Hypothesis 47: A dismissed executive’s education at a prestigious institution will 
moderate the relationship between performance related CEO dismissal and likelihood of 
re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with education at a 
prestigious institution will be more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than 
dismissed executives without education at a prestigious institution. 
Hypothesis 48: A dismissed executive’s reputation will moderate the relationship between 
performance related CEO dismissal and likelihood of re-employment as an executive 
such that dismissed executives with a more positive reputation will be more likely to gain 
re-employment as an executive than dismissed executiv s with a less positive reputation. 
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Hypothesis 49: A dismissed executive’s number of directorships will moderate the 
relationship between performance related CEO dismisal and likelihood of re-
employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with a greater number of 
directorships will be more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed 
executives with fewer directorships. 
Hypothesis 50: A dismissed executive’s number of previous executive positions will 
moderate the relationship between performance related CEO dismissal and likelihood of 
re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with a greater number of 
previous executive positions will be more likely to gain re-employment as an executive 
than dismissed executives with fewer previous executiv  positions. 
Hypothesis 51: A dismissed executive’s location in a major city will moderate the 
relationship between performance related CEO dismisal and likelihood of re-
employment as an executive such that dismissed executives located in a major city will be 
more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives not located 
in a major city. 
Violations of Fiduciary Duty and Executive Capital 
 Violations of fiduciary duty are likely to be associated with the greatest degree of stigma 
on an executive’s career.  Such violations indicate the executive is untrustworthy, acts 
opportunistically, or intentionally mismanaged or mishandled shareholder money.  Such 
executives are likely never to regain employment in an executive position, given the loss of 
legitimacy and reputation that would be associated with hiring such an offender.  However, 
executives having been dismissed due to violations of fiduciary duty may be more likely to be 
employed by organizations under several potential circumstances.  First, executives dismissed 
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for violating fiduciary duty may be able to leverage significant social capital in order to call in 
favors to gain re-employment.  If dismissed executives are well tied into social networks, these 
networks may facilitate re-employment for another mmber of the ‘inner circle’ and shield the 
individual from the effects of stigmatization.  Second, executives with higher levels of human 
capital may attempt to distance themselves from the effects of the stigma associated with the 
violation of fiduciary duty.  In such situations, executives may argue that they were unaware 
certain actions were occurring (e.g. accounting misstatements, organizational fraud).  Executives 
with higher levels of capital accumulated may argue that they are both an executive that acts with 
integrity, but also one that exhibits higher quality.  If executives can decouple themselves from 
the violation of fiduciary duty, another organization may be willing to hire the executive in a top 
management capacity. 
Hypothesis 52: A dismissed executive’s prior experience in a prestigious organization 
will moderate the relationship between dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with 
experience in a prestigious firm will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives without experience in a prestigious firm. 
Hypothesis 53: A dismissed executive’s level of education will moderate the relationship 
between dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and likelihood of re-employment as 
an executive such that dismissed executives with greater levels of education will be more 
likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives with lower levels 
of education. 
Hypothesis 54: A dismissed executive’s education at a prestigious institution will 
moderate the relationship between dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and 
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likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with 
education at a prestigious institution will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives without education  a prestigious institution. 
Hypothesis 55: A dismissed executive’s reputation will moderate the relationship between 
dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and like ihood of re-employment as an 
executive such that dismissed executives who have won a certification contest will be 
more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives who have 
not won a certification contest. 
Hypothesis 56: A dismissed executive’s number of directorships will moderate the 
relationship between dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and likelihood of re-
employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with a greater number of 
directorships will be more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed 
executives with fewer directorships. 
Hypothesis 57: A dismissed executive’s number of previous executive positions will 
moderate the relationship between dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with a greater 
number of previous executive positions will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives with fewer previous executive positions. 
Hypothesis 58: A dismissed executive’s location in a major city will moderate the 
relationship between dismissal due to violations of fiduciary duty and likelihood of re-
employment as an executive such that dismissed executives located in a major city will be 
more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives not located 
in a major city. 
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Personal Conduct Violations and Executive Capital 
 An executive’s accumulated capital may not only assist in finding re-employment when 
dismissal was related to performance, but may also enhance job prospects when dismissal occurs 
due to problems relating to personal conduct.  While dismissal due to personal conduct problems 
may decrease the likelihood of re-gaining employment as a top manager, an executive’s capital 
may increase the likelihood other organizations are willing to take a chance and hire the 
executive for several reasons.  First, accumulated human, reputational, and social capital can 
signal the executive’s quality, which allows the organization to point to the positive attributes of 
the executive, reducing the negative elements of the s igma. Organizations can argue that they 
are enhancing shareholder value by hiring a capable executive to serve in a top management 
position.  Second, organizations may be willing to forgive an individual’s personal issues when 
the individual seeks forgiveness if the new hiring firm has individuals with a personal 
relationship with the executive.  This social capitl can allow for the dismissed executive’s 
network ties to vouch for the personal characteristics of the dismissed executive given past 
interpersonal interactions.  Taken together, these arguments suggest that executives dismissed for 
reasons of personal conduct violations can have a significantly higher probability of re-
employment as an executive if they have accumulated gr ater stakes of human, reputational, and 
social capital. 
Hypothesis 59: A dismissed executive’s prior experience in a prestigious organization 
will moderate the relationship between dismissal due to personal conduct violations and 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with 
experience in a prestigious firm will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives without experience in a prestigious firm. 
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Hypothesis 60: A dismissed executive’s level of education will moderate the relationship 
between dismissal due to personal conduct violations and likelihood of re-employment as 
an executive such that dismissed executives with greater levels of education will be more 
likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives with lower levels 
of education. 
Hypothesis 61: A dismissed executive’s education at a prestigious institution will 
moderate the relationship between dismissal due to personal conduct violations and 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with 
education at a prestigious institution will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives without education  a prestigious institution. 
Hypothesis 62: A dismissed executive’s reputation will moderate the relationship between 
dismissal due to personal conduct violations and likelihood of re-employment as an 
executive such that dismissed executives with a more positive reputation will be more 
likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives with a less 
positive reputation. 
Hypothesis 63: A dismissed executive’s number of directorships will moderate the 
relationship between dismissal due to personal conduct violations and likelihood of re-
employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with a greater number of 
directorships will be more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed 
executives with fewer directorships. 
Hypothesis 64: A dismissed executive’s number of previous executive positions will 
moderate the relationship between dismissal due to personal conduct violations and 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive such that dismissed executives with a greater 
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number of previous executive positions will be more likely to gain re-employment as an 
executive than dismissed executives with fewer previous executive positions. 
Hypothesis 65: A dismissed executive’s location in a major city will moderate the 
relationship between dismissal due to personal conduct violations and likelihood of re-
employment as an executive such that dismissed executives located in a major city will be 
more likely to gain re-employment as an executive than dismissed executives not located 
in a major city. 
METHODS  
Sample 
 The sample for this study was drawn from all publicly traded firms not in industries 
related to banking or finance with more than 1000 employees.  All CEO turnover events for each 
firm identified were researched for the years 2005 and 2006.  This time period was selected in 
order to utilize data on CEO reputation, as well as examine a five year time period following 
dismissal to determine the likelihood of regaining executive employment.  The initial sample 
consisted of 2,256 firm-year observations covering 1,267 firms.  From this sample, 299 CEO 
turnover events were identified, which allowed for the determination by an independent coder of 
whether the CEO was dismissed or departed for other reasons.   
 Identifying dismissals of CEOs represents a significant challenge in management 
research, as firms do not often disclose why CEOs resign or depart (Denis & Denis, 1995; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Shen & Cannella, 2002).  However, recent research has identified 
several techniques in order to better identify dismis als that have more successfully helped 
identify when CEOs resign or are fired (e.g., Shen & Cannella, 2002).  Given the success of 
these approaches at identifying dismissals (e.g., Shen & Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006, 2008), this 
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study follows the initial approach used by Shen and Cannella (2002) relying on news reports and 
descriptions of the event surrounding the departure of a CEO from a sample firm. 
 News reports were examined to understand the reasons for all executive successions.  
Successions that were the result of a CEO’s death, health reasons, acceptance of a similar 
position at another firm, or a merger or acquisition were not coded as dismissals. Three criteria 
were then used to identify instances defined as dismissals.  First, a CEO may be directly reported 
as fired or forced out; however, this is rare.  Second, a CEO is reported as resigning under 
pressure, unexpectedly, or immediately, due to poorerformance, personal reasons that are not 
indicated, or desires to pursue “other interests.”  Third, cases where CEOs choose early 
retirement, but discussion of performance problems is reported in the announcement, were 
classified as dismissals.  As noted by Shen and Cannell  (2002), CEOs may have little choice but 
to resign when pressure surrounding their performance is high.  Additionally, this study builds on 
Shen and Cannella’s criteria for dismissal by identifyi g any situation where problems of any 
kind (e.g. SEC investigation, accounting restatements) exist as a dismissal, in addition to 
discussion of performance problems.  CEO turnovers w re classified as a dismissal if any of the 
above criteria are met.  After analyzing the sample of 299 turnover events for reasons relating to 
dismissal, 88 of the CEO turnovers identified were classified as dismissals. 
 All firm information and performance information was gathered from CompuStat and 
firm proxy statements.  Identification of CEOs each year was done through the Corporate 
Library database and supplemented by ExecuComp.  Information on CEOs was gathered through 
Corporate Library, Marquis’ Who’s Who On the Web, Standard & Poor’s Corporate Register of 
Directors & Executives, Dun & Bradstreet’s Referenc Book of Corporate Management, and 
Forbes, as well as from other company and executive profiles where available.  Data on 
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executive directorships was gathered from Corporate Library and other biographical information 
and data on previous positions was gathered from ExecuComp.  Data on geographical locations 
was gathered from the United States Census Bureau. 
Dependent Variable 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the likelihood of dismissed CEOs regaining 
executive re-employment at a publicly traded organiz tion.  Thus the dependent variable of this 
study is whether the executive regained employment as an executive in a given year in a publicly 
traded firm.  This variable is measured as Rehired as Public Executive, defined as whether or not 
the executive gained employment in an executive capa ity at a publicly traded firm during the 
observation year.  Each dismissed executive was tracked by examining biographical information 
following dismissal in order to identify the next job obtained by the CEO.  Data on each 
executive was gathered for each year, up to five years; however, observations for a CEO were no 
longer gathered for any years after the year in which an executive regained employment in an 
executive capacity.  Executives were considered re-employed in a given year if in a new position 
they were listed on a publicly traded firm’s proxy statement.  The use of this metric is the same 
as previous research examining executive dismissal and re-hiring (e.g., Gilson, 1989).  This 
measure is appropriate, as it determines whether or not the executive was hired into a 
meaningful, executive capacity in a new position.  Dismissed executives may take lower level 
executive positions in order to regain employment, bu  the purpose of this study is to examine 
how strong the stigmatizing effects of dismissal are on executive careers and whether the effects 
of human, social, and reputational capital can limit the stigmatization that executives experience.  
The variable Rehired as Public Executive r presents a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an 
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executive appears on a publicly traded proxy statement as an executive in the observation year, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
 Circumstances of Dismissal.  The reason why an executive is dismissed may influece 
perceptions of the executive in the external labor ma ket following dismissal.  Thus, three 
circumstances were identified that may impact perceptions of the executive.  Performance 
dismissal is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if news reports at the time of dismissal include 
discussion of poor performance or performance related problems.  This variable serves as a 
measure of whether the executive was dismissed due to poor performance.  Fiduciary violation 
represents a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if news reports at the time of the executive’s 
dismissal indicate the executive was involved in an ethical or legal violation relating to the firm 
and its operations and 0 otherwise.  Examples of these include fraudulent behavior, stock option 
backdating, or securities class action lawsuits.  Personal conduct violation is a dichotomous 
variable set equal to 1 if news reports at the timeof the executive’s dismissal indicate that the 
executive was dismissed for reasons relating to personal conduct that do not involve the firm’s 
operations.  These may include personally illegal behavior or personal conduct problems (e.g. 
falsifying one’s resume), but do not include health reasons.   
 These circumstances do not represent the entire wealth of reasons for why executives 
may be dismissed.  For instance, executives may be dismissed due to conflicts of interest with 
the board or a disagreement over strategy.  Thus, executives may be classified into no more than 
one of the three categories identified; however, not all executives must be categorized into one of 
the three categories. 
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 Human Capital. Prestige experience is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the CEO 
has served as an executive listed on a proxy statement of any Fortune 500 company at any point 
in their career and 0 otherwise.  Fortune 500 companies are highly visible and attract top talent.  
Executives at these organizations are regularly sought after to run other organizations.  Thus, this 
variable serves as a proxy for human capital with rega ds to an actor’s credibility in the market.   
Education level is calculated using a 5-point scale based on the highest level of education 
completed by the CEO (1=high school, 2=some college, 3=undergraduate degree, 4=graduate 
degree, 5=doctorate).  Elite education is a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 if the CEO attended 
an Ivy League institution or one of the US News andWorld Report top 25 institutions as 
designated in 2011 and 0 otherwise.  These institutions chosen will represent those with national 
recognition for prestige, rather than those with middle-level or regional reputations.  While these 
institutions chosen are different from those from prior research (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992), these 
institutions represent those that contain a higher level of prestige during the sample time period 
identified9.     
 Reputational Capital. For this study, the CEO’s reputation is measured in two ways.  
The first measure is based on a certification contest; whether the CEO was included on 
Institutional Investor magazine’s Best CEOs list, which began identifying top CEOs in 2003.  
Institutional Investor asks buy and sell-side analysts to identify the best executives from the 
companies they follow.  Survey data reflects the opini ns of more than 1,300 analysts from more 
than 550 firms.  Institutional Investor has a circulation of more than 130,000 and its lis  of Best 
CEOs has been reported on by outlets such as CNN and CNBC.  Best CEO, therefore, is a 
dichotomous variable based on whether the CEO has been indicated as a top CEO by 
                                                          
9 Alternative conceptualizations were also analyzed, including using the list of institutions developed by Finkelstein 
(1992) with results being similar.  Results are avail ble from the author upon request. 
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Institutional Investor at any point up to the observation year.  CEOs that have been named a best 
CEO were provided a value of 1, while those not appe ring on the list at any point prior to the 
observation year were coded as 010.
The second measure is the n gative publicity associated with the CEO over the 3 years 
prior to the observation year in major US newspapers.  An independent coder examined all 
newspaper reports across six major US newspapers for each dismissed CEO and coded each 
article mentioning a CEO’s name as either positive/neutral or negative.  Publicity regarding the 
CEO was only coded as negative if the article specifically mentions the CEO and would cast the 
CEO in a negative light (e.g. adversely affect how others view the CEO, not how others view the 
organization).  This measure represents a count of the negative articles regarding the CEO over 
the three years prior to the observation year.  This measure is similar to Milbourn’s (2003) 
construct of CEO reputation with regard to press coverage, and is indicative of a CEO’s 
reputation as bad publicity may alter how stigmatized an executive is due to his or her portrayal 
in the media.  CEOs with greater levels of negative publicity may be more “tainted” or have a 
greater “stain” on their character which may decrease their likelihood of re-employment. 
The six newspapers examined were The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the Houston 
Chronicle.  These newspapers cover different regions of the United States, but also represent 7 of 
the top 10 newspapers in circulation in the United States.   
Social Capital. Total directorships is a count variable based on the cumulative number of 
directorships the executive has occupied at any point in his or her career prior to the observation 
                                                          
10 A second measure of reputation was whether the CEOhad appeared in the Institutional Investor top 5 in a given 
year prior to the observation year, as analysts rank the top 5 CEOs each year.  Results with the alterna ive 
specification were nearly identical and are available from the author upon request. 
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year.  These directorships represent the ties that the executive has developed across a wide 
variety of organizations.  Prior executive employers i  a count variable of all prior employers for 
which the executive has appeared on the company’s proxy statement as a top executive or for 
which the executive has served on the organization’s board of directors as an inside director.  
Finally, Residence in major city represents a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the executive’s 
position as CEO was located in one of the 15 largest m tropolitan statistical areas in the United 
States and 0 otherwise.  The top 15 largest metropolitan areas were chosen as they represent all 
US cities with a population of greater than 2.5 million people11. 
Control Variables 
In order to control for the effects of likelihood of re-employment or whether a dismissed 
executive will re-enter the workforce, several other variables were added.  SEC investigation 
represents a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the CEO’s prior firm underwent an SEC 
investigation in the three years prior to the CEO’s dismissal or if an investigation was announced 
within 3 months of the CEO’s dismissal.  Additionally, the investigation had to be related to the 
tenure of the dismissed CEO.  Current age represents the CEO’s age at the time of the 
observation year.  Older executives may not desire to -enter the workforce or may enter it on a 
temporary basis as a consultant or in some other fashion.  CEO’s prior compensation is the 
CEO’s total compensation in the year in which the ex cutive was dismissed.  Executives who 
make significant earnings may not seek out future employment as their need for earnings is 
lessened by their accumulated wealth.  Alternatively, wealthy dismissed executives may be able 
to “purchase” future executive employment, either by buying publicly traded firms or 
establishing their own new enterprises with their wealth.  Prior ownership represents the 
                                                          
11 Alternative specifications were utilized examining the top 10 and 20 largest metropolitan areas.  A similar pattern 
of results emerged and are available from the author up n request. 
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proportion of ownership the CEO had in the firm from which he or she was dismissed in the 
dismissal year, in order to control for alternative w alth effects.  Firm size represents the size of 
the firm firing the executive and is measured as the natural log of assets in the year of the 
executive’s dismissal.  Executives from larger firms ay find it easier to gain employment at 
smaller firms who wish to enhance their image or legitimacy through the employment of high 
profile executives or who wish to gain access to expertise.  The CEO’s tenure may also impact 
his or her re-employability when searching for a new position.  Long-tenured CEOs may have 
become obsolete for their firms or have too much firm-specific human capital, which is not 
portable to other organizations.  Thus, CEO tenure represents the length of the dismissed CEO’s 
tenure in years at the dismissing firm.  Finally, dismissals often occur due to poor performance, 
which may impact how organizations view the executive when determining whether to re-
employ him or her.  Thus, Prior firm’s performance measures the performance of the firm at 
which the executive served as CEO and is measured using a three year average of industry 
adjusted return on assets (ROA) at the 2-digit SIC level.   
Analysis 
The sample for this study is comprised of executives who underwent a potentially 
traumatizing career event: dismissal.  This sample, however, does not represent a random sample 
of CEOs.  Instead, given that each executive was dismissed from their prior firm, albeit for 
different reasons, it is important to control for the reasons for such dismissal.  Thus, this study 
uses a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Karaevli, 2007, p.696; Zajac & Westphal, 
1996, p. 72) in order to correct for any sample selction error that may exist regarding firm 
characteristics or characteristics surrounding dismis al.  As a first-step, all firms with more than 
1,000 employees in non-banking and finance industries were included in order to determine 
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likelihood of dismissal.  Each observation was a firm-year pairing with the dependent variable 
representing dismissal, where observations with a dismissed CEO coded as 1, and 0 for all 
observations where a CEO was not dismissed.  In order to test the likelihood of dismissal, 
variables relating to CEO power, board monitoring, and other CEO characteristics were 
included.  The results can be found in Appendix A.  The results of this model were used to 
calculate the Inverse Mills ratio, which was included in the second stage of the analysis to test 
the likelihood of re-employment.    
In order to test hypotheses, event history survival an lysis was employed using a Cox 
proportional hazards model.  Survival analysis allows for examining the likelihood of an event to 
occur over time after an initial baseline date is determined.  The initial baseline date for this 
study was the calendar year in which the CEO was dismissed.  In order to determine likelihood 
of re-employment, each record represents an observation calendar year following the dismissal 
year for each CEO, with each CEO having up to 5 years represented in the dataset.  Thus, each 
observation represents an additional year since the dismissal occurred.  Independent variables are 
allowed to vary over time.  Such time varying variables for this study include the CEO’s age in 
the observation year, negative publicity regarding the CEO over the prior 3 years, and the 
executive’s cumulative number of directorships held.  The Cox proportional hazards model 
allows for the calculation of an initial baseline hazard rate and the calculation of subsequent 
hazard rates for the likelihood of re-employment over each observation period (e.g. years since 
dismissal) given the data analyzed.  Each executive drops out of the study at the time in which 
the event (e.g. re-employment) occurs; that is, once the executive is re-employed, no further 
observations relating to that executive are included.  The final analyses for the likelihood of re-
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employment for the 88 subjects resulted in 397 observations, as 10 of the 88 dismissed CEOs 
were rehired by a public company. 
RESULTS 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables included in 
the study.  The rehiring of a dismissed CEO as an executive at a publicly traded company is 
significantly correlated with the size of the dismising firm and prestigious experience obtained 
by the CEO, indicating that CEOs who have worked for large, prestigious firms are significantly 
more likely to gain re-employment following dismissal. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about Here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Tables 6 and 7 provide information relating to the career outcomes of the 88 CEOs 
identified in this study as dismissed.  As seen in Table 6, 10 CEOs were able to overcome 
dismissal and regain a position as an executive at a publicly traded firm, with 8 of these 
assuming the role of CEO again during the sample period.  All 10 dismissed CEOs who regained 
employment did so within the calendar year following their dismissal.  Table 7 shows that on 
average, it took CEOs who regained the CEO role 1.5 years before they were re-appointed to the 
position.  Additionally, 14 CEOs were hired as CEOs of private companies, positions which took 
on average 2.07 years to obtain following dismissal.  Out of the 88 CEOs identified, 60 went on 
to assume a new position at some point during the five year sample window.  19 of these 
individuals accepted positions in other fields (e.g. private equity, venture capital) and 14 were 
classified as self-employed.  Table 7 notes that on average executives were rehired 1.54 years 
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after their dismissal.  This data suggests that executives are likely to overcome the stigmatization 
of dismissal shortly after it occurs to regain employment or not at all. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about Here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Table 6 also identifies interesting information regarding reasons for dismissal and 
likelihood of re-employment.  In total, 39 CEOs were classified as dismissed due to performance 
related reasons, 15 for violations of fiduciary duty, and 3 for personal conduct violations.  No 
classification was identified for 31 of the 88 subjects.  While five of the CEOs who regained a 
position as a public executive were dismissed with discussion of performance problems, none of 
the 18 CEOs dismissed for violations of fiduciary duty or personal conduct violations were re-
employed as executives at publicly traded corporatins following their dismissal.  In fact, only 
10 of these 18 individuals regained any employment in the five years following dismissal, 
compared to 50 of the 70 individuals dismissed for other reasons or performance related 
problems.  This descriptive data suggests that it is more difficult to overcome violation of 
fiduciary duty or personal conduct violations than dismissal for other reasons.  
Table 8 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazards model with the dependent 
variable representing the rehiring of the CEO as a public company executive in the observation 
year.  Model 1 presents only control variables, while Model 2 incorporates the inverse Mills ratio 
as calculated in the first stage of the selection mdel.   Model 3 includes all main effects for 
hypothesis testing.  Models 4 through 26 in Tables 8 and 9 present the results of interaction tests 
done in order to analyze how the circumstances surrounding a CEO’s dismissal are moderated by 
the executive’s capital in order to alter the likelhood of re-employment. 
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----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 8, 9a, 9b, and 9c about Here 
----------------------------------------------- 
As seen in Model 1, an SEC investigation related to the CEO’s tenure at the dismissing 
firm significantly decreases the likelihood of obtaining an executive position at a publicly traded 
company.  Dismissed CEOs from larger firms, however, are significantly more likely to obtain 
an executive position.  Model 3 presents the results of he analysis for hypothesis testing.  
Hypothesis 34 predicts that executives dismissed for performance related reasons will be less 
likely to gain re-employment.  Results, however, fail to provide support for this hypothesis.  
Hypotheses 35 and 36 predict that executives dismissed for violations of fiduciary duty and 
personal conduct violations will be less likely to regain employment in a publicly traded 
company.  Both fiduciary violation (p ≤ 0.001) and personal conduct violation (p ≤ 0.001) are 
significant, providing strong support for both Hypotheses 35 and 36.  These results suggest that it 
is significantly more difficult to regain employment following violations of fiduciary duty and 
personal conduct than for dismissal for other reasons.  Hypothesis 37 argues that circumstances 
of dismissal relating to performance and personal conduct violations will have a lesser effect 
than violation of fiduciary duty on likelihood of re-employment.  Results indicate that 
performance dismissal does not significantly alter th  likelihood of re-employment, especially in 
comparison to violations of fiduciary duty; however, personal conduct violations and violations 
of fiduciary duty appear to affect the likelihood of re-employment in near equal fashions, 
providing only partial support for Hypothesis 37.  These results are consistent with the statistics 
on re-employment in Table 6, which show a much greate  likelihood of re-employment for 
executives dismissed for performance or other reasons than for those dismissed for violations of 
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fiduciary duty or personal conduct violations.  Taken together, these results suggest that 
dismissal for violations of fiduciary duty or related to personal conduct serve as stigmatizing 
events in the career of executives, more so than performance related dismissal. 
Hypotheses 38 through 41 examine an executive’s human and reputational capital on the 
likelihood of dismissal.  Among these, results provide significant support for both prestige 
experience (p ≤ 0.001) and Best CEO (p ≤ 0.01) with regard to increasing the likelihood of 
regaining employment as an executive in a publicly traded firm.  Additionally, greater negative 
publicity regarding the CEO significantly reduces the likelihood of executive re-employment (p 
≤ 0.05).  These results provide support for Hypotheses 38 and 41, while failing to provide 
support for Hypotheses 39 and 40.  Taken together, se results suggest that experience in 
prestigious organizations and earning a reputation from analysts enhances career outcomes 
following dismissal and reduces the effects of the stigmatization of dismissal.  These results also 
provide support for the notion that being certified as a “Best CEO” enhances the attractiveness of 
a dismissed CEO in the labor market following dismissal.  Alternatively, negative publicity 
negatively impacts a dismissed CEO’s reputation, such that greater publicity that portrays the 
CEO poorly and reduces the likelihood of re-employment.  These last two results provide 
significant evidence that a CEO’s reputation affects his or her likelihood of re-employment. 
Hypotheses 42 through 44 examine the impact of CEO social capital on the likelihood of 
re-employment.  Among these hypotheses, only Residence in major city significantly impacts the 
likelihood of re-employment (p ≤ 0.05), such that CEOs whose firms were located in larger cities 
have a greater chance of re-employment.  This result may indicate that dismissed CEOs gain jobs 
when living in major cities due to a larger social network.  Alternatively, however, major cities 
may offer a greater number of potential positions that are available for the executive to select 
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from and with whom are willing to hire the executive.  In total, Hypothesis 44 is supported, 
while no support is obtained for Hypotheses 42 and 43.  
As noted above, interaction tests were performed in order to determine whether human, 
reputational, and social capital could buffer executives from dismissal based on the 
circumstances surrounding the dismissal.  Following Aiken and West (1991), continuous 
variables were mean-centered prior to their inclusion in the interaction terms.  Each interaction 
term was entered individually in order to test the impact each interaction has on the likelihood of 
dismissal.  Models 4 through 11 test Hypotheses 45 through 51, which argue that an executive’s 
human, reputational, and social capital will reduce the effects of performance related dismissals 
on the likelihood of executive re-employment.  Among these variables, prestige experience (p ≤ 
0.001), elite education (p ≤ 0.001), Best CEO (p ≤ 0.05), negative publicity (p ≤ 0.05), prior 
executive employers (p ≤ 0.05), and Residence in major city (p ≤ 0.05) all impact the likelihood 
of re-employment in a publicly traded firm as an executive when interacted with performance 
related dismissal.  These results provide support for Hypotheses 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 51.  In 
order to better understand these relationships, Figures 7-12 provide descriptive information 
regarding executives appearing in these cases.   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 7-12 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 As seen in Figure 7, more executives with prestige experience were able to obtain re-
employment than those without, regardless of whether the dismissal was performance related.  
Additionally, Figure 8 shows that more executives rceived re-employment when performance 
was the reason for dismissal if they did not have an lite education; however, elite education was 
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beneficial for more executives when dismissal was performance related.  Figure 9 provides 
descriptive evidence that winning a Best CEO award helps more when performance was not the 
reason for dismissal, but did not help the one individual who was dismissed due to performance 
concerns.  The effects of negative publicity and performance related dismissals have a different 
effect.  Above average negative publicity appears to descriptively help more CEOs obtain re-
employment regardless of whether the dismissal was performance related, as seen in Figure 10.  
In Figure 11, executives with more prior employers in an executive position did not receive a 
position when they had the most prior jobs (2) than when others had fewer jobs and dismissal 
was not performance related.  However, having more p sitions did assist in regaining 
employment for some executives when dismissal was performance related.  This may be an 
indication that previous employers help when dismisal occurs for performance related reasons.  
Finally, Figure 12 shows that a higher percentage of executives in non-major cities received re-
employment when dismissal was not performance related than those in major cities, while 
executives fired for performance related issues were equally likely, in this sample, to gain re-
employment whether they resided in a major metropolitan area or not. 
 Hypotheses 52 through 58 predict that human, reputational, and social capital would 
buffer an executive from the harmful effects of dismi sal due to violation of fiduciary duty.  As 
seen in models 12 through 19, education level (p ≤ 0.001), Best CEO (p ≤ 0.001), negative 
publicity (p ≤ 0.001), prior executive employers (p ≤ 0.001), and residence in major city (p ≤ 
0.001) all interact with violations of fiduciary duty significantly to impact likelihood of re-
employment.  These findings support Hypotheses 53, 5 , 57, and 58.  Given that no executives 
dismissed for violation of fiduciary duty regained mployment, it is likely that fiduciary 
violations moderated the impact that human, reputation l, and social capital have on the 
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likelihood of executive re-employment.  In order to better understand these relationships, Figures 
13-17 provide descriptive information regarding executives appearing in these cases.     
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 13-17 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Figure 13 provides information on the outcomes of dismissed executives who were 
dismissed for violation of fiduciary duty and their ducation level.  As noted in the figure, no 
executives who were dismissed for fiduciary duty violations received new positions, regardless 
of education level, while only CEOs who had undergraduate and graduate degrees received new 
positions when fiduciary duties were not violated.  With regards to CEO reputation and 
outcomes for dismissed CEOs, again no CEOs dismissed for violation of fiduciary duty were 
rehired; however, a higher percentage of CEOs winning a best CEO award were rehired when 
fiduciary duties were not violated.  These results, however, must be examined with extreme 
caution, as only two cases were identified where CEOs who received a best CEO award were 
dismissed without violating fiduciary duties.  Figure 15 illustrates that when fiduciary duties 
were not violated, a higher percentage of CEOs were rehired when there was more negative 
publicity about the CEO (e.g. negative publicity was above the average).  These result statistics 
run counter to the main effects of negative publicity on the likelihood of firing.  Statistics in 
Figure 16 show that a greater percentage of CEOs were rehired when they did not violate 
fiduciary duty and they had previously served in executive positions for other firms.  These 
results provide limited support for the notion that a greater number of executive positions 
enhance an executive’s chance of rehiring, but onlywhen fiduciary duties are not violated.  
Finally, Figure 17 statistics show that residence in a major city impacts a CEO’s chance of being 
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rehired only when fiduciary duties are not violated.  In sum, Figures 13-17 provide some 
evidence on what may buffer executives from the stigmatization of dismissal; however, these 
statistics also clearly illustrate that the sample CEOs who were dismissed for violation of 
fiduciary duty faced severe consequences in the labor market, regardless of their level of human, 
reputational, and social capital; that is, violation of fiduciary duty limits the impact that executive 
capital have on regaining employment. 
 Hypotheses 59 through 66 predict that human, reputational, and social capital will 
moderate the relationship between personal conduct violations and likelihood of re-employment, 
such that executives with greater levels of accumulated capital will be more likely to regain 
employment.  Due to only three executives classified as having been dismissed for personal 
conduct violations, and a lack of variation in these xecutives’ traits, models could only be 
analyzed to test Hypotheses 59, 60, 63, 64, and 65.  None of the tested interactions were 
significant at conventional levels.  These results fail to provide support for Hypotheses 59 
through 65.   
Overall, the results suggest that the circumstances of dismissal strongly impact the 
likelihood of executive re-employment, such that committing violations relating to fiduciary duty 
and personal conduct significantly reduce the likelihood of re-employment.  At the same time, 
gaining human, reputational, and social capital can also reduce the harmful effects of dismissal 
and assist dismissed CEOs in regaining re-employment as an executive of a publicly traded 
company.  The results of the interaction effects suggest that dismissal due to violations of 
fiduciary duty reduce the effects of executive capital on the ability to regain executive 
employment.  Additionally, executive’s human and reputational capital, in particular, are likely 
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to assist executives who are fired for reasons other than fiduciary duty or personal conduct 
violations more so than executives fired for such reasons. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 In order to test the robustness of the results report d, additional analyses were conducted 
in order to examine the likelihood of re-employment using alternative specifications of the 
dependent variable.  The first alternative dependent variable examined is Rehired as Public 
CEO, defined as whether or not the dismissed CEO appears as a publicly traded firm’s CEO in a 
given observation year.  This variable represents a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
dismissed executive appears as a publicly traded firm’s CEO in the observation year and 0 
otherwise.  Tables 10 and 11 display the results of he analyses conducted using this dependent 
variable.  As seen in Model 3, executives dismissed for reasons of fiduciary violation (p ≤ 0.001) 
or personal conduct violation (p ≤ 0.001) are significantly less likely to regain a position as a 
CEO of a publicly traded firm, consistent with result  reported earlier.  Additionally, prestige 
experience significantly enhances the likelihood of an executive regaining employment as a 
public company CEO (p ≤ 0.05).  Finally, executives with greater social capital in the form of 
more prior executive positions (p ≤ 0.05) and residence in a major city (p ≤ 0.01) are more likely 
to gain re-employment as a CEO of a publicly traded firm.  These results are similar to the 
results reported in Table 8, with several differences.  First, negative publicity is only marginally 
significant (p ≤ 0.10) with regards to decreasing the likelihood of regaining employment as a 
CEO.  Additionally, the Best CEO award does not significantly impact the likelihood of 
employment as a public company CEO.  Finally, prior executive employers significantly impacts 
the likelihood of regaining employment as a CEO, but not as an executive in a publicly traded 
firm.  These results suggest that many of the same f ctors affect re-employment as a CEO that 
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affect a dismissed executive’s re-employment as an executive; however, some factors alter the 
likelihood as well. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 10, 11a, 11b, and 11c about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Table 11 presents the results of the interaction tests using the alternative dependent 
variable.  With regards to interactions between executive capital and performance related 
dismissal, results find significant interactions with prestige experience (p ≤ 0.001), elite 
education (p ≤ 0.001), negative publicity (p ≤ 0. 01), total directorships (p ≤ 0.01), prior 
executive employers (p ≤ 0.001), and residence in major city (p ≤ 0.001). Figures 18 through 23 
provide statistics on career outcomes for CEOs who ere and were not dismissed for 
performance reasons, as well as their prestige experi nc , education, negative publicity, 
directorships, prior employers, and residence in major city.  In particular, it is interesting to note 
that regardless of performance related reasons for dismissal, more executives with prestige 
experience gained re-employment; however, more executiv s were also rehired as a CEO when 
their dismissal was related to performance.  Additionally, more executives, and a higher 
percentage, were re-employed as a public CEO when dismissed for reasons not relating to 
performance and when they had received an elite education.  Finally, executives in the sample 
who reside in a major city and were dismissed for performance related reasons were more likely 
to regain employment as a CEO than executives not in a major city or not fired for performance 
related reasons. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 18-23 about here 
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 With regard to violations of fiduciary duty, significant interactions were identified with 
education level (p ≤ 0.01), negative publicity (p ≤ 0.001), prior executive employers (p ≤ 0.001), 
and residence in major city (p ≤ 0.001).  Figures 24 through 27 provide statistics on the 
outcomes for executives in these conditions.  As noted earlier, no executives who were dismissed 
for fiduciary violations were rehired. Executives in the sample who did not violate fiduciary 
duties were more likely to gain re-employment as a CEO when they had greater levels of 
education, above average negative publicity, and resi ed in a major city.  Finally, no interactions 
between personal conduct violations and executive capital reached conventional significance. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 24-27 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 The final alternate dependent variable examined in this study is Rehired as Executive, 
defined as whether the dismissed executive regained employment as an executive at any firm, 
public or private, in the given observation year.  This variable includes all executives who 
regained employment at publicly traded firms and appe ring on proxy statements.  However, all 
executives who were identified as gaining positions at the Vice President level or above at any 
private company were also included as having gained ex cutive re-employment.  This level was 
chosen as private companies do not have to report thei  top executives in the same fashion as 
public companies.  Tables 12 and 13 present the results of the analyses.  As seen in Model 3 in 
Table 12, the likelihood of re-employment as any executive, in a public or private firm, is 
significantly affected by only whether the dismissed executive had been named Best CEO (p ≤ 
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0.05).  These results suggest that circumstances of di missal and executive capital most strongly 
affect the re-employment of executives in publicly traded firms, rather than in private firms. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 12 and 13 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Additionally, Models 4 through 26 present the results of tests of interactions between 
circumstances of dismissal and executive capital on the likelihood of re-employment as any 
executive.  Results regarding performance related dismissals suggest that education level (p ≤ 
0.05) and elite education (p ≤ 0.05) both significantly impact the likelihood of regaining 
employment as an executive.  Figures 28 and 29 show t e career outcomes of sample CEOs by 
differing values of the capital variables based on the reasons for dismissal.  Within the sample, 
Figure 28 identifies that a greater percentage of executives with graduate degrees received re-
employment when dismissal was not performance related, while a greater percentage of 
executives regained employment when dismissal was performance related when only having 
received an undergraduate degree.  Additionally, Figure 29 illustrates that within sample 
executives’ elite education helped more executives regain employment as any executive when 
dismissal was not performance related; however, more executives regained employment without 
elite education when dismissal was performance related. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 28 and 29 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Results regarding interactions between executive capital and fiduciary violations present 
a different picture regarding likelihood of re-employment as any executive.  Prestige experience, 
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Best CEO, and negative publicity all significantly alter the likelihood of re-employment. Figures 
30, 31, and 32 utilize sample outcomes for dismissed executives across the ranges of each of 
these interaction variables.  Figure 30 provides evidence that for sample executives, re-
employment was more likely when executives were not dismissed for violations of fiduciary 
duty with the most likely scenario being re-employment when dismissal was not related to 
violation of fiduciary duty and the executive had prestigious experience.  Alternatively, for 
sample CEOs, more CEOs dismissed for violation of fiduciary duty were rehired as any 
executive when they did not have prestigious experience than when they did.   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 30-32 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Finally, interaction tests were conducted between dismissals for personal conduct 
violations and executive capital, finding significant relationships with prestige experience (p ≤ 
0.001), education level (p ≤ 0.001), and prior executive employers (p ≤ 0.001). Figures 33 
through 35 provide outcomes for sample CEOs in eachof t ese instances.  For instance, Figure 
35 provides evidence that for sample CEOs, executives were most likely to be rehired when 
personal conduct violations were not committed; however, for CEOs not dismissed for personal 
conduct violations, a greater percentage of CEOs were rehired as the number of prior executive 
employers increased.  Alternatively, only one CEO who committed a personal conduct violation 
was rehired, and that executive had no prior executive employers. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 33-35 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
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 The results of the sensitivity analyses provide support for the initial findings regarding 
how circumstances of dismissal and executive capital impact the likelihood of executive re-
employment following dismissal.  Additionally, these analyses provide strong evidence that the 
circumstances of dismissal and an executive’s capital most strongly drive the impact of dismissal 
on re-employment when examining career outcomes of CEOs with regards to publicly traded 
firms.  In particular, the reasons for dismissal only affect the likelihood of executive re-
employment at publicly traded firms, but have a signif cantly less affect when examining re-
employment at public or private firms, suggesting that norms of legitimacy prevent publicly 
traded firms from hiring executives dismissed for violations relating to fiduciary duty or personal 
conduct.  Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that circumstances of dismissal 
and executive capital alter the likelihood of executive re-employment, but that such factors 
matter most in the labor market for executive talent at publicly traded firms. 
DISCUSSION 
 CEO dismissal is an increasingly occurring phenomenon with significant consequences 
for the firm choosing to dismiss a CEO and the CEO him or herself.  While great attention has 
been focused on how firms go through succession processes and choose successors following 
dismissal, only a small and disparate stream of research has examined what happens to CEOs 
after such a fall from grace.  Prior studies have noted that executives are unlikely to gain re-
employment following bankruptcy (Gilson, 1989) or dismissal (Ward et al., 1995), indicating 
that negative events in a CEO’s career can stigmatize the CEO.  Such stigmatization can prevent 
organizations from wanting to associate with the excutive in the future due to norms of 
legitimacy and pressure from economic arbiters.  However, among the executives studied by 
these authors, some executives do manage to recover and regain employment in an executive 
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capacity.  To date, however, research has not empirically examined how such executives are able 
to overcome stigmatization to regain employment with publicly traded firms.  This study makes 
several interesting and important contributions to the literature on stigmatization of executives 
following harmful career events by bringing together the literature on executive stigmatization 
and research on executive’s career responses to dismissal. 
 First, this study builds upon prior theoretical work (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008) regarding 
executive stigmatization following career failures to illustrate how dismissal can stigmatize an 
executive’s career.  Dismissal reduces the likelihood that firms will choose to associate with 
executives in the future due to pressure from economic arbiters and norms of legitimacy for 
publicly traded firms.  Further, this study builds upon this theory to predict that the 
circumstances surrounding an executive’s dismissal will contribute to the degree of 
stigmatization associated with the CEO.  While prior studies find how events surrounding 
dismissal impact likelihood of re-employment (e.g., Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Ward et al., 1995), 
such studies have not developed rigorous theoretical models as to why dismissal should result in 
such outcomes.  In particular, this study argues that CEOs dismissed for reasons relating to the 
violation of fiduciary duty will undergo the greates  degree of stigmatization, as violations of 
fiduciary duty are representative of an executive’s willingness to deceive organizational 
stakeholders or act opportunistically at the expense of shareholders.  Furthermore, the theoretical 
foundations of this study provide evidence that both performance related dismissals and personal 
conduct violations should provide some degree of stigmatization regarding an executive 
following dismissal, as both reasons for dismissal provide negative information regarding the 
executive’s capabilities and / or character that may be difficult to overcome.   
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 Second, this study extends research on overcoming career failures by examining how 
executive human, reputational, and social capital can assist dismissed CEOs in regaining 
employment as executives in publicly traded firms.  In particular, building on Wiesenfeld and 
colleagues (2008), this study argues that greater lev ls of not only social capital, but also human 
and reputational capital should signal CEO capabilities following dismissal, such that greater 
levels of accumulated capital should assist dismissed CEOs in regaining employment.  This 
study extends the research on the career outcomes of dismissed executives by going beyond 
examining whether executives were rehired based on why dismissal occurred to examine the 
characteristics of executives who regained employment.  This theoretical step is important in 
order to understand how executives can overcome stigma zation following dismissal in order to 
re-enter the workforce as an executive.  While the circumstances of dismissal may provide 
negative cues about capabilities and character, an executive’s accumulated capital may provide 
positive signals about the executive’s capability (e.g. human and reputational capital) and 
character (e.g. social capital). 
Third, this study tracks 88 executives dismissed in 2005 or 2006 and examines their 
likelihood of re-employment as an executive at a publicly traded organization each year for five 
years following dismissal.  Consistent with prior studies, only ten of the 88 executives regain 
employment as executives at publicly traded firms; however, eight of the ten dismissed 
executives regain employment as a CEO at such firms.  Results of the analyses conducted 
provide strong support for the notion that circumstances of dismissal stigmatize executives, as 
CEOs dismissed for violations of fiduciary duty or personal conduct violations are significantly 
less likely to be re-employed as executives in publicly traded firms than executives dismissed for 
other reasons or performance related concerns.  In particular, none of the 18 executives in this 
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study’s dataset who were dismissed for personal conduct violations or violations of fiduciary 
duty regained employment as an executive in a publicly traded firm within 5 years of dismissal. 
These results are consistent with the concept of ‘settling up’, in that the market disciplines 
executives in the future who act opportunistically in their prior positions. 
While circumstances of dismissal negatively impact the likelihood of re-employment, an 
executive’s human, reputational and social capital each positively impact the likelihood of re-
employment.  Wiesenfeld and colleagues (2008) argue that norms of legitimacy and pressure 
from outside forces prevent publicly traded organiztions from hiring stigmatized executives.  
However, results of this study provide evidence that executive capital can help organizations 
overcome such pressure in order to rehire dismissed ex cutives under certain circumstances.  For 
instance, prestigious experience, in the form of having worked as an executive at a Fortune 500 
company, increases the likelihood of re-employment following dismissal.  Prestigious experience 
serves as a signal of the executive’s capabilities, as prestigious organizations have strong training 
for executives and experience as an executive serve as the firm’s endorsement of the 
individual’s capabilities.  Additionally, an executive having won an award for “Best CEO” as 
voted on by analysts significantly increases the lik lihood of re-employment.  Alternatively, 
executives with greater levels of negative publicity are less likely to regain employment as an 
executive.  Both measures indicate that as a positive reputation (or less negative reputation) is 
developed, executives can utilize reputational capital as a signal of capabilities to others in the 
market.  Finally, executive re-employment is more lik ly when the executive’s prior position as a 
CEO was located in one of the 15 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.  An executive’s 
location is important as many social networks develop geographically through board interlocks 
and community involvement.  Residence in a major city may expand a dismissed CEO’s network 
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through this community involvement, which develops greater friendships with other members of 
the corporate elite, who may assist the executive in finding re-employment following dismissal. 
Additionally, results based on the additional analyses performed indicate that 
circumstances of dismissal and executive capital impact the likelihood of executive re-
employment more for executives who wish to regain positions in publicly traded firms.  These 
results are significant as they indicate that the pressures facing firms with regards to hiring 
stigmatized executives are significantly greater on publicly traded organizations.  Such 
constraints are likely to be less powerful on private firms who face less pressure from 
stakeholders and third parties with regards to personnel decisions.   
Finally, this study builds on the growing literature regarding executive reputation and 
certification contests to show how an executive’s rputation as a CEO affects his or her career 
outcomes following dismissal.  First, results indicate that the certification of a CEO through 
winning the Institutional Investor magazine’s annual “Best CEO” contest can buffer a dismissed 
executive from the effects of stigmatization following dismissal.  Institutional Investor’s contest 
regarding top executives surveys analysts, who closely follow each firm in an industry and may 
be considered experts on the executives in the firms they follow, to determine who analysts 
believe are the top CEOs in each industry.  Thus, thi  “Best CEO” award represents a 
certification bestowed on a CEO as the top executive in an industry as awarded by a panel of 
industry “experts”.  The results of this study indicate that when CEOs obtain such a certification 
they are more likely to be re-employed following dism ssal.  That is, externally awarded 
certifications signal to the market a CEO’s capabilities as determined by other expert parties and 
this signal reduces the stigmatizing effects of the signal provided by the executive’s dismissal. 
Additionally, this study finds a significant relationship between the negative publicity an 
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executive receives and his or her subsequent career outcomes, such that greater negative 
publicity reduces the likelihood of re-employment.  These results suggest that a negative 
reputation can also signal the market about a CEO, such that firms choose not to associate with 
executives who have negative reputations.  Both of ese findings regarding CEO reputation 
advance the literature on CEO reputation, as they indicate that how external parties collectively 
evaluate and discuss an executive’s capabilities aff ct their likelihood of re-employment. 
Overall, this study is the first to build on the existing literature regarding career outcomes 
of dismissed executives and the effects of stigmatization to empirically test how executives can 
overcome negative career outcomes.  This study provides an important contribution by showing 
how circumstances of dismissal negatively impact the likelihood of re-employment, while 
executive capital can assist in counteracting this process to increase the likelihood of re-
employment. 
Implications for Managers and Future Research 
 These results are not without practical implications for current executives.  First, the 
results regarding violations of fiduciary duty and personal conduct violations have a resounding 
impact on executives.  While CEOs likely know that opportunistically acting may cost them their 
executive positions, executives may be unaware of the long-term career implications of such 
behaviors.  Executives should especially consider th  long-term career consequences when 
engaging in opportunistic behaviors, as short-term gains may be cancelled out due to long-term 
career losses.  Additionally, the results of this study indicate that personal conduct violations, 
such as falsifying resume information, also impact future career consequences of CEOs.  Like 
with violations of fiduciary duty, executives should be acutely aware of the long-term 
consequences associated with committing violations relating to personal conduct. 
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 Additionally, this study can assist CEOs who are dismissed in determining how best to 
find future re-employment.  For instance, dismissed CEOs may be wise to use their reputational 
and human capital, in addition to leveraging social apital, in order to signal their capabilities to 
potential employers.  The findings are important as they provide evidence of capabilities and 
capital that dismissed executives can leverage in order to gain re-employment.  Additionally, the 
results when examining the likelihood of re-employment in a private or public position indicate 
that human, reputational, and social capital do not necessarily affect employment in the same 
manner that such capital affects employment at onlypublicly traded firms.  These findings can 
provide evidence to managers that while dismissal may limit their ability to regain employment 
as an executive at a publicly traded firm; other options exist, including executive positions at 
private firms. 
 Future research can build upon this study to continue to examine the consequences of 
executive dismissal on the career outcomes of executiv s.  First, future research can examine 
additional characteristics of dismissed executives n order to determine their likelihood of re-
employment.  Such characteristics may include industry-specific human and social capital that is 
developed or individual characteristics of executives that may drive them to find new 
employment in order to personally overcome the distres  associated with dismissal.  Second, 
future research could examine other measures of social capital that may enhance the likelihood 
of re-employment.  For instance, social network studies have looked at indications of capital 
including network centrality, betweenness, and embeddedness, which may impact an executive’s 
ability to regain executive employment.  Using alternative measures of social capital within an 
executive’s firm and between other firms may generate additional insights with regards to how 
social capital can buffer executives from stigma. 
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 A third avenue for future research would be to examine how executives perform at 
positions following re-employment.  Executives who perform well following dismissal may be 
an indication that executives have learned from past mi takes and this learning allows for better 
success in the future.  Alternatively, if re-employed executives fail to perform well in new 
positions, results may indicate that firms that fail to rehire dismissed executives are making wise 
decisions.  Such results may indicate that executives have not learned from past mistakes or 
adapted to new environments and the capabilities and c pital accumulated by executives may not 
help organizations succeed in the future.  If such results are obtained, it may be a strong 
indication of why few dismissed executives gain re-employment in an executive capacity. 
Limitations 
Despite the findings of this paper, it is not without its limitations.  First, the sample size is 
still relatively small with only 88 subjects and 397 firm-year observations.  The relatively low 
sample size may fail to identify significant result and results in interaction effects being difficult 
to interpret.  Additionally, only 10 subjects regain employment in publicly traded organizations.  
Future research should continue to track the career outcomes of dismissed executives to identify 
how executives are able to recover from the stigma of dismissal.  A greater sample size may 
allow for better generalizability across firms and time and identify more significant results.  
Second, this study is limited to only United States ba ed firms.  The career outcomes for 
dismissed executives in other countries may be evenmore limited, especially if circumstances 
surrounding dismissal are due to stigmatizing events such as violation of fiduciary duty or 
personal conduct violations.  Future research should examine how the process of ‘settling up’ 
varies among nations.  Differing national characteris ics may alter how such violations impact 
perceptions of executive character and capabilities. 
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 Third, each executive who regained employment in a publicly traded organization did so 
within the calendar year following their dismissal.  Results using survival analysis thus may be 
skewed, as the baseline hazard rate does not change across time due to the lack of executives 
regaining employment over time.  As the sample sizefor future studies is increased, the baseline 
hazard rate may be affected over time. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, this study provides evidence that dismissal erves as a stigmatizing event in the 
career of executives.  Ten of 88 subjects identified as dismissed CEOs regained executive 
positions, and on average, positions were obtained within 1 calendar year of dismissal.  
Furthermore, executives dismissed for violations of fiduciary duty or personal conduct suffered 
the greatest degree of stigmatization, as they weremost unlikely to regain future employment.  
Despite the negative impact of circumstances of dismis al, this study also illustrates how 
executive human, reputational, and social capital can help executives overcome the harmful 
effects of stigmatization to regain employment as an executive at a publicly traded organization.  
These results can better help executives understand how to overcome the negative effects of 
dismissal. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
A MODEL OF EXECUTIVE CAPITAL AND ALTERNATIVE CEO CA NDIDATES ON 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXECUTIVE DISMISSAL 
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FIGURE 2 
 
PLOT OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRM ROA AND CEO CO MPENSATION 
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF DISMISSAL 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
PLOT OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRM ROA AND NEGATI VE PUBLICITY 
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF DISMISSAL 
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FIGURE 4 
PLOT OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRM ROA AND FIRM L OCATED IN 
MAJOR CITY ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF DISMISSAL 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
PLOT OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TOBIN’S Q AND PREST IGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF DISMISSAL 
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FIGURE 6 
 
A MODEL FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXECUTIVE RE-EMPLOYME NT AFTER 
DISMISSAL AS CEO 
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FIGURE 7 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND PRESTIGIOUS EXPER IENCE 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Prestigious 
Experience 
No 
0 / 24 
(0%) 
1 / 17 
(5.88%) 
Yes 
4 / 25 
(16.00%) 
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(22.72%) 
 
FIGURE 8 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND ELITE EDUCATION 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Elite 
Education 
No 
1 / 33 
(3.03%) 
4 / 26 
(15.38%) 
Yes 
3 / 16 
(18.75%) 
0 / 13 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 9 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND BEST CEO AWARD 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Best CEO 
No 
3 / 47 
(6.38%) 
6 / 38 
(15.78%) 
Yes 
1 / 2 
(50.00%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
 
FIGURE 10 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND NEGATIVE PUBLICIT Y 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Negative 
Publicity 
Below 
Average 
1 / 38 
(2.63%) 
3 / 34 
(8.82%) 
Above 
Average 
3 / 11 
(27.27%) 
2 / 5 
(40%) 
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FIGURE 11 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND NUMBER OF EXECUTI VE 
EMPLOYERS 
 
  Executive Employers 
  0 1 2 
Performance 
Dismissal 
No 
3 / 41 
(7.32%) 
1 / 6 
(16.67%) 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
Yes 
4 / 31 
(12.90%) 
1 / 7 
(14.29%) 
1 / 1 
(100%) 
 
FIGURE 12 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND RESIDENCE IN MAJO R 
METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Residence in 
Major City 
No 
2 / 20 
(10%) 
2 / 13 
(15.38%) 
Yes 
2 / 29 
(6.90%) 
4 / 26 
(15.38%) 
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FIGURE 13 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND EDUCATION L EVEL 
 
  Education Level 
  High School Some College Undergrad Graduate Doctorate 
Fiduciary 
Violation 
No 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
4 / 26 
(15.38%) 
6 / 44 
(13.64%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
Yes 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
0 / 7 
(0%) 
0 / 8 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
 
FIGURE 14 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN 
VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BEST CEO 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Best CEO 
No 
9 / 71 
(12.68%) 
0 / 14 
(0%) 
Yes 
1 / 2 
(50%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 15 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN 
VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NEGATIVE PUBLICITY 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Negative 
Publicity 
Below 
Average 
5 / 62 
(8.06%) 
0 / 10 
(0%) 
Above 
Average 
5 / 11 
(45.45%) 
0 / 5 
(0%) 
 
FIGURE 16 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN 
VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE  EMPLOYERS 
 
  Executive Employers 
  0 1 2 
Fiduciary 
Violation 
No 
7 / 60 
(11.67%) 
2 / 10 
(20%) 
1 / 3 
(33.33%) 
Yes 
0 / 12 
(0%) 
0 / 3 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 17 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR I NTERACTION 
BETWEEN VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND RESIDENCE I N MAJOR CITY 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Residence in 
Major City 
No 
4 / 29 
(13.79%) 
0 / 4 
(0%) 
Yes 
6 / 44 
(13.63%) 
0 / 11 
(0%) 
 
FIGURE 18 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERAC TION BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND PRESTIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Prestigious 
Experience 
No 
0 / 24 
(0%) 
1 / 17 
(5.88%) 
Yes 
3 / 25 
(12.00%) 
4 / 22 
(18.18%) 
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FIGURE 19 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERAC TION BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND ELITE EDUCATION 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Elite 
Education 
No 
1 / 33 
(3.03%) 
2 / 16 
(12.5%) 
Yes 
5 / 26 
(19.23%) 
0 / 13 
(0%) 
 
FIGURE 20 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERAC TION BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND NEGATIVE PUBLICITY 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Negative 
Publicity 
Below 
Average 
0 / 38 
(0%) 
3 / 11 
(27.27%) 
Above 
Average 
4 / 34 
(11.76%) 
1 / 5 
(20%) 
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FIGURE 21 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND NUMBER OF DIRECTORSHIPS 
 
  Cumulative Number of Directorships 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Performance 
Dismissal 
No 
1 / 27 
(3.70%) 
0 / 9 
(0%) 
2 / 5 
(40%) 
0 / 3 
(0%) 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
Yes 
2 / 12 
(16.67%) 
2 / 9 
(22.22%) 
0 / 9 
(0%) 
1 / 4 
(25%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
 
 
FIGURE 22 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC EXECUTIVE FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE EMPLO YERS 
 
  Executive Employers 
  0 1 2 
Performance 
Dismissal 
No 
2 / 41 
(4.88%) 
1 / 6 
(16.67%) 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
Yes 
3 / 31 
(0%) 
0 / 6 
(0%) 
1 / 2 
(50%) 
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FIGURE 23 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERAC TION BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND RESIDENCE IN MAJOR CITY 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Residence in 
Major City 
No 
1 / 20 
(5%) 
2 / 29 
(6.90%) 
Yes 
1 / 13 
(7.69%) 
4 / 26 
(15.38%) 
 
 
FIGURE 24 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERAC TION BETWEEN 
VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND EDUCATION LEVEL 
 
  Education Level 
  High School Some College Undergrad Graduate Doctorate 
Fiduciary 
Violation 
No 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
3 / 26 
(11.54%) 
5 / 44 
(11.36%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
Yes 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
0 / 7 
(0%) 
0 / 8 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 25 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERACTION BETWEE N VIOLATION 
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NEGATIVE PUBLICITY 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Negative 
Publicity 
Below 
Average 
4 / 62 
(6.45%) 
0 / 10 
(0%) 
Above 
Average 
4 / 11 
(36.36%) 
0 / 5 
(0%) 
 
 
FIGURE 26 
 
STATISTICS FOR AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERACTION BETWEE N VIOLATION 
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE EMPLOYERS  
 
  Executive Employers 
  0 1 2 
Fiduciary 
Violation 
No 
6 / 60 
(10%) 
1 / 10 
(10%) 
1 / 3 
(33.33%) 
Yes 
0 / 12 
(0%) 
0 / 3 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 27 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC CEO FOR INTERAC TION BETWEEN 
VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND RESIDENCE IN MAJOR CITY 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Residence in 
Major City 
No 
2 / 29 
(6.90%) 
0 / 4 
(0%) 
Yes 
6 / 44 
(13.63%) 
0 / 11 
(0%) 
 
 
FIGURE 28 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND EDUCA TION LEVEL 
 
  Education Level 
  High School Some College Undergrad Graduate Doctorate 
Performance 
Dismissal 
No 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
4 / 20 
(20%) 
8 / 27 
(29.63%) 
1 / 1 
(100%) 
Yes 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
8 / 13 
(61.54%) 
7 / 25 
(28%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 29 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN PERFORMANCE DISMISSAL AND ELITE  EDUCATION 
 
  Performance Dismissal 
  No Yes 
Elite 
Education 
No 
6 / 33 
(18.18%) 
11 / 26 
(42.31%) 
Yes 
7 / 16 
(43.75%) 
2 / 13 
(15.38%) 
 
FIGURE 30 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN FIDUCIARY VIOLATION AND PRESTIG E 
EXPERIENCE 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Prestige 
Experience 
No 
8 / 33 
(24.24%) 
3 / 8 
(37.5%) 
Yes 
16 / 40 
(40%) 
1 / 7 
(14.29%) 
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FIGURE 31 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN FIDUCIARY VIOLATION AND BEST CE O 
 
  Fiduciary Violation 
  No Yes 
Best CEO 
No 
49 / 71 
(69.01%) 
4 / 14 
(28.57%) 
Yes 
2 / 2 
(100%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
 
FIGURE 32 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN FIDUCIARY VIOLATION AND BEST CE O 
 
  Fiduciary Violation  
  No Yes 
Negative 
Publicity 
Below 
Average 
17 / 62 
(27.42%) 
2 / 10 
(20%) 
Above 
Average 
7 / 11 
(100%) 
2 / 4 
(50%) 
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FIGURE 33 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN PERSONAL CONDUCT VIOLATION AND PRESTIGE 
EXPERIENCE 
 
  Personal Conduct Violation 
  No Yes 
Prestigious 
Experience 
No 
11 / 40 
(27.5%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
Yes 
16 / 45 
(35.56%) 
1 / 2 
(50%) 
 
FIGURE 34 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN PERSONAL CONDUCT VIOLATION AND PRESTIGE 
EXPERIENCE 
 
  Education Level 
  High School Some College Undergrad Graduate Doctorate 
Personal 
Conduct 
Violation 
No 
0 / 2 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
11 / 31 
(35.48%) 
15 / 51 
(29.41%) 
1 / 1 
(100%) 
Yes 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
1 / 2 
(50%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
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FIGURE 35 
 
STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT AS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXEC UTIVE FOR 
INTERACTION BETWEEN PERSONAL CONDUCT VIOLATION AND NUMBER OF 
EXECUTIVE POSITIONS 
 
  Executive Employers 
  0 1 2 
Personal 
Conduct 
Violation 
No 
21 / 70 
(30%) 
5 / 13 
(38.46%) 
1 / 2 
(50%) 
Yes 
1 / 2 
(50%) 
0 / 0 
(0%) 
0 / 1 
(0%) 
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TABLE 2 
Probit Analysis for Likelihood of CEO Dismissal in a Given Yeara 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Coeff. 
Robust Std. 
Error 
Coeff. 
Robust Std. 
Error 
Coeff. 
Robust Std. 
Error 
Intercept -0.80 (0.70) -1.13 (0.70) -3.69* (1.49) 
Duality -0.40*** (0.09) -0.39*** (0.09) -0.33** (0.11) 
Outside Directors -0.03 (0.69) -0.03 (0.70) 2.52 (1.72) 
Blockholder Ownership 0.35 (0.26) 0.25 (0.28) 0.22 (0.29) 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Firm Size -0.07† (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) 0.01 (0.06) 
CEO Gender 0.07 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.52† (0.31) 
CEO Ownership -0.02† (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.02† (0.01) 
Current Ratio -0.19*** (0.05) -0.18*** (0.05) -0.19*** (0.05) 
       
H17: Firm ROA   -0.83** (0.32) -0.75* (0.34) 
H17: Tobin’s Q   -0.26*** (0.07) -0.28*** (0.07) 
H1: CEO Tenure     -0.01* (0.01) 
H2: Prestige Experience     -0.02 (0.13) 
H3: Prior CEO Experience     0.06 (0.11) 
H4: Education Level     -0.01 (0.04) 
H5: Elite Education      0.21* (0.10) 
H6: CEO Compensation     -0.00** (0.00) 
H7: IIM Top 5 CEO     0.25 (0.16) 
H7: Negative Publicity     0.31* (0.13) 
H8: COO      0.02 (0.10) 
H9: Non –CEO Board Insiders     0.34* (0.17) 
H10: Firm Divisions     -0.04 (0.04) 
H11: Retired CEO on Board     -0.09 (0.11) 
H12: Other Retired CEO on 
Board 
    -0.07 (0.12) 
H13: Industry Concentration     -0.14 (0.11) 
H14: Fortune 500 Firms in 
Industry 
    -0.01 (0.01) 
H15: Directors’ Board 
Memberships 
    -0.00 (0.01) 
H16: Firm’s Geographic 
Location 
    -0.14 (0.10) 
       
-Log Pseudolikelihood 433.93 
50.55*** 
0.08 
0.07 
420.22 
77.93*** 
0.11 
0.10 
399.11 
117.24*** 
0.16 
0.14 
Wald-χ2 
Nagelkerke r2 
Pseudo r2 
Dependent variable is whether a firm dismissed its CEO in a given year or not; n=3648 
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p <0.001, Two-tailed coefficient tests. 
a. Dummy variables for each year were included in the model, but are not reported for sake of parsimony.  No year 
dummies were significant. 
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TABLE 6 
CAREER OUTCOMES FOR THE SAMPLE OF DISMISSED CEOS 
 
  Rehiring Position  
Reason for 
Dismissal 
Public 
Executive 
Public 
CEO 
Private 
Executive 
Private 
CEO 
Self-
Employed 
Other 
Positiona 
No 
Position 
Performance 
Dismissal 
1 
(1.14%) 
5 
(5.68%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
8 
(9.09%) 
5 
(5.68%) 
10 
(11.36%) 
9 
(10.23%) 
Fiduciary 
Violation 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
3 
(3.41%) 
3 
(3.41%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
7 
(7.95%) 
Personal 
Conduct 
Violation 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
Other 
1 
(1.14%) 
3 
(3.41%) 
1 
(1.14%) 
2 
(2.27%) 
5 
(5.68%) 
8 
(9.09%) 
11 
(12.5%) 
Total 
2 
(2.27%) 
8 
(9.09%) 
3 
(3.41%) 
14 
(15.91%) 
14 
(15.91%) 
19 
(21.59%) 
28 
(31.82%) 
a. Other positions accepted include: venture capital/private equity partner, Professor, lawyer, and consultant 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
AVERAGE TIME TO NEW POSITION FOR DISMISSED CEOS 
New  
Position 
Average Years 
to Obtain 
Public Executive 1.00 
Public CEO 1.50 
Private Executive 3.00 
Private CEO 2.07 
Other Position 1.47 
Average Years to Obtain 
Any Position 
1.54 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Selection Model: Antecedents of Dismissal for Study 2 Sample  
 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept  -2.70* (1.27) 
CEO Tenure  -0.00 (0.02) 
CEO Age  0.00 (0.02) 
CEO Compensation  -0.00 0.00 
CEO Ownership  -5.62 (4.78) 
CEO Duality  -0.44 (0.27) 
Independent director proportion  0.73 (0.82) 
Institutional Holdings  -0.07 (0.18) 
Block Ownership  0.06 (0.81) 
Firm ROA  -5.20*** (0.94) 
Firm Tobin’s Q  -0.26 (0.17) 
-2log Likelihood  -292.59 
Chi-square 
 54.31***  
(d.f. = 10) 
Pseudo R2  0.08 
Note:  
a. Dependent variable is whether a firm fired their CEO or not in a given year. 
b. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p <0.001,  two-tailed coefficient tests (N= 1,916). 
 
